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This dissertation consists of three independent chapters that aim to further our 
understanding of the role of information on decision-making. The first chapter 
examines the effect of the introduction of broadband Internet on political 
behavior in the United States. I find that broadband has led to a large increase in 
voter turnout in presidential elections, as well as an increase in the total amount 
donated to political campaigns. Consistent with the hypothesis that Democrats 
have a stronger online presence, I also find a large effect on Democratic vote 
share in presidential elections. Evidence suggests the existence of both direct 
and indirect channels for the broadband effect. In particular, I find that 
broadband availability is associated with greater political knowledge, an 
increase in online (but not offline) donations, and the promotion of liberal 
values. In the second chapter, I examine the implications of a cognitive 
deficiency called “hindsight bias” on two legal standards: negligence and 
probable cause. When the court applies the negligence standard, I find that 
hindsight bias discourages (encourages) preventive measures that reduce the 
likelihood (severity) of an accident (respectively). When the court applies the 
probable cause standard, I show that hindsight bias discourages aggressive 
searches that increase the likelihood of police seizures. I also study the 
effectiveness of counterfactual thinking as a remedy for hindsight bias, and find 
that it is only unambiguously effective under the probable cause standard. In the 
third chapter, co-authored with Rebekka Christopoulou and Dean R. Lillard, we 
study smoking behavior in a model of cultural transmission. We derive 
conditions for the emergence and persistence of the smoking habit, and 
establish novel implications for the relationship between parental and societal 
influences. We then test and confirm the validity of our theory using novel data 
from the United States. 
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Chapter 1
Broadband Internet and Political Behavior:
Evidence from the United States
1.1 Introduction
In 2008, Barack Obama led one of the most successful political campaigns in the history of the United
States. His reliance on the Internet for mobilizing support and raising money has helped him earn
the title of first Internet president. The 2008 presidential campaign took place at a time when
more than half of all Americans were subscribed to broadband Internet. Would Obama’s victory
have been possible ten years earlier, when this technological revolution was not yet underway?1 In
this chapter, I formally investigate the effect of the introduction of broadband Internet on the U.S.
political landscape.
Who did the Internet win over, and how? Even before Obama’s historical campaign, Democrats
used the Internet to attract attention to their cause. Howard Dean gained an early front-runner
status in the 2004 presidential election by winning an “online primary” sponsored by MoveOn.org
(Hindman 2005). The Internet decentralized the flow of information about politics, with the creation
of new forms of political expression (e.g. blogs, Internet forums, social networking). Through
websites, candidates were able to share information about campaign events with volunteers, and help
organize local get-out-the-vote campaigns (Bimber and Davis 2003, Vaccari 2008). By combining
positive and educational online messages, Democrats were also able to fight political disengagement
(e.g. Kaid et al. 2007). These efforts were particularly successful among young college students
with easy access to broadband. As a testament for these dynamics, the 2008 election was marked
by a historically high turnout of the youth, who voted in a 2 to 1 ratio for Barack Obama.2
But while the Internet has facilitated the flow of information about politics, it has also brought
with it an endless stream of entertainment options. Hence in principle, the opportunity cost of
becoming informed could have risen, leading to political disengagement. Furthermore, the relevance
1SNL Kagan only estimates broadband availability starting in 1997, a time at which they estimate broadband to have
reached 0.1% of households. By 1999, this number reaches only 1.5%. See http://tinyurl.com/krng8mg (retrieved on October
20, 2013).
2See Pew and Census reports at http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election/ and
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf (retrieved on November 12, 2013).
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of information for voting behavior is still debated among theorists. For example, in the classical
Downsian (1957) framework, voters base their vote on deeply rooted political views.
The effect of broadband Internet on political participation thus remains a fundamentally empir-
ical question. To study the effect of broadband Internet, I use a panel of four presidential elections
(every four years between 1996 and 2008), and zip code level panels of campaign donations for eight
election cycles (every two years between 1994 and 2008). I include pre-broadband years as a refer-
ence point for the analysis, and end the study in 2008 for data availability reasons. The broadband
measure is the number of Internet Service Providers, which I show is a good proxy for the number
of broadband subscriptions.
The estimation of a broadband effect is complicated by the error in the measurement of broad-
band availability. It is also challenged by the existence of factors that correlate with both broadband
availability and political participation. Using county / zip code fixed effects, I estimate the effect of
the growth in broadband availability on the change in political participation. Since I only rely on
variation from within a county / zip code, each geographic area is allowed to have its own baseline
voting/donating behavior. To deal with the potentially confounding influence of time-varying char-
acteristics, I also use an instrumental variable strategy based on land topography. The identifying
assumption is that topography only affected the change in political participation in the 2000s – rel-
ative to pre-broadband years – through its effect on broadband deployment. I argue that low-lying
areas are more prone to floods and exhibit higher summer temperatures. I then present evidence
that these climate conditions hampered the deployment of broadband infrastructure. For exam-
ple, flood protection required the erection of natural and artificial barriers to protect broadband
facilities, while high temperatures made it necessary to use costly heat-resistant cable material.
To strengthen the validity of the identification strategy, I include state-time dummies as well
as controls for zip code / county time-varying characteristics (e.g. income, population, education).
This accounts for the potentially confounding influence of the electoral environment. I also include
time dummies interacted with demographics that correlate with broadband availability. This allows
areas that initially differ on observable characteristics (e.g. density, racial composition) to follow a
different path in broadband deployment. Finally, I argue that the effect of broadband availability
does not capture the influence of ongoing trends, e.g. through the influence of cable television.
Overall, I find that in presidential elections, broadband Internet has persuaded at least 29 per-
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cent of non-voters to cast a vote, and 10 percent of non-Democrats to switch sides. I compare the
magnitude of these findings to the ones from the literature on persuasion, and find that broadband
Internet has been a particularly persuasive medium of communication. I also estimate broadband
explains 41 percent of the increase in campaign contributions between 1994 and 2008. However,
this total effect on donations masks a great deal of heterogeneity across both donor and recipient
characteristics. Dividing elections into presidential and mid-term cycles, I find that the effect of
broadband is entirely driven by an increase in donations made in non-presidential years. I also find
that in presidential election years, broadband caused a large re-allocation of funds toward Demo-
cratic presidential candidates, and away from House candidates and Political Action Committees.
I then examine the mechanism behind the effect of broadband. I show that individuals living in ar-
eas with more broadband availability increased their consumption of online political news, donated
more online (but not oﬄine), exhibited greater levels of political knowledge, and were more likely
to adhere to liberal values.
The findings on donating behavior indicate that the effect of broadband came from a reduction
in the transaction cost of giving. As for the findings on voting behavior, they suggest that broad-
band has encouraged previously uninformed individuals to cast a vote. An effect of the media on
political participation channeling through political knowledge has previously been documented for
commercial TV (Prat and Strömberg 2005). More broadly, there is extensive theoretical and empir-
ical evidence that information provision helps stimulate turnout (e.g. Matsusaka 1995, Feddersen
and Pesendorfer 1996, Degan and Merlo 2009; Bartels 1996, Lassen 2005, Larcinese 2007, Battaglini
et al. 2010).
Combined with the increase in turnout, the documented favorable vote swing toward Democrats
suggests that the media can polarize individuals who have a preference for like-minded news (Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer 2005, Sunstein 2007).3 The association that I document between broadband
and liberal values helps provide a mechanism for this polarizing effect. My findings suggest that
broadband had an indirect effect on politics, by promoting social values that have been associated
with the platform of the Democratic party. This argument is in the spirit of recent evidence that
3It is possible to generate a demand for like-minded news in both behavioral and rational models of behavior (e.g. Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Empirical evidence supports the existence of such “demand-driven”
bias. For example, both Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find that the ideology of U.S. newspapers
conforms with the partisan composition of the geographic areas they circulate in.
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television has indirectly favored Silvio Berlusconi by promoting a culture of individualism in Italy
(Durante et al. 2013).
In a preliminary and independent study, Larcinese and Miner (2012) also consider the effect
of the Internet on U.S. elections. They instrument for broadband availability using state-specific
right-of-way laws. Larcinese and Miner find a positive effect of broadband on Democratic vote share,
but cannot reject the absence of an effect on either turnout or campaign donations. They also do
not attempt to uncover the mechanism behind the effect of broadband.
A few other contemporaneous studies attempt to disentangle the effect of broadband Internet
on voting behavior in other countries, and find mixed evidence (Miner 2013, Czernich 2012, Falck
et al. 2013, Campante et al. 2013).4 My findings contribute to this literature in a number of
ways. First, I document a robust positive effect of broadband on voter turnout in a well-established
democracy. This effect on turnout lends credence to the idea that the Internet has fostered civic
engagement. Second, I look at the effect of broadband on campaign donations, an important
form of political participation that remains poorly understood (see Ansolabahere et al. 2003).
Third, I suggest channels for the effect of broadband using data on political knowledge, political
news consumption, moral values, and the medium for campaign donations (i.e. online or oﬄine).
Studying the mechanism behind the effect of broadband provides the necessary first step toward an
understanding of why it differs so greatly across institutional contexts.5
My study also proposes a novel identification strategy to assess the effect of non-DSL broadband
technologies. In contrast, the papers mentioned above identify the effect of DSL broadband Internet
on political outcomes, by relying on measures of the distance between key components of the pre-
existing telephony network (households, central office, backbone).6 Since the dominance of DSL
4Miner (2013) studies Malaysian elections and finds that Internet penetration explains a third of the decrease in the incum-
bent party vote share. In an investigation of German elections, Czernich (2012) and Falck et al. (2013) find that broadband
explains more than a third of the decrease in voter turnout in parliamentary elections in a subset of municipalities. Finally,
Campante et al. (2013) find that broadband decreased voter turnout in Italian parliament elections between 1996 and 2008.
But by 2013, this effect faded with the emergence of online grassroots movements. In the political science literature, researchers
have also studied the effect of the Internet on voter turnout, online news consumption, and political attitudes. However, this
evidence is mostly correlational, and has yielded mixed evidence (e.g. Bimber 2001, Tolbert and McNeal 2003, Golde and Nie
2010, Liang and Nordin 2012).
5To my knowledge, the study by Falck et al. (2013) is the only one that attempts to uncover the mechanism behind a
broadband effect. As noted in footnote 4, their study argues for a negative effect of broadband on voter turnout. Using
survey data, they then provide evidence that broadband crowded out television news, and led to a greater consumption of
entertainment news. However, their definition of television news includes both political and non-political news, while their
measure of entertainment is not limited to the online realm.
6The empirical approaches of the papers I have mentioned in this paragraph are all based on the structure of the pre-existing
telephony network, which is only appropriate for understanding the effect of DSL broadband Internet. Czernich (2012) and
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in the broadband market is slowly fading away, the identification strategy that I propose lays the
building blocks for future studies of the effect of the Internet.7 This potential is not limited to
the realm of politics. In fact, numerous studies have argued for an effect of the Internet outside
politics, including market competitiveness (Brown and Goolsbee 2002), international trade (Freund
and Weinhod 2004), cigarette tax revenue (Goolsbee et al. 2010), female labor supply (Dettling
2013), sex crime (Bhuller et al. 2013), and marriage rates (Bellou 2013).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data. Section 1.3 turns
to the identification strategy. Section 1.4 contains the main analysis, along with robustness tests
and placebo regressions. Section 1.5 studies the mechanism behind the documented effect. Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
Data on the availability of broadband Internet comes from the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC). Every June 30th and December 31st between late-1999 and mid-2008, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) were required to report to the FCC all zip codes in which they had at least one
high-speed Internet customer. The FCC defines a high-speed line as one that provides a connection
speed exceeding 200 kb/s in at least one direction (upload or download). This includes Internet
technologies like Cable Modem, DSL, and wireless.8 In the rest of the analysis, I will use inter-
changeably the following expressions: “number of ISPs”, “broadband availability”, and “high-speed
Internet availability”.
The main measure of broadband availability, ISP z,t, is the number of ISPs operating in a zip
code area z at time t.9 The FCC lumps zip codes with 1, 2, or 3 ISPs into one category. I assume
that “2” ISPs – i.e. the middle of the range – operate in each of these geographic areas. I then
Falck et al. (2013) instrument for broadband availability using the distance between a household and the closest central office.
This factor determines whether it is possible to provide ADSL through traditional copper wires. Miner (2013) and Campante
et al. (2013) use the distance between the central office and the backbone of the network as a basis for their instrumental
variables. The underlying logic is that this distance affects the cost of laying out necessary fiber optic cables.
7For instance, the deployment of wireless Internet is more costly in forested areas like New England (Gillett et al. 2004).
The use of terrain attributes is particularly promising given the availability of geological data at fine levels of geographic detail
across the globe.
8Note however that dial-up connections are excluded, given their theoretical transfer speed of 56 kb/s. See footnote 50 for
a discussion of why dial-up Internet is unlikely to have been an important determinant of political behavior.
9I also explore whether results are robust to an alternative measure of broadband availability. I define the extent of broadband
diffusion as the number of ISPs operating in a zip code area weighted by the number of years they have been in the market.
This modification to the raw measure ISP z,t is based on the idea that an ISP that has been operating for longer in an area
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assign a value of “0” ISPs to zip codes where no high-speed line is reported (in a given year).10
Because elections data is only available at the county-level, I also compute a county-level measure
of the number of Internet Service Providers. I define broadband availability in a county as the
population-weighted average of the number of ISPs in the zip codes contained in that county.11
This chapter therefore identifies the effect of the number of ISPs on political outcomes. However,
the number of ISPs is only a measure of broadband availability if it exhibits a relationship with the
share of broadband subscribers in a geographic area, which I refer to as “broadband penetration”.
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest such the existence of such a link, through the effect
of competition among ISPs the price and quality of broadband service (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss
1991; Aron and Burnstein 2003, Crandall et al 2004, Xiao and Orazem 2009).
Using county data from the FCC, I also provide empirical support for the relationship between
broadband availability and penetration. In particular, I examine the relationship between the num-
ber of ISPs and the percentage of broadband households. Unfortunately, the broadband availability
and penetration data series do not overlap; the former data series ends in June 2008, while the
latter starts in December 2008. To maximize the comparability of these data, I compare the 2008
time series for these two variables.
In Table 1.1, I report estimates from regressions of broadband penetration on broadband avail-
ability. These regressions always include data from 2008, but either include or exclude data from
may have achieved greater market penetration. Formally, I construct diffusion in the following way:
diffusionz,t = Σt˜≤t
(
t− t˜
2
)
· ISP_newz,t˜,
where z denotes a zip code area,
(
t, t˜
) ∈ {June 1996, December 1996, ..., t}2 indicate half-years, and ISP_newz,t˜ ≡ ISPz,t˜−1−
ISPz,t˜ denotes the difference in the number of ISPs between time t˜ and time t˜−1. There are three implicit assumptions that go
into the construction of this measure of broadband diffusion. First, the growth in market penetration of an ISP grows linearly
with time. Second, new ISPs start operating halfway through the semester being considered (factor of “2” in the denominator).
Third, entry / exit into a zip code broadband market can be captured through the evolution in the number of ISPs through
time (the FCC data do not report the name of the ISPs included in the zip code-level counts). For all practical purposes, using
this diffusion leads similar broadband effects to the ones obtained in the analysis reported in the body of the chapter (both
qualitatively and quantitatively).
10This does not indicate that there is exactly zero broadband subscriptions. In fact, broadband providers were initially only
required to report their activity in a given state only if they had a minimum of 250 lines. This minimum reporting requirement
was however dropped in December 2004, and this had little effect of this change on zip code level aggregates of the number of
ISPs (c.f. Table 1.15 and Chart 12 in FCC, 2009).
11Formally, the amount of broadband availability in county c at time t is ISP c,t ≡
∑
zc∈c ISPzc,t·pzc∑
zc∈c pzc
, where the subscript
zc indicates a zip code contained within county c, and pzcdenotes the 2000 Census population of that zip code. When zip codes
are not fully contained within counties, I allocate the population of each zip code equally over all counties it is contained in. I
do not limit myself to zip codes that are fully contained in counties, as this would force me to drop a large – and non-random
– sample of counties from the analysis.
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1996 and county dummies. In the first set of regressions, the same high-speed lines are included
under the definition of both broadband penetration and broadband availability (connection speeds
of 200 kb/s in at least one direction). In the second set of regressions, I base broadband penetration
on a more conservative definition, which only includes internet lines with download speeds of at least
768 kb/s.12 This alternative measure became the FCC’s official definition of broadband starting
in December 2008.13 It has since been featured in policy debates, like the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.
In the regressions which utilize data from 1996 and 2008, an additional ISP predicts an increase
in broadband penetration of at least 4.38 percent. Relying only on data from 2008, this correlation
between broadband availability and broadband penetration reduces to at most 3.15 percent. In
all cases, estimates are highly statistically significant, which suggests that broadband availability
is a good proxy for broadband penetration. However, regressions utilizing data from both 1996
and 2008 explain more variation in broadband penetration than those relying solely on 2008 data
(R2 ≥ 0.71 vs. R2 ≤ 0.174, respectively). Therefore, broadband availability is a more appropriate
proxy for broadband penetration in an investigation that relies on within-county variation, rather
than cross-county variation.
To assess the effect of broadband on presidential election outcomes, I match county-level broad-
band data with data on presidential votes. Data on presidential election returns come from the CQ
Press Voting and Elections database. These data, whose time frame extends from 1980 to 2008,
include for each county the number of votes cast and their distribution across candidates. I define
voter turnout as the proportion of the adult voting-age population who cast a ballot.14 I then focus
on vote shares for the two major parties in the U.S. political system, the Democratic party and
the Republican party. The county elections dataset is constructed in a straightforward way. I only
exclude 3 counties for which I do not have election data for all years. This leaves me with 3,105
counties and county-equivalents in the 48 contiguous states.15
12The upstream speed requirement remains 200 kb/s under this alternative definition of broadband.
13See statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280909A2.doc
(retrieved on October 20, 2013).
14An alternative definition of voter turnout is relative to the number of registered voters. The literature has however avoided
using it, for reasons pointed out by Gentzkow (2006) quoting Prysby (1987): “Calculating turnout as a proportion of registered
voters [...] is generally inappropriate in the American context, given the large numbers of people who are eligible to register
but fail to do so. In fact, the available research indicates that most nonvoters are not registered.”
15The U.S. federal government uses the term “county-equivalent” to describe Louisiana parishes; and the independent cities
of the states of Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Nevada that are not a part of any county, nor considered a consolidated
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To understand the effect of broadband on campaign contributions, I combine zip code-level
broadband data with data on campaign contributions from the Federal Elections Commission
(FEC).16 For each monetary donation, the FEC collects data on the characteristics of both contrib-
utors and recipients. These data allow a study of the effect of broadband on campaign donations to
presidential candidates, Congressional candidates, and Political Action Committees (while the vot-
ing data only reflects participation in presidential elections). In the main analysis, I aggregate data
on campaign donations at the zip code / election cycle level. In an ancillary analysis, I investigate
the potentially heterogeneous effect of broadband by constructing separate panels on each donor /
recipient characteristic (e.g. gender of contributor, political party of recipient).
The number and boundaries of zip codes change through time, and some zip codes are dedicated
for military purposes. To avoid artificially assigning zero donations to some zip codes, data on
donations is only included for zip codes for which the US Census reports a population estimate
in 2000. For the 48 contiguous United States, this leaves me with a sample of 27,405 zip codes,
which house 99.1 percent of the U.S. population.17 For each one of those zip codes, I only include
a portion of all donations. This is partly due to data limitations, as only money given by donors
who contributed at least $200 in an election cycle are included (FEC reporting requirement).18 I
also voluntarily only include campaign contributions emanating from individuals not running for
office.19 Overall, this is a small limitation as the donations that remain in the dataset constitute the
bulk of the money that goes toward funding political campaigns (e.g. Ansolabahere et al., 2003).
city–county.
16The Center for Responsive Politics assembles into a single database all forms filed by donors to the FEC. To minimize the
extent of measurement error, I perform some data cleaning on this dataset. First, I delete duplicate transactions, e.g. same
amount, individual, date, and recipient (3.3 percent of transactions in 2008). Second, I cap donations at the legal contribution
limits, which are described in detail in Appendix Table A1 (0.21 percent of transactions in 2008).
17Since 1963, the United States Postal Service (USPS) has organized mail delivery by dividing geographic areas into zip codes.
Keeping with this original intention, the USPS periodically updates the boundaries of zip codes, and new zip codes are added
to the list of existing ones. (e.g. see http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-facts/; retrieved November 29, 2013). I obtain a
classification of zip codes into four “classes” : “Standard,” “Military,” “PO Box” and “Unique”; see http://www.populardata.com
(retrieved on October 20, 2013). The analysis only includes “standard” zip codes, which are likely to refer to primary living
headquarters.
18The majority of individual donations come from donors giving more than $200. This observation is true even
for the 2008 Obama presidential campaign. Despite being celebrated for its reliance on small donor money, Obama
raised only about a quarter of all its funds through donations below the $200 threshold. See ABC News article at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6329217&page=1 (retrieved on October 20, 2013).
19I exclude candidates’ self-financing, the only form of fundraising that is not capped by the FEC (see Appendix Table A1 for
legal limits). This helps prevent generating misleading results due to outliers. I also exclude donations made by Political Action
Committees (PACs), since it is difficult to assign a meaningful measure of broadband availability to them. In particular, their
operations are often spread out through geographic space. It would thus not be reasonable to base the broadband availability
on, say, the zip code or county its headquarters are located in.
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To identify the effect of broadband on political outcomes, I construct two county-level instru-
mental variables based on land altitude using ArcGIS. Data on land elevation is available for each
90-square meter of the globe, but I convert them to county-level means to match them with the
presidential elections and demographics panels described above. In particular, I use data on land
elevation collected in 1996 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Using the land elevation data,
a measure of flow accumulation is also constructed to capture the location of where rainfall water
accumulates.20
To study the mechanism behind the effect of broadband, I merge broadband data with individual-
level data from the Pew Research Center. Over the course of the past two decades, Pew has fielded
numerous surveys on themes related to political behavior and Internet use.21 I include data from Pew
surveys that measure respondents’ political knowledge, moral values, preferred media for political
news (e.g. radio, internet), and medium for campaign donations (i.e. online or oﬄine). I further
limit myself to surveys fielded in 2000 or later, as earlier surveys do not provide detailed data for
where the respondent lives (either county or zip code). Without detailed geographic data, I cannot
match each survey participant with the ISPs measure described above, and therefore cannot identify
the broadband available to them.
1.3 Empirical strategy
1.3.1 The introduction and growth of broadband availability
Market analysis suggests there has been strong demand for broadband connectivity since the early
2000s (Faulhaber 2002). However, technological limitations and cost considerations have made
broadband availability lag behind. At the core, the major impediments to broadband growth are all
related to the structure of cable companies’ networks. Traditional cable networks were only designed
to transmit one-way television signals. In order to provide broadband, cable companies had to make
their networks compatible for two-way data transmission. In practice, cable firms chose to upgrade
to high-bandwidth Hybrid Coaxial-Fiber (HCF) networks, which can transmit higher-quality data
(see Figure 1.1).
20Flow accumulation is a derivative measure based on land elevation. For any given 90-square meter cell in a grid, it is
defined as the number of cells that lie at a higher level of elevation.
21All the information relevant to Pew surveys is available online at http://www.pewresearch.org/
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The upgrade to HCF networks was limited in its scope. Firms only had the incentive to enter
markets where they expected to recoup an appropriate rate of return on their investment (Faul-
haber 2002). Because a large portion of the expense came from the fixed cost of connecting a
neighborhood to the backbone of the network, cable companies only provided broadband to areas
with at least 500-2000 customers (e.g. Hazlett and Bittlingmayer 2003). The upgrade to broadband
connectivity was also not instantaneous. An important impediment to speedy broadband growth
was the heavy construction work required to lay out new cables. From cable firms’ perspective, the
early deployment of infrastructure was also undesirable since broadband systems are more expen-
sive to maintain than traditional cable networks. Furthermore, cable companies are likely to have
been facing severe liquidity constraints. In fact, the cost of deploying broadband infrastructure is
prohibitive, averaging $200 per home passed.
Figure 1.2 give a visual representation of the broadband market, through maps depicting broad-
band availability at the beginning of, and half-way through, the sample period (December 1999,
December 2003). There is clearly a great extent of both within- and between-zip code variation in
broadband availability. Table 1.2 then summarizes the distribution of broadband availability over
seven election cycles. In 1996, no broadband was available to U.S. customers. Overall, broadband
availability steadily increases through time. In June 2008, the median number of ISPs was 7 (50
percent broadband penetration), and only 55 zip codes (i.e. 0.2 percent of all zip codes) had no
broadband available.22
Cable infrastructure is subject to damage from flooding, high ground temperatures, and exces-
sive precipitation (Zimmerman and Faris 2010). There is strong evidence that climate conditions
affect both the cost and time required to construct broadband infrastructure. For example, these
challenges from nature require the use of damage-resistant material and the construction of natural
/ artificial barriers (Rosenzweig et al. 2011). They also generate larger maintenance costs once the
infrastructure has been constructed. In this chapter, I argue that by capturing part of the influence
of climate, lower land elevation correlates positively with the cost of building infrastructure.
The reliance on land elevation to capture a multitude of influences at once is not unconventional.
In fact, geologists have shown that land elevation predicts soil characteristics such as water content,
22Given that I set to “0” the number of ISPs for zip codes absent from the FCC data in a given year, this is a strong indication
that none of the zip codes in my sample are systematically excluded from the FCC broadband data.
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crop yields, and vegetation type (Moore et al. 1991, Erskine et al. 2007). Moreover, the availability
of elevation data at fine levels of aggregation is itself testimony for its predictive power. It is not
a coincidence that the USGS has devoted considerable time and effort constructing elevation maps
for the entire globe.
Low-lying areas are subject to greater flooding of telecommunications infrastructure through
storm surges and hurricanes (e.g. Michel-Kerjan et al. 2010, Landry and Parvar 2011). When
facing flood risk, broadband providers must invest more to safeguard their broadband facilities
from being submerged under water (e.g. Nordhaus 2010, Rosenzweig et al. 2011).23 For example,
following Hurricane Sandy back-up generators failed in Lower Manhattan’s broadband facilities,
which led to the shut down of the telecommunications network.24 Another challenge associated
with being in a flood-prone area comes from the difficulty of burying cable underground. In turn,
this may affect the cost of building broadband infrastructure, as overhead poles are in general more
susceptible to weather damage (Bascom and Antoniello 2011).25
There also exists a strong negative relationship between elevation and summer temperatures
(e.g. Willmott and Matsuura, 1995).26 Evidence suggests that high temperatures damage cables
carrying too much power. This is because cables produce heat, which needs to be dissipated in
the ground.27 When faced with this challenge, broadband providers incur higher installation and
maintenance costs (e.g. additional cables, or artificial soil to absorb heat).
The many challenges I have outlined are heavily associated with the use of cable technology. This
makes them unique to the United States, where cable companies have controlled the lion share of the
broadband market (85 percent in 2003). In contrast, most other industrialized nations have relied
on ADSL broadband technology (e.g. Western Europe). Unlike cable technology, ADSL requires
minimal investment in infrastructure to be able to carry broadband signals. The conscientious
23In inland areas, flood damage comes from the accumulation of rainfall water; see NYC’s report http://tinyurl.com/mtyrhem
(retrieved on October 20, 2013). In coastal areas, flood damage comes from water corrosion due to sea level rise.
24See also NYC’s report at http://tinyurl.com/mtyrhem (retrieved on October 20, 2013).
25There are advantages to each cabling approach. For example, underground are convenient to use in densely populated areas
and to cross rivers, less prone to some types of damage (e.g. severe weather, theft), have a lower environmental impact (e.g.
emission of electromagnetic fields), and need less clear surrounding area (e.g. airplanes). As for overhead cables, they are more
accessible when damaged (fault location, management of dielectric oil in cables), less subject to some types of damage (e.g.
unaware digger, earthquakes), cheaper to install, and requires less difficult voltage control. See http://tinyurl.com/ao4u4pc,
http://tinyurl.com/m4rwx78 and http://tinyurl.com/mtlnwra (all retrieved on October 20, 2013).
26This relationship depends heavily on the atmosphere being well-mixed, which means it holds particularly well in inland
areas. The main summer exception is in coastal regions with well-defined marine layers, where maximum temperatures often
increase with elevation above the marine inversion (Daly et al. 2008).
27See http://www.atc-projects.com/learning-center/underground-transmission-lines/ (retrieved on October 20, 2013).
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reader may then wonder why ADSL has not played a more major role in the U.S. context. I turn to
this issue in some detail in the Appendix, where I discuss the market, technological, and regulatory
limitations that have hampered ADSL provision in the United States.
1.3.2 Identification strategy
The goal of this chapter is to estimate if broadband availability affects voting patterns in presi-
dential elections, and the amount donated to federal political causes (i.e. Congressional / Presiden-
tial candidates, PACs). There has been much discussion of the potential effect of the Internet on
U.S. politics. However, identifying its causal effect is a challenging task. As previously mentioned,
the introduction and growth of broadband Internet was far from uniform across the United States.
To the extent that some of this variation reflects the different underlying demand of these counties,
any correlation between broadband availability and political outcomes would have to be interpreted
with caution. In particular, the unobserved characteristics of the residents of a geographic area may
affect both broadband and political outcomes. For example, broadband providers found it more
profitable to provide broadband to wealthier and more educated geographic areas. In turn, these
areas have exhibited different trends in political participation over time. A raw correlation between
broadband availability and political participation may then reflect the influence of such omitted
variables from the model.
A second challenge to identification comes from the fact that broadband availability is measured
with error. If it is classical, this measurement error in my data on broadband availability will cause
attenuation bias. First, data limitations force me to manually assign a single value for broadband
availability to zip codes where 1 to 3 ISPs operate. This is an important limitation, as it applies
to 41.2% of zip code broadband data assigned to the five election cycles between 2000 and 2008.
Second, I am forced to introduce error because the data on voting patterns and ISPs are partially
geographically mismatched.
It is informative to pinpoint county characteristics that have a bearing on both broadband avail-
ability and political participation. Table 1.3 presents socio-economic characteristics of geographic
areas by broadband status. I compute the summary statistics of zip code areas and counties for the
top and bottom half on broadband availability in 2000. On average, I find that geographic areas
with greater broadband availability are more densely populated, more urban, wealthier, more edu-
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cated, and younger. Importantly, high broadband areas also contribute more money to campaigns,
and exhibit lower voter turnout.
A simple regression makes more precise the key characteristics which determine broadband de-
ployment (regression estimates not reported). Using the 2000 data cross-section, I find that the
number of ISPs correlates strongly with median age, income, federal expenditures, population, log
farm value, % black, % below poverty line, % high school grads, % income $100k+, % urban, and %
pop 18+ and % pop 65+ (R2 = 0.56).28 However, when one regresses the residuals from the previous
regression on the other demographics listed in Table 1.3, the coefficients are non-statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero. This suggests that the remaining variation is largely idiosyncratic. Adding
state fixed effects, however, helps capture some of the remaining variation (R2 = 0.61).
1.3.3 Empirical specification
One of the contributions of this study is to provide a framework for the study of the effect of
broadband that mitigates the potential bias from omitted variables and measurement error. To do
so, I rely on panels of zip code and county level data. I then combine a fixed effects regression
framework with an instrumental variables strategy. Formally, I estimate the following system of
equations:
Yit = αi + δst + γXit + βISPit + εit, (1)
ISPit = α˜i + δ˜st + γ˜Xit + ηZit + νit, (2)
The subscript i denotes a “geographic area”, which should be interpreted as a zip code or county
depending on the context. The subscript t refers to a presidential election date (e.g. November
4 2008) or campaign contributions cycle (e.g. January 1st 2007 to December 31st 2008). The
variable ISPit denotes the number of Internet Service Providers in geographic area i at time t.29
The political outcome Yit denotes campaign donations, voter turnout, or Democratic vote share.
Finally, the specification includes a number of controls at different levels of aggregations: zip code
28The Census defines as “urban” census blocks that are densely populated (≥1,000 people per square mile), and that are
surrounded by highly dense census blocks (≥500 people per square mile). See http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-
rural-2000.html (retrieved on November 28, 2013)
29Data on the number of ISPs is only available up until June 2008, and so I use this early value of diffusion to capture
broadband availability in the 2007-2008 election cycle.
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or county fixed effects (αi and α˜i), depending on whether the analysis is for presidential elections
or campaign contributions (respectively), state-time fixed effects (δst and δ˜st) and time-varying
area-level characteristics (Xit).
Equation (1) models a political outcome Yit as a function of an an endogenous regressor ISPit,
Equation (2) is the corresponding first-stage equation where Zi, a measure of land elevation described
below, serves as an excluded instrument. Geographic areas are defined at the lowest possible level of
data aggregation for the dependent variable Yit. This corresponds to the zip code level for campaign
donations, and to the county level for presidential voting outcomes.
I estimate the effect of broadband using zip code variation in the analysis of campaign donations,
and county variation in the analysis of presidential elections voting. I thus compare the growth of
broadband availability with the evolution of different forms of political participation. Any relation-
ship that is a function of the baseline characteristics of zip codes / counties would be absorbed
by the zip code / county dummies. The instrumental variable strategy, which is inspired by the
effect of topography on the cost of building broadband infrastructure, then deals with the potential
influence of time-varying factors. Since topography does not vary in any significant way over the
course of a few decades, I cannot use time variation as the source for identification. Instead, the
estimation strategy instead relies on the relationship between time-invariant topographic measures
and broadband deployment.
The main instrumental variable used in the analysis is log(mean elevation)i · It≥2000, i.e. a
measure of altitude interacted with a post-broadband dummy.30 The use of a single post-broadband
dummy identifies the average effect of land elevation across broadband years.31 The identifying
assumption is that land elevation causes a change in political outcomes between pre- and post-
broadband years only through its effect on broadband deployment. To be clear, the use of zip code-
/ county-level fixed effects does not prevent the political culture to systematically differ in more
hilly areas, or topography to affect the rate of change in political participation before 2000.
The state-time fixed effects (δst and δ˜st) account for the differing electoral stakes and broadband
30In order to more directly capture the influence of rainfall accumulation, I also attempt to include an additional instrument,
log(flow accumulation) · It≥2000. Because the first-stage of this potential instrument is weak, I however drop it from the main
analysis. Results are however similar when both instruments are included. Findings are in fact slightly larger in magnitude,
which reinforces the idea that attenuation bias reduces the magnitude of the raw correlation between broadband and political
participation
31In Section 1.4.1, I test empirically the hypothesis that the effect of land elevation on broadband deployment varies across
years.
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regulation across states. For example, the electoral college system encourages presidential candidates
to pay special attention to some states (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Strömberg 2008). Similarly,
the incentive to donate to a Congressional candidate is a function of the electoral stakes of the
election she is participating in (Cox and Munger, 1989). State-time dummies can also account
for the technological improvements that have helped significantly drive down the cost of providing
broadband service over time (Xiao and Orazem 2011). Lastly, these variables capture the influence
of state-level regulation on the construction of broadband infrastructure (Faulhaber 2002; Wallsten
2005).
The time-varying area-level characteristics Xit control for the demand and supply factors sus-
pected to affect broadband deployment: median age, log(density), log(population), log(farm size),
log(value farms), log(income), log(value housing), log(federal expenditures), % high school grads, %
urban, % white, % black, % hispanic, % income $150k+, % income below poverty line, % 18+ popu-
lation, % 65+ population, % male.32 This choice of controls reflects the existing state of knowledge
of the literature on the drivers of broadband demand and supply. Higher income, more educated,
and younger individuals have been documented to be more frequent PC users (e.g. Jimeniz and
Greenstein 1998, Goolsbee and Klenow 2002, Greenstein and Prince 2006). There is also some evi-
dence of a digital divide disfavoring females and members of minorities (e.g. Flamm 2005). Finally,
broadband service is cheaper to provide to dense urban areas, given the significant fixed costs of
laying out cable infrastructure (e.g. Greenstein 2004).33
The specification also accounts for the possibility that a correlation between the instruments
and broadband growth reflects the influence of other demographics. As shown in Section 1.3.2,
broadband was not introduced at the same pace in different counties. To account for this potential
confound, I include in Xit interactions between time dummies and pre-broadband values of the key
demographics identified in Section 1.3.2: median age, income, federal expenditures, population, log
32Zip code and county level data on demographic controls for 1980-2008 comes from the IRS and US Census. Note that for
each series data are unavailable for selected years of the sample. Data on median income is available every year between 1995
and 2008 (except 1996), while other data series are available in Census years (i.e. 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010). At the zip code
level, population data is available for Census years (1990, 2000, 2010), and IRS data is publicly available for three years (1998,
2001, 2008). To fill these gaps, I interpolate or extrapolate. The IRS data is only available for zip code areas that house enough
individuals so that reporting summary statistics is unlikely to infringe on confidentiality. Extrapolation has the disadvantage
of sometimes producing out-of-range values (e.g. income below $0, % high school above 1). In these individual cases, I either
exclude the particular data point from the analysis, or cap it at the maximum. For instance, negative values for zip code level
income are set as missing, while a percentage of high-schoolers greater than 100% is replaced with 100%.
33There may, however, be greater demand for broadband in (isolated) rural areas, as the Internet can help them find additional
retail options or introduce them to new education possibilities (Hindman, 2000, Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004).
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farm value, % black, % below poverty line, % high school grads, % income $100k+, % urban, and
% pop 18+ and % pop 65+.34 I also include in X similarly-constructed time dummies for the
dependent variable Y (e.g. campaign donations). The addition of these controls allows areas with
different baseline characteristics to follow different paths in broadband availability.
1.4 Did broadband availability affect U.S. politics?
1.4.1 Preliminary analysis
I start by examining trends in the raw data on county-level presidential votes and broadband
availability (Figure 1.3). In Panel A, I consider the two subsamples of U.S. counties with the
highest (“top 10 percent”) and lowest (“bottom 10 percent”) broadband availability in 2000. The
difference in broadband availability in these two sets of counties is comparable to the average
broadband deployment across all counties in 2008.35 For this reason, an inspection of the relative
trends in political participation in “top 10 percent” vs. “bottom 10 percent” counties is informative,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, regarding the magnitude of the effect of broadband growth
on political participation. In Panel B, I divide the full sample of U.S. counties into two groups,
depending on whether their broadband availability in 2000 was in the “top 50 percent” vs. “bottom
50 percent”.
Because Figure 1.3 can provide both a qualitative and quantitative estimate of the effect of
broadband, I focus on interpreting it in what follows (the same qualitative patterns hold in Figure
1.3). From 1980 to 1996, turnout in “bottom 10 percent” counties was 8-10 points higher than it
was in “top 10 percent Internet” counties, while the share of Democratic votes was on average 3
points lower. Starting in 2000, voter turnout increased in “top 10 percent” counties but remained
constant in “bottom 10 percent” counties; by 2008, voter turnout was 2 percentage points higher
in the “top 10 percent Internet” counties. The same general pattern can be observed for the share
of Democratic votes; by 2008, Democratic vote share was 17 percentage points higher in “top 10
percent” counties. From a visual inspection of these figures, we can thus conclude that there was
34All the main findings are robust to including interactions with the full list of controls, though estimates become a bit less
precise.
35In 2008, the “high Internet” counties housed average of 11.5 Internet Service Providers. In contrast, the “low Internet”
counties housed an average of 5 Internet Service Providers. The difference in broadband availability is roughly equivalent to
the 7.98 growth in broadband availability in the full set of counties between 1996 and 2008.
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sharp breaks in voting patterns after broadband was introduced in 2000. Furthermore, counties
with and without broadband available are different in their pre-broadband turnout, which suggests
that they differ on observable characteristics.
It is also instructive to examine first-stage and reduced-form regressions. In an OLS framework,
this can provide evidence that the claimed relationship between topography and broadband avail-
ability / political outcomes is a robust feature of the data. In Table 1.4, I report estimates from
the full county-level specifications of Section 1.3.3, which include county and state-time dummies,
county controls, as well as county time trends. In an additional empirical exercise, I investigate
whether the effect of topography on broadband availability varies with time. This provides a for-
mal empirical investigation of the effect of topography on the final level vs. pace of broadband
deployment (see Section 1.3.1).
I find a highly statistically significant positive correlation between land elevation and the main
variables of interest. A county with a one standard deviation higher land elevation has on average
an 0.18 additional ISP in a county, a 0.38 percentage-point higher turnout, and a 0.30 percentage
point higher Democratic vote share. There is also a negative relationship between flow accumulation
and the variables of interest. However, this negative correlation is only statistically different from
zero when the dependent variable is the number of ISPs; a one standard deviation higher flow
accumulation is associated with an additional 0.05 ISP. Because of this weak relationship, I do not
include this potential instrument in the main analysis (see footnote 30).
Further investigation reveals that the effect of topography on broadband availability differs across
years. Relative to 1996, a one standard deviation higher land elevation predicts an additional
0.05 ISP by 2000, an additional 0.25 ISP by 2004, and an additional 0.19 ISP by 2008. Hence
the comparative broadband advantage provided by topography peaks in 2004, but is somewhat
reversed by 2008. This suggests that favorable topography propelled broadband deployment in a
certain group of counties both in the short-term and long-term.
1.4.2 Main regressions
The analysis of presidential elections is carried out at the county level. Throughout, I limit my
attention to the four presidential elections between 1996 and 2008. The analysis of campaign
donations is carried out at the zip code level for both presidential and mid-term election cycles
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between 1994 and 2008. For 1996 (and earlier years), I can confidently impute null broadband
availability for all zip codes, since high-speed Internet had yet to be commercialized. Data is
excluded for 1998 because of the lack of availability of broadband data (see robustness analysis in
Section 1.4.4).
Table 1.5 presents estimates of the effect of broadband availability on county-level measures of
voter turnout, the share of votes cast for the Democratic nominee, and the share of votes cast for
the Republican nominee. Table 1.6 presents estimates of the effect of broadband availability on zip
code-level aggregates of the dollar amount in campaign contributions. The first group of regressions
includes all election cycles between 1994 and 2008 (excluding 2008). The second group of regressions
splits donations into presidential (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008) and non-presidential (1994, 2002, 2006)
election years. These empirical exercises justify the inclusion of both a mid-term and presidential
election cycle (1994 and 1996).
In all regressions, I include geographic area (i.e. county or zip code), and state-time fixed-effects.
For each political outcome, I report regressions from this basic fixed-effects specification. I then turn
to models that also include land elevation as an instrumental variable. Time-varying demographics
and interactions are as mentioned in Section 1.3.3. In models of voter turnout, I also control for
the absolute difference between Republican and Democratic vote share (“winning margin”). This
last variable measures the competitiveness of a race, and has been shown to have a strong effect
on turnout (e.g. Strömberg 2004, Gentzkow 2006).36 In models of campaign contributions, I also
control for zip code level tax and population data.37 Furthermore, the larger cross-section of zip
codes (relative to counties) makes it possible to test whether the effect of broadband changes with
time.
In the most basic specification, each new ISP brings a 0.53 percentage points increase in voter
turnout, a 0.66 percentage points increase in Democratic vote share, and a $12,287 increase in
campaign donations. When the model is re-estimated treating ISPs as endogenous, the effect
increases relative to the fixed effects estimates to 0.87 points for voter turnout (64 percent increase),
1.48 points for Democratic share (124 percent increase), and $34,378 for campaign donations (180
36Note that I do not include winning margin in models of Democratic vote share. This is because of how closely related its
definition is to the dependent variable (Democratic vote share). In any case, results are unaffected by the including of voting
margin as a control.
37I also include controls for missing values of the salaries and returns variables.
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percent increase). Breaking down the effect of broadband on campaign donations across election
cycles, I find that its effect is three times larger in presidential election years ($46,977 vs. $17,618).38
With the addition of county controls, the broadband estimate changes relative to the specification
with fixed effects and the instrumental variable. The effect of broadband availability now becomes
2.15 points on voter turnout (148 percent increase), 1.62 point on Democratic vote share (9 percent
increase), $7,333 on donations in non-presidential election cycles (58 percent decrease), and - $251.4
on donations in presidential election cycles.39 Furthermore, the effect of an additional ISP on
campaign contributions is larger between 1994 and 2002 than it is between 2002 and 2006. This
suggests the effect of broadband availability declines over the sample period.
One implication of these estimates is that broadband benefitted both Democrats and third-party
candidates, to the detriment of Republicans. The effect on third-party candidates is consistent with
Campante et al.’s (2013) study of Italian elections, who find that broadband Internet benefitted
the newly formed M5S party. Another implication is that omitted variables artificially reduced
the size of the broadband estimate for presidential election outcomes. To investigate the drivers
of these effects, I examine coefficient estimates on the control variables in the specification (not
reported). First, in the 2000s racial minorities received lower broadband access, but their turnout
increased at a faster pace than the rest of the population. Second, older individuals have shifted
their support more drastically toward Democrats, while receiving lower broadband demand. Third
and last, the increase in turnout and Democratic support was less pronounced in dense urban areas,
which concurrently have had more broadband available.
The estimate of a heterogeneous effect of broadband on donations in presidential vs. non-
presidential election cycles motivates further investigation. I re-estimate the most conservative
regression of Table 1.6 separately for different groups of donors / recipients of campaign money.
In Table 1.7, I divide donations depending on recipient characteristics, for both presidential and
non-presidential election years. In Table 1.8, I divide donations on the basis of donations / donor
characteristics, focusing on non-presidential election years. To avoid cluttering the tables, I only
report the coefficient estimate on broadband availability. Notably, I also draw a distinction between
38Residents in the average zip code area donated 50 percent more money in the 1996 presidential election year than they
donated in the 1994 presidential election cycle. This general pattern is present across election years. This makes sense because
the presence of a presidential race implies a greater number of political campaigns to give to.
39Consistent with further reduction in attenuation bias, when adding flow accumulation as an instrument, estimates are more
precisely estimated, and slightly higher.
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donations going toward House candidates running in the same state as the donor, and donations
going toward House candidates running outside the state of the donor.40 A comparison of in-state
vs. out-of-state House donations provides a direct test for whether the salience of political races
interacts with the effect of broadband. In fact, in the past information about House races was only
accessible to individuals living in the same state, as this type of political activity was only covered
by local newspapers (e.g. Snyder and Strömberg 2010).
In non-presidential elections, I find that broadband’s positive effect was mainly driven by an
increase in donations toward PACs and in-state House candidates.41 As for the lack of broadband
effect in presidential election years, evidence suggests that it masks a large re-allocation of funds from
in-state House candidates and PACs toward presidential candidates (particularly Democrats). I also
find that broadband availability did not affect the amount donated to House candidates running
out-of-state. This provides an interesting contrast with recent survey evidence that consumers of
online news are more likely to be interested in niche political issues (Nie et al. 2010).
The results for campaign contributions for particular demographic groups show varied effects
of ISPs expansion on the amount contributed. The broadband effect is larger on female vs. male
contributions (in percentage terms), even though evidence suggests the existence of a gender gap
in Internet use that favors males (NES, 1998; Bimber 2000). Moreover, the broadband effect is
concentrated on smaller donations (≤ $1000). Keeping in mind that donors who give less than $200
are excluded from the dataset, this bolsters, and precisely quantifies, received wisdoms about the
stimulating effect of the Internet on small donations. The model results suggest that an additional
ISP in a zip code area causes a large increase in contributions in the donations of professionals. As
the elderly are infrequent Internet users, one would expect to find a smaller effect of broadband on
their contributions (if the specification is valid). Reassuringly, I find that broadband leads to no
changes in the contributions of these retired individuals. But turning to further robustness analysis,
I interpret the magnitudes of my findings in the next subsection.
40The phenomenon of donating out-of-state has recently attracted attention because of concerns of undue influence in the
electoral process, as well as their increasing prominence. In 1995, Senator Feingold attempted – but failed – to introduce
legislation to curtail the scope of donating out-of-state. In 2010, the practice of donating out-of-state attracted media atten-
tion when Representative Dennis Kucinich raised 98.2 percent of his campaign funds from outside of his state. Only a few
potential determinants have been suggested for this type of donations (influence over the legislative process (Grenzke 1988);
competitiveness of the race (Gimpel et al. 2008); interconnectedness of the donor’s geographic area (Bednar and Gerber 2012).
41I exclude Senate / gubernatorial elections as they involve seats open for elections once every six years, which substantially
complicates the implementation of a fixed effects framework.
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1.4.3 Interpreting magnitudes
The above results provide evidence for whether political behavior changes in response to access to
broadband Internet service. To interpret the magnitude of the findings, it is useful to put them
in relation with contemporaneous forces affecting voting / donating, and to compare them with
related estimates from the literature. I compute persuasion rates on voting behavior, i.e. the share
of individuals affected by broadband Internet, among broadband users. Since donating to political
campaigns is a much less frequent political act, I instead compare broadband’s effect with that of
contemporaneous forces that have also affected campaign donations.42
To assess the importance of broadband availability on voting behavior, I compute its persuasive
effect for three potential messages: “Get out the vote” (GOTV), “Vote for the Democratic candidate”
(Positive message), “Do not vote for the Republican candidate” (Negative message). To compute
these statistics, one could assume a uniform 63.5 percent exposure to broadband Internet for all
subpopulations.43 However, this approach ignores two crucial considerations, which may lead to an
overestimate of persuasion rates. First, broadband access was higher for non-voters than voters,
which would lead to the overestimation of the effectiveness of the GOTV message.44 Second,
anecdotal evidence suggests that online political campaigns have relied heavily on the convincing
effort of volunteers within their social circles. In the words of John Kerry’s director of Internet
strategy Josh Ross, “What we were trying to do is have a multiplier effect. If you can recruit one
volunteer, that volunteer can contact many, many voters as they show up for their local canvas
event” (Vaccari 2008). In order to avoid overestimating the effect of broadband, a more cautious
approach would be to assume 100 percent broadband access. This implies persuasion rates of 29.5
percent, 9.63 percent, and 12.19 percent for the GOTV, positive, and negative messages, which
42The data show that the average zip code houses an average of 21 donors who each donated about $1,000. Donating thus
only involves a very select group of individuals (0.3 percent of the adult US population). In contrast, in the average county
voting about half of the adult population voted in 1996. This indicates that the representative donor and voter are two very
different individuals.
43The estimate comes from October 2009 Census data. See government’s report as
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_internet_use_report_feb2010.pdf (retrieved on October 23, 2013).
44Assuming uniform broadband access potentially leads to an overestimate of the persuasiveness of broadband, particularly
its GOTV message. First, non-voters exhibit higher levels of broadband access than non-voters. Dense urban areas have more
broadband access and house significantly more non-voters (see Figure 1.3). Furthermore, the youth have consistently lower
turnout than other segments of society, as well as greater Internet use. The youth constitute a large fraction of the electorate in
any given election. Using age-specific data on mortality and population growth from the Human Mortality Database, I estimate
that 31.8 percent of the 2008 voting age population consists of individuals who were too young to vote in 1996.
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should be interpreted as lower bounds (respectively).45
The relative magnitudes of these three effects suggest that broadband’s GOTV message was
more persuasive than its partisan messages. In comparison to the rest of the literature, the effect
of broadband Internet on U.S. voter turnout is somewhat larger. In their survey of the literature,
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) report that persuasion estimates on voter turnout range between
4.3 percent and 20.5 percent. This suggests that broadband Internet was particularly effective in
encouraging non-voters to cast a vote. There are only a handful of other studies that have established
an effect of the media on vote shares (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gerber et al. 2009, Enikolopov
et al. 2011). Relative to these studies, broadband Internet’s positive and negative messages are
intermediate (range for positive messages: 8 percent to 20 percent; range for negative messages: 14
percent to 65.4 percent).46
To assess the importance of broadband availability for campaign donations, I compute the share
of the increase in campaign donations due to broadband. To do so, I rely on estimates from the most
conservative specifications of Table 1.8. Overall, I estimate that broadband increased donations by
an average of 144 percent in non-presidential election years, and decreased them by 5 percent in
presidential election years. Over the time period of the study, the total increase in donations was
147 percent in non-presidential election years, and an astonishing 278 percent in presidential election
years. Taking a dollar-weighted average, I then find that broadband explains 41.5 percent of the
increase in individual contributions over the time period of the study.
At least part of the remaining variation is likely to have come from the 81 percent increase in
GDP over the time period. In fact, the evolution of campaign donations has historically mirrored
45An additional ISP is associated with a 2.15 percentage points increase in voter turnout, a 1.62 percentage points in-
crease in Democratic vote Share, and a 1.95 percentage points decrease in Republican vote share (Table 1.5). Note that
in 2008 average number of ISPs in a county was 7.98, average turnout was 58.83 percent, average Democratic share was
41.49 percent, and average Republican share was 56.86 percent. I compute persuasion rates adapting formulas derived
by Enikolopov et al. (2011): fGOTV =
β̂turnout∗ISP2008
1−(t2008−β̂turnout∗ISP2008)
, fPositive =
β̂Democrat∗ISP2008∗t2008
1−
(
d2008−β̂Democrat∗ISP2008
) , and
fNegative =
−β̂Republican∗ISP2008∗t2008
r2008−β̂Republican∗ISP2008
.
46The study that finds the largest negative effect of a media was authored by Enikolopov et al.. They study the effect of
the introduction of an independent news television channel, NTV, on Russian politics. They find a large negative effect of
NTV on Putin supporters’ voting behavior. A larger effect in Russia provides strong support for the theoretical prediction
that government capture of the media becomes less likely in a competitive news market (e.g. Besley and Prat 2006). In
Russia, the media has historically been government-controlled, which may give a single independently-owned media outlet the
power to reveal new information to society. That being said, even in countries with strong constitutional guarantees for press
independence, the state has many levers by which to influence it. For example, less than a decade ago (in 2004), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff successfully pressured a CBS reporter to delay reporting on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.
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GDP growth (Ansolabahere at. al 2003).47 However, the discussion thus far still leaves the increase
in campaign donations in presidential election cycles largely unexplained. I hypothesize that the
2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) may have played a role. The BCRA discouraged
spending on unregulated electioneering communications, and raised contribution limits on regulated
donations (see Table A1 for the evolution contribution limits). In general, PACs are the institutions
that carry out political advertising. One way to provide support for the claim that the BCRA
helped fuel the increase in campaign donations is thus to examine the evolution in PACs donations.
Consistent with this interpretation, 50.2 percent of the massive increase in presidential years came
from a surge in donations toward PACs.
1.4.4 Robustness analysis
I note three concerns that are specific to the campaign donations analysis, but do not apply to
the presidential voting analysis. The first concern comes from the exclusion of the 1998 election
cycle, a year of transition where broadband might have been introduced. This choice was motivated
by the lack of broadband availability data for that year. If an increase in campaign contributions
was already underway by then, then I may be misattributing a secular time trend to broadband in
the main analysis. To alleviate this potential concern with the specification, I instead assume some
value of broadband for 1998, e.g. zero or half of the 2000 value. I report estimates in Table 1.10;
regardless of the specification used, the broadband effect persists and is similar in magnitude to the
earlier results.
The next two concerns both stem from the existence of zip codes whose residents contribute
zero dollars to political campaigns. Table 1.9 divides the universe of 27,405 zip codes into 8 bins
labelled by a number between “0” and “7”, which corresponds to the number of election cycles for
which at least one zip code resident donated money.48 There are 1,488 zip code areas in which no
person ever contributed over the sample period. Furthermore, half of all zip codes donate no money
to politics in at least one election.49
47This pattern has held robustly until the 1990s, and has been interpreted as evidence that donations constitute a normal
consumption good.
48Naturally, zip code areas with larger populations contribute more often to politics. Moreover, a striking 95 percent of all
donations come from 14,622 zip codes which donate in each election cycle between 1994 and 2008.
49The sample would suffer from severe selection bias if I dropped all data points with zero campaign donations and focused
on a balanced panel of observations. In fact, included observations would by design have a greater propensity for giving.
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This large presence of zeros support the use of the dollar amount of donations – rather than its
logarithm – as the dependent variable in the main analysis above.50 But one potential concern with
the dollar variable is its non-normal distribution. As evidence against this claim, Appendix Figure
A1 suggests the existence of no such systematic relationship between the size of the residuals and
fitted values.
This large presence of zeros may also reflect a systematic omission by the FEC, as it is surprising
that some large zip codes never contribute to politics. To make this concern concrete, there are 257
zip codes with at least 1,000 inhabitants with zero donors. If one assumes that no such such zip
code area should exist, this indicates that the FEC data is somewhat incomplete. In Table 1.10, I
find that the effect of broadband is both qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the exclusion of
the 1,488 problematic zip codes.
1.4.5 Does the effect of broadband mask an effect of cable television?
One may be worried that the analysis misattributes to broadband an effect of cable television.51
As previously mentioned, the broadband market has been dominated by cable television firms.
Those firms had an early advantage in offering broadband service, since they only needed to upgrade
part of networks to make them broadband compatible (see Section 1.3.1 and the Appendix). The
deployment of broadband infrastructure is thus likely to have exhibited similarities with the earlier
deployment of cable television. This would be a source of concern if cable television’s effect on
political participation was similar to the one attributed above to broadband.
To test the hypothesis that cable television confounds the effect of broadband, I explore whether
geographic variation in broadband availability predicts variation in political participation before the
advent of broadband. I use broadband availability as a proxy given the lack of geographically
disaggregated data on cable television penetration.
The core analysis in this subsection uses data on county-level presidential elections outcomes,
50Using a logarithm specification is an unsatisfactory approach since requires making an ad hod assumption about the zeros
in the data. I experiment with such specifications (e.g. adding one cent, one dollar, 100 dollars), but I omit reporting these
findings because of their sensitivity of my findings to the assumption made.
51Note that the deployment of dial-up followed different patterns from broadband, which makes it an unlikely confounder
(e.g. Grubesic 2006). Furthermore, a lack of effect of dial-up is consistent with anecdotal evidence on campaign donations.
In fact, the first online fundraising campaigns coincided with the time of the introduction of broadband. were led by Senator
McCain in 2000 ($2 million) and Howard Dean in 2004 ($41 million). In 2008, only 37 percent of dial-up users consumed online
political news, relative to 62 percent for broadband users (Tedesco 2011).
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whose time frame extends back to 1980. This long panel allows me to analyze outcomes in two
separate pre-broadband periods that are of similar length to the one used in the main analysis:
1984-1996 and 1980-1992. Because the deployment of traditional cable networks took place in the
1980s, this time frame is appropriate for an investigation of the effect of cable television on politics.
In fact, the percentage of household with cable access increased from 23 percent to 63 percent
between 1980 and 1996 (see Figure 1.5).52 Therefore, one would expect any effect of cable television
to have been more pronounced in these years than in the 2000s.
In Table 1.11, I report regression estimates on these data using the most conservative empirical
specification from Table 1.5 (i.e. with full controls and the instrumental variable). I find that
broadband availability does not predict a significant change in Democratic vote share between 1980
and 1984-1992, or voter turnout between 1984 and 1988-1996. However, I find that the growth
in the number of ISPs in 1996-2008 predicts a decrease in voter turnout between 1980 and 1984-
1992, as well as a decrease in Democratic share between 1984 and 1988-1996. The persistence of a
negative effect into the broadband years would imply that I underestimate the effect of broadband
over the 1996-2008 sample period. These findings thus only reinforce the interpretation of the main
estimates of Section 1.4.2. They are also consistent with empirical evidence for a depressive effect
of (network) television on voter turnout (Gentzkow 2006). More broadly, they conform with the
general decrease in turnout observed between 1960 and the end of the twentieth century (see Figure
1.4).
The secondary analysis uses data on zip code-level campaign donations. The time frame for
these data only extends back to 1990. I estimate a model of the change in campaign donations
between 1990 and 1998 on the growth in broadband availability between 1994 and 2002. In Table
1.11, I report estimates using the specification from the last column of Table 1.6. I find that broad-
band does not significantly predict the evolution of pre-broadband donations. If we assume that
cable television indeed drives these findings, we may deduce that some its influence had faded away
by the early 1990s. This would be consistent with the fact that cable television penetration had
almost peaked by that time. Extrapolating this finding into the future, we would expect any cable
52The increase in cable penetration over this time period must have at least been partly driven by the large ex-
pansion in the number of channels. While in the early 1980s, only a handful of programming networks existed, pro-
gramming options increased drastically to more than 150 channels by the mid 1990s (e.g.: CNN, USA, MTV); see
http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (retrieved on October 20, 2013).
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television effect to disappear by the 2000s, as cable television penetration continuously decreased
from 1997 onwards (see Figure 1.5).
1.5 Through what channel(s) did broadband availability affect U.S.
politics?
1.5.1 Methodology
As a final analysis, I explore the mechanism(s) behind the effect of broadband availability on U.S.
politics using individual-level survey data. I use survey data that measure how much people know
about politics, their moral values, the medium for campaign donations (i.e. online vs. oﬄine),
and the medium for political news consumption (e.g. television, radio). These data all come from
the Pew research center, which regularly fields surveys on nationally representative samples of
individuals. The Appendix contains details about data construction, as well as a full list of the
survey questions used as dependent variables in the forthcoming analysis.
Over the course of the 2007-2008 presidential election campaign, Pew fielded five surveys to
assess the political knowledge of respondents. To do so, they asked questions about issues that either
pertain to general political knowledge, or have recently been featured in the news. For example, one
question asks individuals to name the vice-president of the United States, while another asks them
to estimate the number of soldiers who died in Iraq. I construct an index of political knowledge
based on the share of correct answers provided, giving equal weight to each survey question.53
The analysis of media consumption is based on ten surveys spanning three presidential election
years (2000, 2004, 2008). The main question asks individuals to list their preferred source for
obtaining news about election campaigns (e.g. Television, Internet). A follow-up question, only
available in 2004 and 2008 surveys, asks respondents who listed “Television” as a preferred media
to indicate the television channel they most often turn to. Using answers to these two questions,
I construct media-specific measures of news consumption, set to “100” when the media in question
was mentioned by the respondent, and “0” otherwise.54
53Formally, this index is defined as knowledge indexi,s =
# correct answersi,s
# questionss
for respondent i participating in survey s.
54Respondents can volunteer multiple answers to each question and so news consumption does not in general add up to “100”
across media. I am reluctant to give an intensity interpretation based on the order in which media are mentioned, or the total
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Finally, the analysis of liberal values is based on sixteen Pew surveys fielded between 2003 and
2008, which ask individuals if they would support the legalization of abortion or gay marriage. The
question on gay marriage is available in fifteen surveys, while the question on abortion appears on
only the six most recent surveys (fielded between early 2007 and late 2008). For the five surveys
that ask the two questions, I construct a “liberal index”, defined as the share of answers provided
that are pro-gay or pro-choice.
To estimate the effect of broadband availability, I match each respondent with the number
of ISPs in her zip code or county of residence. I control for possible confounding factors with the
following list of demographics, along with a corresponding set of dummies indicating missing values:
age, party affiliation, employment status, gender, urban / suburban / rural area, income, race,
educational attainment, home ownership, marital status, life satisfaction, household size, household
head, religion. However, I abandon both the instrumental variables and fixed effects framework of
the last section.
The different empirical specification for this Section is motivated by the fact that I neither have
data for pre-broadband years, nor repeated observations for the same individuals. I do not include
zip code / county dummies because Pew samples are only meant to be nationally representative,
making it conceptually inappropriate to construct zip code or county aggregates. As for the in-
strumental variable strategy, it was only designed to identify the effect of broadband relative to
pre-broadband years, and the Pew data starts in 2000.
Attenuation bias through measurement error is a more important concern than in the main
analysis. In fact, the analysis matches a zip code / county measure of broadband availability to
individual respondents who do not in general represent the behavior of the average resident in a
geographic area. I thus relegate to a robustness analysis the addition of state-time dummies and zip
code / county- level controls (Table A4). While attenuation bias reduces the effect of broadband in
a few cases, the main findings are generally robust to the inclusion of these controls.
number of media listed. In fact, someone who only mentions Media A may consume less Media A-news than a person who lists
both Media and Media B. For instance, providing multiple answer choices may signal stronger interest in politics, and hence
greater total media consumption.
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1.5.2 Results
In Tables 12-14, I report regression estimates. I interpret the difference in the behavior of respon-
dents living in a zip code / county with a one standard deviation higher number of ISPs. I find
that a one standard deviation higher broadband availability predicts a 3.5 percent higher political
knowledge, a 9.9 percent / 4.9 percent more likely pro-gay / pro-choice attitude, and a 30.6 percent
higher chance of donating online. All estimates – except the one on pro-gay attitude – are solely
based on data from the 2007-2008 election cycle. As argued above, the number of ISPs is measured
with error in this setting. To the extent that I am dealing with classical measurement error, I would
be understating the full extent of the effect of broadband.
I then find that a one standard deviation higher number of ISPs predicts a 41 percent higher
Internet news consumption, and a 3.6 percent lower television news consumption. However, broad-
band has no detectable effect on other forms of news acquisition (radio, magazines, radio). Hence
greater broadband availability crowds out television news, and increases the consumption of Internet
news. It should be emphasized that a positive effect of broadband availability on online political
news consumption was not self-evident a priori. The Internet could in principle have reduced the
intake of political information. For example, Falck et al. (2013) provide evidence in the context of
Germany that the introduction of broadband Internet has reduced interest in politics, by creating
new forms of entertainment.
The next empirical exercise examines whether the promotion of liberal values was the result of
online media bias, or online information acquisition. To do so, the broadband effect is interacted
with the ideology of the respondent. If the Internet had a liberal bias, a rational Republican-leaning
individual should react by not consuming online news. As evidence against either rationality of
liberal bias of the online media, I find that Republicans were in fact more likely than Democrats to
consume online news (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011 for consistent evidence). This suggests the
importance of reconsidering the effect of biased news on viewers.
Finally, I ask which TV channels were crowded out by online political news. The decrease
in interest in television news affected both cable television and network / local television, and in
particular FOX news and CBS news. These findings provide additional evidence for the claim made
in Section 1.4.5 that the number of ISPs does not capture pre-existing trends in cable television
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deployment.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the effect of broadband Internet on political participation. I found
that the Internet is slowly emerging as an alternative to television for the retrieval of political
news. Moreover, I documented large effects of broadband availability on campaign donations, voter
turnout, and support for the Democratic party. As plausible mechanisms for these findings, I then
showed that broadband availability was linked with an increase in online political news consumption,
online donations, political knowledge, and liberal values (see Figure 1.6).
The analysis is, however, far from exhaustive, and it suggests a number of fruitful areas for further
inquiry. First, it is important to understand the effect of broadband on voting in Congressional
elections. In fact, evidence suggests that extrapolating conclusions about the effect of a media
across political contexts may lead to flawed conclusions (e.g. Gentzkow 2006). Consistent with this
interpretation, I have provided evidence for a great deal of heterogeneity for the effect of broadband
on campaign donations across political causes. In order to make progress in this direction, it will be
necessary to collect county-level data on Congressional elections for the 1990s, as it is not readily
available for this time period.
The documented effect of broadband also points toward the importance of incorporating be-
havioral mechanisms for persuasion in the political economy literature (e.g. DeMarzo et al. 2003,
Eyster and Rabin 2009). In particular, Republican audiences’ heavy reliance on online news is hard
to reconcile with rational behavior, as individuals should be able to filter out the bias of media with
a known partisan inclination, e.g. by switching to alternative news sources (e.g. Gerber at. al 2009,
Chiang and Knight 2011, Durante and Knight 2012). In order to generate more broadly applicable
conclusions for the effect of media bias, one possibility would be to treat differently subtle (i.e.
online) and explicit (i.e. television) bias in political news.
The findings in this chapter can also help inform, and relate, policy debates on campaign finance
regulation and broadband open-access rules. The low broadband connectivity of disadvantaged
populations and the increasingly large role of corporate donors have often been deplored (e.g. Lessig
1999, 2011). However, the intrinsic connection that exists between broadband access and campaign
29
donating has not been formally recognized in the past. My study suggests that broadband access
can help tilt the balance of power in favor of individual donors. This finding is timely, given the
renewed concerns about the undue influence of corporations and the wealthy following Citizens
United vs. FEC (2010).
More broadly, this study provides a portable framework for studying the effect of the Internet.
The Internet is gaining an increasingly central status in all wakes of social and political life. Fur-
thermore, its effect is likely to evolve with time, as broadband access spreads more widely, and the
quality of service improves. However, the lack of clear theoretical predictions have opened the gate
for endless hypothesizing and generalizing over its effect. The Internet may have been a bane, or a
boon, but the answer is farther than a Facebook status away.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: The evolution of cable television networks
Panel A Panel B
Panel C
Notes: Panel A: A traditional cable network consisted of a Head-End connected to a trunk cable (in bolded black line) that
enters various sections of a city. The trunk cable was itself connected to a number of branch networks (light black lines) that
connect to taps (in red), which enter the subscribers homes. Panel B: A modern cable network differs from a traditional cable
network in a few ways. The Head-End is connected to multiple fiber optic cables (dotted lines), which themselves connected to
fiber optic neighborhood nodes (in yellow). Panel C: The Head-End of a broadband cable television network hosts broadband
equipment, which includes a Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS). Source: Vicomsoft
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Figure 1.2: Number of high-speed Internet Service Providers by zip code
Source: Xiao and Orazem (2011)
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Figure 1.3: Relative trends in voting behavior as a function of broadband access (1980-2008)
Notes: This Figure plots the evolution of Voter turnout and Democratic vote share in 1980-2008 using county-level elections
data described in the text. The “High Internet (Top 10 percent)” / “High Internet (Top 50 percent)” / “Low Internet (Top 10
percent)” / “Low Internet (Top 50 percent)” data series corresponds to the evolution of political outcomes for counties whose
broadband availability belongs to the highest decile / top 50 percent / lowest decile / bottom 50 percent in 2000 (respectively).
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Figure 1.4: Voting behavior in presidential elections
Notes: This Figure plots the evolution of Voter turnout and Democratic vote share in 1960-2008, using national level data
from the FCC. The “Raw data” series count all votes, while the “Standardized 2-party” series only count votes for the two major
parties (Republicans, Democrats).
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Figure 1.5: Cable TV and Broadband penetration rates
Notes: This Figure plots the evolution of the percentage of American households with cable television and broadband In-
ternet subscriptions between 1975 and 2008. Values were constructed by the author using two complementary datasets: 1) Data
on the number of subscribers to cable television/broadband come from NSL Kagan (https://www.ncta.com/industry-data), and
2) data on the number of U.S. households in January of each year from the Census. Source: author’s calculations.
Figure 1.6: Process for the effect of broadband Internet on political participation
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1
Relationship between broadband penetration and the number of ISPs
% 200 kb/s + % 720 kb/s +
1996, 2008 1996, 2008
Fixed effects Pooled OLS 2008 Fixed effects Pooled OLS 2008
Number of ISPs 5.42*** 5.19*** 2.52*** 4.48*** 4.38*** 3.15***
(0.0372) (0.0385) (0.114) (0.0363) (0.0374) (0.121)
Intercept 1.10*** 2.03*** 25.4*** 0.51*** 0.93*** 11.7***
(0.149) (0.107) (0.957) (0.145) (0.0910) (1.02)
R2 0.865 0.765 0.127 0.825 0.710 0.174
Number of counties 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108
Notes: Observations are at the county-level, and standard errors are clustered by county. The dependent variable is the
percentage of the population with broadband access under two alternative definitions. The FCC divides counties into six
groups on the basis of broadband penetration: 1) Zero broadband penetration, 2) 0<broadband≤20%, 3)
20<broadband≤40%, 4) 40%<broadband≤60%, 5) 60%<broadband≤80%, and 6) broadband>80%. For each category, I
impute the middle of the range (e.g. 10% penetration for counties in the second category). For county fixed effects
specifications, the intercept captures the average value of all county interecepts in the sample. *** indicates significance at
the 1 percent level.
Table 1.2
Distribution of the number of ISPs
1994, 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
10th percentile 0 0 0 2 2 2
median 0 2 2 2 5 7
90th percentile 0 4 7 10 13 12
Minimum 0 0 0 2 2 2
Mean 0 1.54 3.04 4.43 6.13 7.22
Maximum 0 10 18 20 25 23
Notes: These values come from the sample of 27,405 “standard” zip codes used in the
analysis
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Table 1.3
Summary statistics
Mean by # ISPs in 2000
N mean s.d. Bottom 50% Top 50%
Main variables
% turnout 3,105 52 10 54 51
% democrat vote 3,105 44 11 44 44
% republican vote 3,105 45 12 44 45
mean land elevation (m) 3,105 438 508 425 451
1994 campaign donations ($) 27,405 13,740 60,365 827 22,082
1996 campaign donations ($) 27,405 21,219 91,350 1,321 34,073
Control variables
median age 3,105 37 4 37 35
population per square mile 3,105 242 1,667 41 444
county population 3,105 89,772 293,434 24,247 155,296
farm size 3,105 645 1,449 757 533
farm value ($) 3,105 2,099 4,377 1344 2854
median income ($) 3,105 36,280 8,970 32,822 39,738
new housing units value ($) 3,105 59,262 204,306 9,393 109,130
federal expenditures (million $) 3,105 0.48 1.7 0.13 0.83
% high school 3,105 77 8.7 75 79
% urban 3,105 40 31 26 55
% male 3,105 50 1.9 50 49
% white 3,105 85 16 86 84
% black 3,105 9 14.5 8 9
% hispanic 3,105 6 12 5 7
% high income 3,105 1 0.8 0 1
% below poverty 3,105 3 4.8 2 5
% 18+ population 3,105 75 3.2 74 74
% 65+ population 3,105 15 4.1 16 14
aggregate salaries (million $) 27,080 143 235 20.3 220
number of tax returns 26,033 4240 5,771 808 6,390
number of contributors 27,405 21 53 3 27
zip code population (2000) 27,405 9,533 13,002 1,942 14,436
Notes: Summary statistics are for 1996 unless otherwise reported. Zip code level variables are italicized, and
the remaining variables are at the county-level.
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Table 1.4
First-stage and Reduced form estimates
Number of ISPs Turnout Dem. vote share
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Mean elev. * It≥2000 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.0441*** 0.295*** 0.311*** 0.232*** 0.322***
(0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0149) (0.0960) (0.0992) (0.0804) (0.0724)
Flow acc. * It≥2000 -0.0254*** -0.0102* -0.0335 -0.0131
(0.00981) (0.00590) (0.0293) (0.0347)
Mean elev. * It≥2004 0.158***
(0.0339)
Flow acc. * It≥2004 -0.0481***
(0.0124)
Mean elev. * It≥2008 -0.0518
(0.0326)
Flow acc. * It≥2008 0.0510***
-0.0146
Mean d.v. (2008) 7.98 7.98 7.98 58% 58% 41% 41%
R2 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.757 0.760 0.769 0.804
Number of counties 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by county. The analysis is always based on a panel of four presidential
election cycles (1996-2008). The first raw gives the name of the dependent variable used Turnout is the
proportion of the voting age population who casts a vote in presidential elections: Number of ISPs, Turnout,
Democratic vote share. Democratic vote share is the share of votes in presidential elections going towards the
Democratic candidate. All regressions include county dummies, state-time dummies, time-varying controls,
and time itneractions. Time-varying controls are the following county-level demographics: median age,
log(density), log(population), log(farm size), log(value farms), log(income), log(value housing), log(federal
expenditures), % high school grads, % urban, % white, %black, % hispanic, %income $150k+, % income below
poverty line, %18+ population, %65+ population, % male. Time interactions are year dummies interacted
with 1996 values of the following time-varying controls: median age, income, federal expenditures, population,
log farm value, % black, % below poverty line, % high school grads, % income $100k+, % urban, and % pop
18+ and % pop 65+. Time interactions also include year dummies interacted with the dependent variable (e,g,
voter turnout). In the turnout analysis, I also include winning margin and the corresponding time interactions
as controls. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level., *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 1.5
Effect of broadband on voting in presidential elections
Turnout Dem Rep
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (3)
Number of ISPs 0.528*** 0.867*** 2.15*** 0.658*** 1.48*** 1.62** -1.95**
(0.0412) (0.0771) (0.800) (0.0367) (0.0734) (0.647) (0.815)
County-, state-time
dummies
X X X X X X X
Time-varying controls and
interactions
X X X
Elev. instrument X X X X X
Mean d.v. (1996) 56% 56% 56% 41% 41% 41% 55%
R2 0.658 - - 0.647 - - -
First-stage F-statistic - 1314 28.68 - 1314 31.52 28.68
Number of counties 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by county. The analysis is always based on a panel of four presidential
election cycles (1996-2008). The first raw gives the name of the dependent variable used Turnout is the
proportion of the voting age population who casts a vote in presidential elections. Democratic/Republican
vote share is the share of votes in presidential elections going towards the Democratic/Republican candidate.
The Instrument is the logarithm of county-level mean elevation interacted with an indicator for the first year
of broadband (i.e. 2000). Time-varying controls and itneractions are as in Table 1.4. County-level fixed effects
absorb the level of those variables. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level., *** indicates significance at
the 1 percent level, and “-” indicates that the corresponding statistic cannot be meaningfully calculated.
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Table 1.7
Effect of broadband on campaign donations across election cycles / political causes (in dollars)
Non-pres. years Pres. years Pres. elections
PACs: 3,588** -1,977 -
(1,678) (3,207) -
mean dep. var. $9,508 $5,770 -
House in-state: 1,423** -1,326* -
(686.0) (766.2) -
mean dep. var. $3,362 ) $4,350 -
House out-of-state: 215.0 108.9 -
(234.5) (317.5) -
mean dep. var. $728 $927 -
President: - - 4,872**
- - (2,032)
mean dep. var. - - $2,164
Democratic candidate: 5,075*** 5,385***
(1,824) (1,448)
mean dep. var. $5,347 $706
Republican candidate: 2,398* 332.5
(1,339) (901.2)
mean dep. var. $6,198 $1,415
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each cell, the title of the raw/column indicates the
subset of donations that are included. For each category of donations, I include the regression estimate on the
ISPs measure for the full specification of Table 1.6. Below the regression estimate, I report the amount
contributed in the average zip code for the mentioned category in 1994 (non-presidential election cycles) or
1996 (presidentail election cycles). * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at
the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, “-” indicates that the corresponding
statistic cannot be meaningfully calculated.
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Table 1.8
Heterogeneity of broadband effect across donor/donations characteristics (in dollars)
Female: 2,612** Male: 4,182**
(1,269) (2,077)
mean dep. var. $3,007 $9,255
Retired: -24.55 Professionals: 2,250***
(382.8) (640.1)
mean dep. var. $910 $985
≤ $250: 264.7*** ≤ $1000: 1,953***
(87.11) (453.5)
mean dep. var. $925 $8,619
>$10,000: 580.5 >$1,000: 3,166
(2,396) (3,536)
mean dep. var. $3,734 $5,500
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by zip code. Data come from non-presidential election cycles (1994, 2002,
2008). Each raw lists mutually exclusive groups of donations based on donor/donation characteristics. The
categories are not meant to be mutually exhaustive, because of missing data / data fields with open-ended
questions. For each category of donations, I include the regression estimate on the ISPs measure for the full
specification of Table 1.6. Below the regression estimate, I report the amount of each type of money
contributed in 1994.
Table 1.9
Distributing of zip codes based on frequency of contributions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
# zip codes 1,488 1,521 1,582 1,696 1,753 2,146 2,834 14,385
prop. of donations (%) 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.0 4.0 91.8
mean population 589 807 1,029 1,376 1,699 2,303 3,618 16,478
Notes: The summary statistics come from the sample of 27,405 zip codes. I label each column with the
number of election cycles a zip code’s residents donate a positve amoutn to federal political causes. As the
panel of elections between 1994 and 2008 (excluding 1998) is used, the maximum number of appearances is
7. The first raw reports the number of zip codes in each category. The second raw gives the percentage of
donations emanating from each category of zip codes. The third raw gives the mean population of zip
codes in each category using 2000 Census data.
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Table 1.10
Robustness analysis for campaign donations analysis (in dollars)
1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 1994, 2002, 2006
Zero 1998 broadband Interp. 1998 broadband No zeros
Number of ISPs 8,465*** 7,843*** 7,496***
(1,899) (2,193) (2,268)
First-stage F-statistic 130.28 130.28 185
Number of zip codes 27,405 27,405 25,917
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by zip code. I include the full list of controls from Table 1.6. The first raw
mentions the election cycles used in the analysis. The full sample of zip codes is used in the first two columns; the
last column excludes the 1,488 zip codes whose residents never contribute between 1994 and 2008 (excluding
1998). In the first two columns, I use impute a value of zero to broadband for 1998, and half of the 2000 value
(respectively). *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 1.11
Analysis of pre-broadband trends
Turnout Dem. vote share Dollars
1980-1992 1984-1996 1980-1992 1984-1996 1990, 1994
Number of ISPs -1.29** 0.0760 -0.0340 -1.36*** 1,418
(0.594) (0.608) (0.471) (0.446) (1,575)
First-stage F-statistic 15.18 17.16 16.94 18.02 48.71
Number of zip codes - - - - 27,405
Number of counties 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 -
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by county, except the last column where they are clustered by zip code.
The first raw indicates the dependent variable used. The election years mentioned refer to the time frame used
for the dependent variables. The first four columns repeat the analysis from the full specifications of Table 1.5.
The last column repeats the analysis of the last column of Table 1.6. In each case, I include the corresponding
time interactions for the new dependent variables. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates
significance at the 1 percent level, “-” indicates that the corresponding statistic cannot be meaningfully
calculated.
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Table 1.12
Effect of broadband on political knowledge, moral values and medium for campaign donations
Social values Medium for donations Pol. know.
Pro-choice Pro-gay Liberal index Online Oﬄine
Number of ISPs 0.850*** 0.957*** 0.887*** 0.654** -0.0289 0.538***
(0.180) (0.110) (0.166) (0.272) (0.448) (0.107)
mean of d.v. (%) 59 38 50 5.3 17.5 62
Obs. 11,349 20,201 8,546 2,178 2,178 5,103
R2 0.167 0.239 0.268 0.090 0.116 0.278
Notes: Depending on data availability, the regressor is the number of ISPs in either the zip code or county of
the respondent. Standard errors are accordingly clustered at either the zip code or county level. The title of
each column indicates the dependent variable used. The political knowledge and liberal indeces are as defined
in the text. The other dependent variables are indicator values, rescaled to a 0 / 100 scale, for whether the
behavior mentioned is exhibtied by the respondent. In all regressions, I control for the following respondent
demographics: religion, age, party affiliation, employment status, gender, urban/suburban/rural area, income,
race, educational attainment, home ownership, marital status, life satisfaction, household size, household head.
I also include a set of dummies indicating a missing value for each one of these controls. *** indicates
significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Table 1.13
Effect of broadband on medium used to consume political news
General Media Internet Type of TV News
TV Newsp. Radio Mag. Avg. effect Aud. sorting CTV Non-CTV
Number of ISPs -0.652*** 0.0751 -0.0436 -0.0415 1.58*** -0.376** -0.474***
(0.113) (0.122) (0.184) (0.0891) (0.108) 1.42*** (0.187) (0.172)
# ISPs * Dem. (0.148)
1.65***
#ISPs * Rep. (0.163)
1.47***
#ISPs * Indep. (0.273)
1.86***
#ISPs * No party. (0.173)
mean of d.v. (%) 76 35 15 3 16 16 43 40
Obs. 18,969 18,969 18,969 18,969 18,969 18,969 9,529 9,529
R2 0.081 0.070 0.039 0.021 0.166 0.166 0.016 0.061
Notes: Depending on data availability, the regressor is the number of ISPs in either the zip code or county of
the respondent (see Table 1.10). Standard errors are accordingly clustered at either the zip code or county
level. I control for the same respondent characteristics as in Table 1.12. The title of each column indicates the
dependent variable used, each defined as an indicator value, rescaled to a 0 / 100 scale, for whether the media
mentioned is used. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent
level.
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Table 1.14
Effect of broadband on TV channel used to consume political news
MSNBC CNN Local NBC ABC CBS FOX
Number of ISPs -0.123 -0.109 0.004 -0.106 -0.0783 -0.360*** -0.227**
(0.147) (0.158) (0.130) (0.115) (0.117) (0.0902) (0.100)
mean of d.v. (%) 21 21 15 13 12 10 7
Obs. 9,529 9,529 9,529 9,529 9,529 9,529 9,529
R2 0.055 0.039 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.028 0.010
Notes: Standard errors are clustered in the same way as in Table 1.13. In all regressions, I include the
same controls, and define dependent variables, as in Table 1.13. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent
level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
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Chapter 2
Hindsight-biased Courts and the Efficiency
of the Legal System
2.1 Introduction
In the process of making sense of the complex world we live in, we routinely try to assign blame
where it is due. We have even devised institutions – courts – that are entirely devoted to holding
wrongdoers accountable for their actions. The legal system regulates a substantial share of economic
activity, and a large literature has been devoted to assessing whether judges and juries are able
to retrospectively process information. For courts to correctly assign blame, they need to first
understand what information was available to decision-makers at the time of decision-making. In
their investigations, legal scholars have documented a systematic tendency to overestimate the
likelihood of an event after it happens, which psychologists have called hindsight bias (e.g. Fischhoff
1975, Rachlinski 1998). Hindsight bias interferes with courts’ blame calculus by creating a false sense
of inevitability. In this chapter, I fill an important gap in the literature by formally drawing out
the implications of hindsight bias on the legal system.
The reliance on courts reduces the transaction costs involved with writing detailed contractual
clauses about unlikely future events. If individuals correctly factor in the possibility of future
liability at the time of decision-making, the legal system can be designed in a way to promote the
social good. However, by design the legal system only deals with contentious cases, e.g. a tort suit
only takes place in the event of an accident. A hindsight-biased court may then incorrectly utilize
extraneous information it has at its disposal. Throughout, I assume that only the court is prone to
the influence of hindsight bias, while other participants in legal proceedings anticipate the court’s
bias and act accordingly. I also draw an important distinction between situations where a court
intervenes following a failure vs. success in risk management.
To study the implications of hindsight bias in a context where a judgment is cast following a failure
in risk management, I consider the negligence standard. Courts apply the negligence standard
to control accident damages, by requiring the compensation of victims when insufficient care was
undertaken. Shavell (1987) defines accidents to be “harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor
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victims wished to occur – although either might have affected the likelihood or severity of the
outcomes” [added emphasis]. This distinction between two types of preventive measures is clear in
the context of automobile safety, where it is referred to as active safety and passive safety. One
example of active safety is Brake Assist, a technology which helps increase braking pressure in
an emergency situation.55 An example of passive safety is seat belts, which reduce the impact of
an accident.56 I assume that the socially optimal investment involves installing high quality Brake
Assist and low quality seat belts. In the classical analysis of negligence, the court correctly perceives
welfare to only depend on expected damage, i.e. the mathematical product of the likelihood and
severity of an accident. By requiring efficient effort on both dimensions, a rational court is then
able to promote the social good.
It becomes indispensable to distinguish between active and passive safety in a world with a hindsight-
biased court. A hindsight-biased court mistakenly overestimates the likelihood of an accident, which
makes it attach too little value to Brake Assist but overly scrutinize seat belts. In anticipation, the
car manufacturer may find it worthwhile to forego any investment in Brake Assist but install high
quality seat belts. To shed additional light on the effect of hindsight bias, I then focus on the special
case where a car manufacturer can only invest in passive safety. In this context, the socially efficient
amount of investment in seat belts is increasing in the likelihood of the accident, as the investment
becomes more likely to pay off. Hence the car manufacturer only (over)-invests into high quality
seat belts when the likelihood of an accident exceeds a threshold. These findings closely conform
with the recent trends in car manufacturing noted by Gladwell (2004):
Most of us think that S.U.V.s are much safer than sports cars. We feel that way because
[...] in [a] TrailBlazer our chances of surviving a collision with a hypothetical tractor-
trailer in the other lane are greater than they are in the Porsche. What we forget, though,
is that in the TrailBlazer you’re also much more likely to hit the tractor-trailer because
you can’t get out of the way in time. [...] The S.U.V. boom [...] [is] what happens when
a larger number of drivers conclude [...] that they are better off treating accidents as
inevitable rather than avoidable.
To understand the implications of hindsight bias in a context where a judgment is cast following
a success in risk management, I then turn my attention to the probable cause standard. A court
applies the probable cause standard to uphold the Fourth Amendment’s prescription about privacy,
55Other examples of active safety include good visibility from the vehicle, low interior noise levels, anti-lock braking system,
and collision avoidance through automatic braking.
56Other examples of passive safety include air-bags, deformation zones, and laminated glass.
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by invalidating evidence obtained through overly aggressive searches. A police force can increase
the likelihood of uncovering incriminating evidence by engaging in more aggressive searches, and
I assume it is in society’s best interest to engage in highly aggressive searches. In the classical
analysis of probable cause, the court correctly perceives welfare to only depend on expected crime,
i.e. the mathematical product of the likelihood of a seizure and the disutility from crime. As in the
case of negligence, a rational court can promote the social good by requiring the socially optimal
of search effort. A hindsight-biased court then mistakenly overestimates the likelihood of a seizure,
and hence does not recognize the responsiveness of crime control to high levels of search effort. In
anticipation, the police does not invest in aggressive searches.
How can we remedy hindsight bias? One possibility is to encourage courts to think about what
may have happened, i.e. engage in counterfactual thinking, a concept I now illustrate in the context
of automobile safety. As will become clear, the court’s counterfactual thoughts depend on both the
manufacturer’s investment in active safety (e.g. low quality Brake Assist), and the observed state
of the world (e.g. an accident). I dub the “hard counterfactual” the possibility that no accident
would have obtained with the same investment in active safety (i.e. low quality Brake Assist). The
qualifier “hard” reflects the fact that the court needs to contradict a reality it has already observed.
I then call “soft counterfactuals” possible outcomes (i.e. accident or no accident) for alternative
levels of active safety (e.g. high quality Brake Assist). The qualifier “soft” reflects the fact that the
court here contemplates worlds of a fairly hypothetical nature. In what follows, a “partially-biased”
court overestimates the likelihood of an event for the observed level of active safety, but is able to
think through soft counterfactuals.
In the negligence application, soft counterfactual thinking implies that biased misperceptions ap-
ply more broadly the greater the car manufacturer’s investment in active safety. For example, when
an accident materializes following a zero investment in Brake assist, a partially-biased court correctly
perceives the marginal value of low quality Brake Assist. In contrast, when an accident materializes
following an investment in low quality Brake Assist, a partially-biased court perceives the accident
to have been inevitable for low quality Brake Assist. To evade liability, the car manufacturer then
invests into low quality Brake Assist, a level of effort that lies between the (fully)-hindsight-biased
and socially efficient levels. However, counterfactual thinking does not necessarily move the world
toward efficiency, as the higher passive safety requirement may prove so costly as to discourage the
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car manufacturer to comply.
In the probable cause application, soft counterfactual thinking implies that biased misperceptions
apply more broadly the lower the police force’s search aggressiveness. For example, when a seizure
follows no investment in aggressive searches, a partially-biased court perceives the seizure to have
been inevitable for any level of search aggressiveness. In contrast, when a seizure follows a highly-
aggressive search, a partially-biased court perceives the seizure to only have been inevitable for
searches that are at least that aggressive. To be awarded a conviction, the police can now invest
in any level of crime control weakly below the efficient level. Since the police only cares about
crime control, it therefore chooses exactly the efficient level of search aggressiveness. This finding
conforms with puzzling experimental evidence, according to which hindsight clouds judges’ abilities
to assess the likely outcome of the search, but does not influence their legal judgments (Wistrich
et al. 2005, Rachlinski et al. 2011). In contrast with the negligence application, I conclude that
counterfactual thinking is unambiguously socially beneficial in the probable cause context.
I contribute to the behavioral economics literature by characterizing the effect of a well-established
cognitive deficiency. In particular, I add to a small formal literature on the effect of hindsight bias,
which has so far focused exclusively on principal-agent relationships (political agency: Schuett and
Wagner 2011; defensive medicine: Madarász 2012). My analysis makes clear that hindsight bias
requires a nuanced approach to legal reform. This has substantial practical implications, as the lack
of formal treatment in the legal literature has led to an incomplete understanding of this important
psychological phenomenon. For example, in an influential paper Jolls et al. (1998) summarized the
prevailing position of the legal profession by stating that “we can offer clear prescriptions because
the hindsight bias points in only one direction: over-deterrence”.57 Finally, my study suggests a
direction for identifying the extent of the bias outside of the lab, by suggesting distinct predictions
depending on a typology that is irrelevant in the absence of hindsight bias (i.e. failure vs. success
in risk management; accident-prevention vs. damage-mitigation).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a general model of court
decision-making. Section 2.3 defines hindsight bias. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider in turn the effect
of hindsight bias on the negligence and probable cause standards. Section 2.6 concludes.
57This prediction of over-deterrence has led legal scholars to suggest a “no liability” rule as a potential remedy to hindsight
bias (e.g. Rachlinski 1998). Rachlinski points out to the “business judgment rule” as a real-world application of this insight.
According to this form of liability, corporate officers only held accountable when “grossly negligent”.
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2.2 A general model of court decision-making
2.2.1 Background
Regulation of harmful activities takes two main forms. Ex-ante regulation relies on government
agencies announcing in advance what safety standards are to be followed, while ex-post regulation
utilizes courts to deal with issues as they arise. While these two forms of regulation are sometimes
used independently, they are in most instances used jointly (see Shavell (1984,1987), Kolstad et al.
(1990) for formal models). Ex-ante regulation is preferred when dealing with predictable events,
when harm has the potential of exceeding the injurer’s assets, when legal suits may not be brought
forward, or where there is substantial uncertainty about courts’ legal standards (e.g. pollution
control). In contrast, ex-post regulation is more appropriate when dealing with events that are hard
to specify in advance, in which case it becomes less costly to let individuals interact freely with one
another until a contention actually arises (e.g. neighborly disputes).
In this chapter, I study a general model of court decisions that is applicable to the study of two
important types of legal determinations: negligence and probable cause. In negligence hearings,
a court punishes a decision-maker (e.g. an individual, a firm) that imposed external harm after
taking insufficient precautions. In probable cause hearings, a court discards evidence gathered
through a police seizure that inappropriately infringed on privacy. The commonality between these
two legal standards is that they both require a court to choose appropriate behavior on the basis of
information available to the decision-maker (e.g. the police force) at the time of decision-making.
They however differ in that the court intervenes following a failure (in negligence cases) vs. a success
(in probably cause cases) in risk management. While other types of legal rulings exist, a discussion
of their relative advantages and disadvantages is beyond the scope of this chapter. For the purposes
of the analysis, it is sufficient to mention that the class of legal rulings I focus on has substantial
practical relevance (see Shavell 2007 for a survey).
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2.2.2 Formal model
The model has two players, a decision-maker (DM; “she”) and a court (C; “it”). The state of the
world S is binary, where the social benefit of a “success” is always higher than that of a “failure”.
DM and C engage in a simple two-stage interaction. In the first stage, DM can take precautions to
either reduce the likelihood that an activity generates harm, or reduce the potential harm generated
by such an activity. In the second stage, C casts a ruling on DM on the basis of a predetermined
legal standard. Importantly, DM casts a judgment after observing the state of the world S, a crucial
feature of the model that will allow hindsight bias to affect the outcome of the interaction.58 The
formal structure of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: DM chooses effort level (x, y) on two dimensions of effort. I refer to y ≥ 0 as the investment
in damage-mitigation, which consists of measures that alleviate the harm from an accident. As
for investment x ≥ 0 in accident-prevention, it consists of precautions that reduce the likelihood
that an activity generates harm D (y). Taking damage-mitigation as the numeraire, I call the unit
cost of accident-prevention qx. Following DM’s effort choices, the state of the world S = s ∈ {0, 1}
is realized according to the rule
S =

0 with probability p (x)
1 with probability 1− p (x)
,
where p (.) is a differentiable, decreasing and convex function (p′ < 0, p′′ > 0). S = 0 refers to a
“failure” (e.g. an accident, a crime) and S = 1 to a “success” (e.g. no accident, a police seizure).
Hence a higher level of effort x decreases the likelihood of a failure, but becomes less effective at
doing so for higher levels of effort. I then call D (y) the damage associated with a failure S = 0 given
effort level y, and assume that D (.) is a differentiable, decreasing and convex function (D′ < 0,
D′′ > 0). Hence an additional unit of effort y decreases the severity of an accident, but becomes
less effective at doing so for higher levels of effort.
58I ignore considerations that would discourage victims bringing suit forward. One example that the literature has considered
extensively is the cost of litigation.
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Stage 2: The legal standard in place determines whether the court intervenes following state
of the world S = 0 (negligence), or S = 1 (probable cause). I leave more detailed descriptions of
each legal standard to later sections of the chapter.
2.3 Hindsight bias
2.3.1 Background
Ignoring available information is a challenging mental exercise. After an uncertain event takes place,
individuals tend to overestimate the (ex-ante) predictability of its occurrence. In the psychology
literature, this phenomenon has been referred to as hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975). This short-
coming in probabilistic assessment has garnered considerable empirical support across domains,
particularly in the context of the legal system (e.g. tort law: Kamin and Rachlinski 1995, LaBine
and LaBine 1996; criminal law: Wistrich et al. 2005, Rachlinski et al. 2011). Importantly, hindsight
bias manifests itself not only in the general populace that makes up juries, but also in judges (see
Viscusi 1999 and Guthrie et al. 2001).
The evidence that hindsight bias affects judges is testament to the power of this psychological force,
as judges are heavily trained in assessing decisions under risk. In fact, by their own admission
judges are aware of the possibility of falling prey to hindsight bias.59 Furthermore, the adversarial
nature of the legal system ensures judges gain exposure to the arguments formulated by contending
sides. Finally, judges have ample opportunities to learn through experience as cases move through
the courts system.60
59The claim that judges are aware of the existence of hindsight bias is exemplified by a statement made by Judge Frank
Easterbrook in Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co. 1990: “no matter how conscientious jurors may be, there is a bias in the system.
Ex post claims are overvalued and technical arguments are discounted in the process of litigation.”
60For example, whenever a judge’s decision is overturned by an appellate court, this gives a signal for an inaccurate initial
decision.
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2.3.2 A formalization of hindsight bias
A rational court who observes the state of the world S realizes such information was not available
to DM at the time of choosing effort (x, y). However, a fully hindsight-biased court, Cs, mistakenly
projects its knowledge of the realization of the state of the world, S = s, onto its perception of
DM’s ex-ante information set.61
Definition 1 (Full hindsight bias): When the state of the world is revealed to be S = s ∈ {0, 1}, Cs
perceives outcome S = s to have been ex-ante fully predictable.
The psychology literature suggests that to fight hindsight bias, it it useful to encourage individuals
to think through counterfactual outcomes. However, this literature implicitly focuses on only one
type of counterfactual, which I refer to as the hard counterfactual. In the model I study, the
hard counterfactual requires thinking about the potential outcome, S = 1 − s, of DM’s observed
investment in accident-prevention, x = a. By definition, the more the court is able to think through
the hard counterfactual, the less it overestimates the predictability of the observed state of the
world, S = s. However, thinking through the hard counterfactual is mentally onerous since it
requires imagining a world that does not conform with an observed reality.
Another type of counterfactuals, which I refer to as soft counterfactuals, consists of thinking of
the effect of DM’s potential actions, i.e. x = a′ 6= a, on the state of the world S. Importantly, soft
counterfactuals do not interfere with the perceived inevitability of the observed reality, i.e. “S = s
follows x = a”. For that reason, encouraging courts to think through soft counterfactuals – rather
than the hard counterfactual – seems like a more promising approach to fighting hindsight bias.
As a consistency requirement, I assume that soft counterfactual thinking implies that following a
failure (success), a failure (success) is also perceived to be inevitable for effort levels x < a (x > a).
This is a minimal restriction, as it only requires the realization that more precautions can only help
avert a failure, and that fewer precautions cannot make a success any more likely. In what follows, I
call partial hindsight bias the belief that the observed state of the world, S = s, was predictable
for the observed level of accident-prevention, x = a, augmented with the ability to think through
61Note that in the following definition, a hindsight-biased court’s perceptions do not depend in any way on the true probability
of an accident, i.e. p (a) where x = a is the investment in accident-prevention.
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soft counterfactuals.
Definition 2A (Partial hindsight bias when S = 0): When the state of the world is revealed to be
S = 0, Ca,0 perceives outcome S = 0 to have been ex-ante fully predictable for an investment in
accident-prevention below the observed level, x ≤ a, but correctly perceives the marginal value of
accident-prevention, x˜ > a.
Definition 2B (Partial hindsight bias when S = 1): When the state of the world is revealed to be
S = 1, Ca,1 perceives outcome S = 1 to have been ex-ante fully predictable for an investment in
accident-prevention above the observed level x ≥ a, but correctly perceives the infra-marginal value
of accident-prevention, x˜ < a.
I then call p0 (.; a) (p1 (.; a)) the function that embodies Ca,0’s (Ca,1’s) perceptions of the relationship
between effort and the likelihood of a failure (respectively). By directly applying the definition of
partial hindsight bias, I obtain:
p0 (x; a) ≡

1 if x ≤ a
p (x) + (1− p (a)) if x > a
(3)
and
p1 (x; a) ≡

p (x)− p (a) if x ≤ a
0 if x > a
, (4)
which I then illustrate in Figure 1.2 by depicting alongside p0 (x; a) and p1 (x; a) for a given function
p (x).
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2.3 The negligence standard
One objective of accident law is to deter firms from engaging in socially harmful activities in an
irresponsible way (Brown 1973; Diamond 1974). In this section, I focus on cases decided through
the “negligence standard”, according to which a decision-maker pays damages to the victim of an
accident only when she took too few precautions to prevent the occurrence and reduce the severity
of the accident.62 The corresponding minimal levels of effort required by the court are referred to as
due care. Because of its practical importance, negligence determination has been studied extensively
by law and economics scholars (see Shavell 1987 for a book-length review).
2.3.1 The classical negligence standard
In this subsection, I outline the motivation and main finding from the classical study of the negligence
standard in the law and economics literature. In order to motivate the existence of courts in this
context, it is useful to describe – and compare – the unregulated and efficient outcomes from the
game described in Section 2.2.
When unregulated, DM exerts no effort since she only directly incurs the cost of precautions,
i.e. she solves min(x,y)≥0 qxx + y. I refer to this outcome as the unregulated benchmark. In
contrast, efficient effort requires taking into account both the cost of effort and the expected harm
to society from the activity,
min
(x,y)≥0
qxx+ y + p (x)D (y) . (5)
If the optimization problem (5) is quasiconcave, the efficient benchmark (x∗, y∗) solves the fol-
lowing First Order Conditions (FOCs):
qx + p
′ (x)D (y) = 0, and
1 + p (x)D′ (y) = 0.
Because the forthcoming analysis will rely heavily on graphical intuition, I illustrate the shape of
62Judge Learned Hand wrote: “If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.” Judge Hand’s statement corresponds to a discrete version of the model
I describe in Section 2.2, as an investment whose cost is B = qxx + y either reduces the likelihood of an accident to p (x) = 0
or the damage associated with it to D (y) = 0.
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the reaction curves in a quasiconcave problem (Figure 2.1). It is easy to see that the negative semi-
definiteness of the Hessian at (x∗, y∗) – a necessary and sufficient condition for the quasiconcavity
of problem (5) – implies that
∣∣∣∣ 1x′(y∗)
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣y′ (x∗)∣∣∣.63 In other words, x (y) has to be steeper than
y (x) at the point at which they intersect (in the (x, y)-plane).
According to the negligence standard, following an accident S = 0 a (rational) court C requires DM
to pay damages in the amount D (y) to victims when the level of ex-ante precautions is below the
socially efficient level. When indifferent between multiple value of effort, I assume that the court
requires the smaller level of effort. Formally, DM solves the following problem in Stage 1 of the
game:
min
(x,y)≥0
qxx+ y + p (x)D (y) · Ix<x∗ or y<y∗ , (6)
where I. is the indicator function.
Since DM escapes liability by investing efficiently in precautions, she has no incentive to invest more
than the efficient level. On the other hand, DM faces the social planner’s problem (5) when effort is
below the efficient level on either dimension. Conditional on taking effort below the efficient level,
DM then finds it optimal to invest the socially optimal level of effort. By effectively creating a
discontinuity in the firm’s schedule of benefits at the efficient level of effort, the negligence standard
therefore creates a sharp incentive for DM to act in society’s best interest by choosing (x∗, y∗).
2.3.2 The negligence standard with a fully hindsight-biased court
Following an accident S = 0, a fully hindsight-biased court C0 attaches a probability of 1 to an
accident for all effort levels x ≥ 0 on accident-prevention. As accident-prevention is perceived to be
a costly investment with no benefit, C0 sets due care on this dimension to 0. It then sets due care
on damage-mitigation to a level
y ≡ arg min
y≥0
y +D (y) , (7)
which it believes maximizes social welfare. In anticipation of C0’s negligence determination, DM’s
choice of effort depends on the relative cost of being held liable and escaping liability. Proposition
63The determinant of the second-order leading principal minor of the problem satisfies: p (x)D (y) p′′ (x)D′′ (y) −
(p′ (x)D′ (y))2 > 0. Furthermore, by total differentiation of the two FOCs we have 1
x′(y) = −
p′′(x(y))/p′(x(y))
D′(y)/D(y) and
y′ (x) = −p
′(x)/p(x)
D′′(y(x))/D′(y(x)) . It is easy to see that the condition
∣∣∣∣ 1x′(y∗ )
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣y′ (x∗)∣∣∣ is equivalent to assuming that the
necessary condition on the second-order leading principal minor is satisfied.
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2.1 formalizes this discussion and makes precise the effect of full hindsight bias:
Proposition 2.1: When the court is fully hindsight-biased, there are two potential outcomes from
implementing the negligence standard:
• If qxx∗+y∗+p (x∗)D (y∗) ≤ y, DM chooses levels of effort (x∗, y∗), C0 sets due care at
(
0, y
)
,
and DM is held strictly liable for damages.
• If qxx∗ + y∗ + p (x∗)D (y∗) > y, DM chooses levels of effort (0, y), C0 sets due care at
(
0, y
)
,
and DM escapes liability.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: In-text.
To escape liability, DM needs to invest y = y > y∗ in damage-mitigation. A fully hindsight-
biased court C0 requires a higher-than-efficient investment in damage-mitigation, as it perceives
such ex-ante precautions to always pay off in the future. On the other hand, C0 does not value
accident-prevention, which discourages DM from exerting this type of effort. When the cost of
evading liability is low enough, DM therefore invests too much in damage-mitigation, but too little
in accident-prevention (from society’s perspective).
This discussion leaves at least two important questions unanswered. What conditions need to be
satisfied by the primitives of the model for full hindsight bias to lead to a distortion in DM’s effort?
How large is the potential welfare loss due to full hindsight bias? In the rest of this subsection, I
shed light on theses issues by focusing on the case where DM can only invest in damage-mitigation
(but not in accident-prevention).
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Corollary 2.1: Assume that DM cannot reduce the likelihood of an accident, i.e. p (x) = p for
all x, and denote y∗ (p) the corresponding socially optimal amount of damage-mitigation. Letting
p ≡ {p| y∗ (p) + pD (y∗ (p)) = y}, there are two potential outcomes from implementing the negligence
standard when the court is fully hindsight-biased:
• If p ≤ p, DM chooses levels of effort y∗ (p), C0 sets due care at y, and DM is held strictly
liable for damages.
• If p > p, DM chooses levels of effort y, C0 sets due care at y, and DM is never held liable.
Proof of Corollary 2.1: In-text.
The full cost of efficient precautions, y∗ (p) + pD (y∗ (p)), increases with the likelihood p of an
accident, as it becomes more likely victims have to be compensated.64 Hence the more likely the
accident is, the more attractive DM finds it to over-invest in damage-mitigation (i.e. choose y = y)
to escape liability. In Figure 2.3, I illustrate graphically that DM only finds it worthwhile to invest
enough to evade liability for likely accidents, i.e. where p > p.
Corollary 2.1 implies that full hindsight bias only creates a distortion when C0’s damage-mitigation
requirement y is close enough to the efficient level y∗ (p). In fact, efficient effort increases with the
likelihood of an accident, as it becomes more likely to reap off the benefit of damage-mitigation
(dy
∗(p)
dp =
−D′(y)
pD′′(y) > 0). In Corollary 2.2, I show that there is however no a priori indication that
full hindsight bias has a bounded effect on welfare. Intuitively, this rests on the fact that welfare
depends on both damage-mitigation, y, and the shape of the damage function, D (.):
Corollary 2.2: Assume that DM cannot reduce the likelihood of an accident, i.e. p (x) = p for all
x, and that the damage function takes the form D (y) ≡ αy+1 , where α ≥ 0. When p ≥ p = 14 , the
welfare loss from full hindsight bias becomes infinite as α→∞.
Proof of Corollary 2.2: See the Proofs Section.
64We have d
dp
[qyy∗ (p) + pD (y∗ (p))] = D (y∗ (p)) > 0 by the envelope theorem.
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2.3.3 The negligence standard with a partially hindsight-biased court
Following an accident S = 0, a partially biased court C0;a’s perception of soft counterfactuals
depends crucially on the level of effort DM exerted on accident-prevention, x = a. This makes
DM’s problem – in anticipation – fundamentally more complicated than under a fully biased court.
According to the negligence standard, C0;a exonerates DM from liability if she exerted minimum
levels of effort that simultaneously satisfy the following two equations:
x0 (y0; a) ≡ min
x′≥0
qxx
′ + p0
(
x′; a
)
D (y0)
y0 (x0; a) ≡ min
y′≥0
y′ + p0 (x0; a)D
(
y′
)
Importantly, DM’s choice of effort on the damage-mitigation dimension y is irrelevant for C0;a’s due
care calculus. In contrast, the observed level of accident-prevention is a crucial component of C0;a’s
perceptions because it directly affects the construction of soft counterfactuals through p0 (.; a). Since
the specification of partial hindsight bias assumes that p0 (.; a) is differentiable everywhere except
at x = a, C0;a must follow the following steps to determine due care on accident-prevention:
• Step 1: Determine the local optimum to the left of the observed level of effort, i.e. conditional
on x ≤ a.
• Step 2: Determine the local optimum to the right of the observed level of effort, i.e. conditional
on x > a.
• Step 3: Determine the global optimum by comparing (perceived) utility at the two local
optima from Steps 1 and 2 above.
In Proposition 2.2, I state the implications of partial hindsight bias on both the decision-maker and
court’s actions:
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Proposition 2.2: Let x ≡ {a| y (a) = y} ∈ (0, x (y)), where x (y) < x∗. When the court is par-
tially hindsight-biased, there are two potential outcomes from implementing the negligence standard:
• If qxx∗ + y∗ + p (x∗)D (y∗) ≤ qxx+ y, DM chooses levels of effort (x∗, y∗), C0;a sets due care
at
(
0, y
)
, and DM is held strictly liable.
• If qxx∗+ y∗+ p (x∗)D (y∗) > qxx+ y, DM chooses levels of effort
(
x, y
)
, C0;a sets due care at(
0, y
)
, and DM is never held liable.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: See the Proofs Section.
The basic logic for Proposition 2.2 is familiar from Proposition 2.1. However, it may be surprising
that to evade liability, DM chooses a level of accident-prevention x that is higher than the level of
due care that C0;a requires, x = 0. To build intuition, I discuss the special case where DM engages
in an activity whose potential harm lies outside of its control, i.e. D (y) = h > 0 for all y. However,
I still allow accident-prevention x to reduce the likelihood of an accident. If an accident S = 0 takes
place after effort x = a, C0;a attaches a probability of p0 (.; a) to the accident, and so sets due care
at
x (a) ≡ min
x≥0
qxx+ p0 (x; a)h.
Lemma 2.1 states the implications of partial hindsight bias in this simpler context:
Lemma 2.1: Assume that the harm from an accident is fixed at a predetermined level D (y) = h > 0
for all y. Denote x∗ (h) the socially efficient level given a level of harm h, and let x (h) ≡
{a|h = qxx∗ (h) + p0 (x∗ (h) ; a)h} ∈ (0, x∗ (h)). Then the optimal level of accident-prevention per-
ceived by a partially hindsight-biased court C0;a satisfies
x0 (a) =

x∗ (h) if a < x (h)
0 if a ≥ x (h)
,
where x = a is the level of accident-prevention exerted by DM. We then obtain the follow outcome
from implementing the negligence standard: DM chooses effort x (h), C0;a sets due care at 0, and
DM escapes liability.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1: See the Proofs Section.
When DM’s investment in accident-prevention, x = a, is below a threshold, a < x (h), correct
perceptions about the marginal values of effort apply more broadly than biased perceptions (and so
C0;a sets due care at the efficient level). Conversely, when observed effort is above that threshold,
biased perceptions about the inevitability of an accident apply to a larger range of effort levels (and
so C0;a finds it futile for DM to invest in accident-prevention).
Given the definition of p0 (.; a), one can then easily argue by contradiction that x (h) ∈ (0, x∗ (h))
(see Figure 2.3). When a = 0, C0;a correctly perceives the marginal value of additional accident-
prevention, and so sets due care at x∗ (h). In contrast, when a = x∗ (h), C0;a misperceives the
accident to be inevitable for x ≤ x∗ (h), and so sets due care at 0. This establishes that the value of
effort at which C0;a is indifferent between null and efficient accident-prevention lies between these
two extremes.
What obtains when the negligence standard is implemented? Clearly, DM chooses to evade
liability by investing the minimal possible amount in accident-prevention, a = x. Doing so is more
advantageous than being held liable for possible damages, in which case DM would be facing the
social planner’s problem. In fact, DM would in that case incur both the cost of efficient effort,
x∗ (h) > x (h), and the associated expected damages, p (x∗ (h))h. I end this discussion by noting
one important distinction between the two situations studied in Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.2:
DM always underinvests in accident-prevention in the former case, but only sometimes does in the
latter. This is because the court sets a stringent due care requirement on damage-mitigation (in
Proposition 2.2), which may make DM unwilling to comply with the court’s requirements.
2.3.4 Discussion
Under a system of strict liability, DM is always responsible for the compensation of victims for
damages D (y). It is clear that hindsight bias increases the relative attractiveness of the strict
liability rule. That being said, an implicit assumption of my modeling approach is that the negligence
standard is preferred to the strict liability standard. While I do not explicitly model why the
negligence rule dominates strict liability, an element of negligence would be desirable whenever – as
is almost always the case – multiple parties have a role to play in causing accidents, or when DM’s
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assets are not sufficient to cover losses.65 We should then attach a negative interpretation to the
effect of hindsight bias when it turns the negligence rule into a strict liability rule (see Proposition
2.1, Corollary 2.1, and Proposition 2.2). As Shavell (1987) points out, it is unnatural to set due
care at a level that no injurer would adhere to under the negligence rule, as this amounts to using
strict liability. The question then becomes: do the relative benefits of negligence still outweigh the
loss in efficiency caused by hindsight bias?
Would full hindsight bias have different implications if C0 instead assigned a probability δ < 1 to
an accident? Assume that C0 instead assigns a probability δ ∈ (p (0) , 1) to accidents, where the
lower bound reflects the idea that hindsight bias amounts to the overestimation of the likelihood
of an accident. Then the statement of Proposition 2.1 would only require one change: replacing y
by yδ ≡ arg miny≥0 y + δD (y). We have yδ < y, since the pay off to damage-mitigation increases
with the likelihood of an accident. When δ ∈ (p (0) , 1), it is then cheaper for – and therefore more
likely that – DM complies with the hindsight-biased court’s requirement, as due care is closer to the
efficient level. Furthermore, social welfare is higher at yδ than y as this level of damage-mitigation
more closely approximates y (0), the optimal investment under zero accident-prevention.
How do the implications of partial hindsight bias differ from those of full hindsight bias? Both
a partially and fully hindsight-biased court set due care at (0, y); the difference in DM’s behavior
is entirely driven by her anticipation of C0;a’s degree of soft counterfactual thinking. Since C0;a’s
counterfactual thinking requires DM to invest x > 0 in accident-prevention to escape liability,
partial hindsight bias causes a smaller distortion in effort than full hindsight bias. However, DM
needs to invest on accident-prevention to evade liability under partial hindsight bias, which makes
the negligence turn into strict liability more frequently than under full hindsight bias. On net, it is
therefore unclear if soft counterfactual thinking is welfare-enhancing under the negligence standard.
65In the basic model that I present in this chapter, the negligence rule and strict liability rule have the same implications
for DM’s behavior. The equivalence between the two prevalent forms of liability however stops holding once the model is
complicated (Shavell 1986).
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2.4 The probable cause standard
The Fourth Amendment requires the police to weigh out the social goal of crime control and the
desire to preserve privacy (see Packer 1964 for an early analysis of the criminal process).66 In this
section, I focus on one approach to meeting the Fourth Amendment’s objectives, the “probable
cause” standard. According to the probable cause standard, a court does not award the police the
conviction of an individual – even if guilty of the crime he is accused of – when an arrest was the
result of an overly-aggressive search.67 The corresponding maximal level of search intensity allowed
by the court is referred to as exclusionary care. The analysis in this Section follows the same general
format as that of Section 4.
2.4.1 The classical probable cause standard
In this subsection, I outline the motivation and main findings from the classical study of the probable
standard. To minimize the introduction of new notation, I call h the disutility to society from crime.
The greater the level of search aggressiveness, x, the more likely a police is to make a seizure,
1 − p (x). Alternatively, p (x) describes the payoff from aggressive searches through a reduction in
the likelihood of crime. I think of qxx as the direct cost to society of aggressive searches in the form
of privacy infringement. The police force (DM) bears no costs to aggressive searches but internalizes
the benefit of crime control. To break ties, I however assume that when indifferent, DM chooses
the lower level of effort.
It is easy to see that when unregulated, DM exerts infinite effort on minimizing crime, as her
problem is minx≥0 p (x)h. I refer to this outcome as the unregulated benchmark. In contrast,
efficient effort requires taking into account both the cost of effort and the expected harm to society
from the activity,
min
x≥0
qxx+ p (x)h. (8)
66This idea has been expressed explicitly in legal rulings: “in judging reasonableness, we look to the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty” (Illinois v. Lidster 2004). Packer (1964) provides an early legal analysis of the criminal process. Note
that this principle can also be enforced ex ante by requiring the police to obtain a warrant before performing a search.
67Legal rulings have expressed the idea in explicit terms: “in judging reasonableness, we look to the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty” (Illinois v. Lidster 2004). This principle can be enforced ex-ante by requiring the police to obtain
a warrant before performing a search. The guiding principle is that warrants should be obtained in advance, unless expedite
action is required, in which case the probable cause standard is applied following an arrest to decide whether evidence obtained
can be included for prosecution.
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The optimization problem (8) is quasiconcave since p (.) is a decreasing and convex function, and
so the efficient benchmark x∗ solves the First Order Condition, qx + p′ (x)h = 0.
Following a police seizure S = 1, a (rational) court C decides whether to award a police force
DM the conviction of a criminal. The legality of the search depends exclusively upon the state of
knowledge of the police officers who performed it; the outcome of the search is thus irrelevant.68
According to the probable cause standard, the conviction is only awarded when the level of search
aggressiveness x was below the socially efficient level. Formally, DM solves the following problem
in Stage 1 of the game:
min
x≥0
qxx+ p (x)h · Ix>x∗ ,
where I. is the indicator function.
Since DM escapes liability by investing efficiently in precautions, she has no incentive to invest
more than the efficient level. On the other hand, DM faces the social planner’s problem (5) when
effort is above the efficient level on either dimension. Conditional on taking effort below the efficient
level, DM then finds it optimal to invest the socially optimal level of effort. The crucial difference
between the probable cause and negligence standards is that DM is now punished when too much
effort was undertaken. In that case, the fruits of an illegal search are discarded, and so a criminal
may escape prosecution even when guilty of the crime he is accused of.
2.4.2 The probable cause standard with a fully hindsight-biased court
Following a police seizure S = 1, a fully hindsight-biased court C1 sets exclusionary care at
x ≡ minx≥0 qxx = 0, which it perceives to maximize social welfare. Proposition 2.3 makes pre-
cise the effect of full hindsight bias:
Proposition 2.3: When the court is fully hindsight-biased, the implementation of the probable
cause standard leads to the following outcome: DM does not invest in crime-prevention, C1 sets
exclusionary care at x = 0, and DM is never awarded a conviction.
Proof : In-text.
68See the legal rulings in Weeks v. U.S . 1916, Map v. Ohio 1961, Wolf v. Colorado 1979, United States v. Leon 1985.
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The court believes that crime control would have been achieved regardless of whether an ag-
gressive search was undertaken. But since the fully biased court C1 correctly internalizes the cost
of privacy breach, the police is only awarded a conviction when no crime-prevention is undertaken.
Hence any level of search aggressiveness is perceived as being excessive. In anticipation of the court’s
behavior, DM does not engage in aggressive searches, which leads to too little crime control from a
social perspective.
2.4.3 The probable cause standard with a partially hindsight-biased court
Assume that C1;a is a partially biased court that witnessed a police seizure S = 1 following an
investment of x = a in accident-prevention by DM. C1;a’s perceptions about the likelihood of an
accident are the mirror image of C0;a’s perceptions (see Figure 2.2). This crucial distinction comes
from the fact that a probable cause ruling follows a success S = 1 in risk management, while a
negligence ruling follows a failure S = 0. Formally, C1;a awards DM a conviction if she exerts a
maximal level of effort that solves
x1 (a) ≡ min
x≥0
qxx+ p1 (x; a)h.
In Proposition 2.4, I state the implications of partial hindsight bias on the probable cause standard:
Proposition 2.4: Assume that the harm from crime is fixed at a predetermined level D (y) =
h > 0 for all y. Then the optimal level of effort perceived by a partially hindsight-biased court C1;a
satisfies
x1 (a) = min {a, x∗} ,
where x = a is the level of crime-prevention exerted by DM. We then obtain the following outcome
from implementing the probable cause standard: DM invests the socially efficient level x∗ in crime
control, C1;a sets exclusionary care at x∗, and DM is awarded a conviction following a seizure.
Proof : In-text.
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The characterization of p1 (.; a) implies that C1;a understands the infra-marginal value of crime-
prevention, but never perceives the marginal value of additional effort. Hence when DM exerts at
least the efficient level of effort, C1;a correctly perceives that the socially efficient level of crime
control to maximize welfare. But when DM exerts less than the efficient level of effort, C1;a mis-
perceives the observed level of crime-prevention to be optimal. DM is then awarded a conviction
whenever effort is below the exclusionary threshold, i.e. for all a such that a ≤ x1 (a) = min {a, x∗}.
This condition is clearly satisfied for any level of effort below the efficient level, a ≤ x∗. Because
DM always prefers having more crime control, she then chooses the socially efficient level of crime
control. This finding conforms with recent experimental evidence, which suggests that judges 1)
make similar rulings on probable cause in foresight and in hindsight, but 2) exhibit hindsight bias
in their perception of the likely outcome of a search (Wistrich et al. 2005; Rachlinski et al. 2011).
While puzzling at face value, such a duality follows naturally from the formalization of (partial)
hindsight bias.
2.4.4 Discussion
Does the stark implication of full hindsight bias follow from the assumption that C1 assigns a
probability 1 to a seizure (Proposition 2.3)? Say that the court instead attaches a fixed probability
γ to a seizure, then exclusionary care would instead have been set at x
γ
≡ minx≥0 qxx+ (1− γ)h =
0 = x. Hence relaxing the definition of hindsight bias does not affect the conclusions in the text,
unlike in the study of the negligence standard. Note that in the present context, the police force
has no control over the level of crime. Presumably, the harm from crime, h, is determined by a
criminal whose behavior lies outside of the model.
One upside is that under the probable cause standard, counterfactual thinking may arise more
naturally, as the court may realize that it is not reasonable to expect that aggressive searches have
absolutely no role to play in the outcome the police has come to court for. When this is the
case, Proposition 2.4 says that partially biased courts are able to move society back to the socially
efficient level of crime control, which implies that counterfactual thinking is an unambiguously
effective remedy to hindsight bias in this context.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the implications of “hindsight bias” on two legal standards: negligence
and probable cause. In contexts where the negligence rule is applied, I found that hindsight bias
discourages preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of an accident, but encourages investment
that reduces its severity. In contexts where the probable cause standard is applied, I showed that
hindsight bias discourages aggressive searches that are meant to increase the likelihood of police
seizures. I also studied the effectiveness of counterfactual thinking as a remedy for hindsight bias,
and found that it is less effective under the negligence standard than the probable cause standard.
The present study of the effect of hindsight bias on the legal system can be extended in a number
of directions. A natural next step would be to endogenize the occurrence of counterfactual thinking.
Relatedly, the model does not allow a hindsight-biased court to learn from its past experiences. This
is a particularly important limitation in the context of the negligence standard, where my findings
suggest that a hindsight-biased court’s perceptions do not conform with the decision-maker’s actual
choices. From a broader perspective, I have only investigated the implications of hindsight bias on
the legal system. Moving forward, the hope is that the study of this psychological tendency will
grow more commensurate with the enormous amount of evidence that has been produced for its
existence.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2.1: Optimal reaction curves
Notes: The decision-maker’s optimal reaction curves for accident-prevention (x (y)) and damage-mitigation (y (x)).
Starting with any level of effort (x (y) , y) on the x (y) curve, a vertical arrow points toward a superior combination of
effort levels (x (y) , y (x (y))) for DM. Starting with any level of effort (x, y (x)) on the y (x) curve, a horizontal arrow
points toward a superior combination of effort levels (x (y (x)) , y (x)) for DM. This figure illustrates that whenever
x (y) is steeper than y (x) in the (x, y) − plane, the intersection of the two curves corresponds with the socially
efficient-level of effort, (x∗, y∗).
75
Figure 2.2: Partial hindsidght bias
Notes: Illustration of partial hindsight bias given that DM exerts x = a in accident-prevention. The blue solid line
represents the likelihood of an accident for different levels of effort, p (.). This curve highlights that 1) DM needs not
fully control the outcome of the activity she engages in, 2) a failure does not necessarily follow when no effort is exerted
(p (0) < 1), and 3) a success does not necessarily take place when maximal effort is undertaken (limx→∞ p (x) > 0).
The red curve is C0;a’s perception of the likelihood of an accident following S = 0 (p0 (.; a)), while the green line is
C1;a’s perception of the likelihood of an accident following a success S = 1 (p1 (.; a).
76
Figure 2.3: The negligence standard under full hindsight bias
Notes: The negligence standard under full hindsight bias and an accident with a fixed probability p. This figure
depicts DM’s utility as a function of damage-mitigation y in two contexts: frequent accidents (p = p′ > p) and rare
accidents (p = p′′ < p). The red line represents DM’s utility from investing a minimum of y on damage-mitigation.
Over this range, DM is not held liable for damages, and so only incur the direct cost of damage mitigation, y. The
green (blue) curve represents DM’s utility from internalizing the full social cost of the accident, which she must incur
when exerting less than due care y = y, when p = p′ > p (p = p′′ < p).
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Figure 2.4: The negligence under partial hindsight bias
Notes: The negligence standard under partial hindsight bias and a potential accident that causes a fixed damage
h. The black curve depicts DM’s utility as as a function of accident-prevention x. The Figure also illustrates the
court’s perception of DM’s utility given two possible values of DM’s investment in accident-prevention: a = x (h), and
a = x∗ (h). I use blue curves to indicate DM’s perceived utility for levels of accident-prevention above the observed
level, x = a, where the court correctly perceives the marginal value of effort. I then use red curves to indicate DM’s
perceived utility for levels of effort below the observed level, x = a, where the court misperceives the accident to be
inevitable regardless of the investment made in accident-prevention.
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2.7 Proofs
Corollary 2.2: Assume that DM cannot reduce the likelihood of an accident, i.e. p (x) = p for all
x, and that the damage function takes the form D (y) ≡ αy+1 , where α ≥ 0. When p ≥ p = 14 , the
welfare loss from full hindsight bias becomes infinite as α→∞.
Proof of Corollary 2.2: Solving for DM’s optimal level of damage-mitigation, we obtain
αp
(
1
y∗ (p) + 1
)2
= 1,
and so y∗ (p) = √αp − 1, and y = √α − 1. Plugging into the defining equation for p, we obtain
p ≡
{
p|√αp− 1 + p α√αp =
√
α− 1
}
=
{
p| 2√αp = √α} = 14 . The effect of full hindsight bias on
welfare when p ≥ p is then:
y − y∗ (p) + p (D (y)−D (y∗ (p))) = √α (1−√p) + p
(
1√
α
− 1√
αp
)
→ ∞ as α→∞ 
Technical Lemma: The reaction curves of DM perceived by a partially hindsight-biased court
C0;a satisfy
x0 (y0; a) =

x (y0) if y0 < y (a)
0 if y0 ≥ y (a)
.
and
y0 (x0; a) =

y if x0 ≤ a
D′−1
(
− 1p(x0)+1−p(a)
)
if x0 > a
,
where x = a is the level of accident-prevention exerted by DM, x (.) and y (.) refer to DM’s correct
reaction curves, y (a) ≡ {y|D (y) = qxx (y) + p0 (x (y) ; a)D (y)} < {y|x (y) = a} and y is defined
as in (7).
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Proof of Technical Lemma: Starting with damage-mitigation, there are two cases to consider.
When x0 ≤ a, C0;a perceives the accident to be inevitable (p (x0; a) = 1) and so y0 (x0; a) = y. When
x0 > a, y0 (x0; a) is implicitly defined by the FOC
qy + p0 (x0; a)D
′ (y0 (x0; a)) = qy + [p (x0) + 1− p (a)]D′ (y0 (x0; a)) = 0.
Comparing y0 (x0; a) to y (x0), we then have y0 (x0; a) = D′−1
(
− 1p(x0)+1−p(a)
)
> D′−1
(
− 1p(x0)
)
=
y (x0), since D′′ > 0 and p (x0) + 1− p (a) > p (x0).
Turning to accident-prevention, recall that C0;a correctly perceives the marginal value of effort
above the level exhibited by DM (x > a), but misperceives the accident to be inevitable for any
level of effort below DM’s choice of effort (x ≤ a). Given this observation, it is clear that C0;a
may only perceive as optimal two possible levels of of effort: zero accident prevention, or efficient
accident prevention x (y0). To determine which one obtains, I study the sign of the cost savings
S (a, y0) from choosing x = x (y0) over x = 0:
S (y0; a) ≡ p0 (0; a)D (y0)− qxx (y0)− p0 (x (y0) ; a)D (y0)
= (1− p0 (x (y0) ; a))D (y0)− qxx (y0) .
By the envelope theorem, we have ∂∂y0S (y0; a) = (1− p0 (x (y0) ; a))D (y0) < 0. Hence x (y0)
dominates for small values of y0, while 0 dominates for large values of y0. Finally, we have
y (a) < {y|x (y) = a} since S (a; y (a)) = −qxa < 0, i.e. C0;a sets due care at 0 when y0 = y (a). 
Proposition 2.2: Let x ≡ {a| y (a) = y} ∈ (0, x (y)), where x (y) < x∗. When the court
is partially hindsight-biased, there are two potential outcomes from implementing the negligence
standard:
• If qxx∗ + y∗ + p (x∗)D (y∗) ≤ qxx+ y, DM chooses levels of effort (x∗, y∗), C0;a sets due care
at
(
0, y
)
, and DM is held strictly liable.
• If qxx∗+ y∗+ p (x∗)D (y∗) > qxx+ y, DM chooses levels of effort
(
x, y
)
, C0;a sets due care at(
0, y
)
, and DM is never held liable.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: To simplify exposition, this proof will rely on a graphical argument.
The proof relies on insights from the Technical Lemma on the perception of C0;a about the shape
of DM’s reaction curves. From Technical Lemma, it is easy to see that y0 (x0; a) > y (x0) for all
a. Furthermore, the kink in y (x; a) at y (a) moves upward in the (x − y) − plane as the observed
level of effort a increases. This obtains easily through the total differentiation of the equality that
defines y (a) (dy(a)da =
∂p(x(y(a)),a)
∂a
D(y(a))
[p(0,a)−p(x(y(a));a)]D′(y(a)) < 0).
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C0;a sets due care at the intersection of the perceived reaction curves of DM, as long as the
reaction-curve with respect to damage-mitigation is flatter than the one for accident-prevention.
Applying this insight, it is easy to see graphically – using the Technical Lemma – that if DM chooses
a level of accident-prevention below x, C0;a sets due care at x > x on accident-prevention. If DM
chooses a level of accident-prevention above x, C0;a sets due care at x = 0 on accident-prevention.
The last thing I need to show is that x < x
(
y
)
. Assuming that x ≥ x (y), we obtain a
contradiction since D
(
y
)
= qxx
(
y
)
+ p0
(
x
(
y
)
;x
)
D
(
y
)
= qxx
(
y
)
+ D
(
y
)
> D
(
y
)
, where the
inequality follows from the fact that p0 (x; a) = 1 whenever x ≤ a. 
69D′ (y0 (a)) dy0 (a) =
∂p(x(y0(a)),a)
∂a
D (y0 (a)) da+ p (x (y0 (a)) , a)D
′ (y0 (a)) dy0 (a)
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Lemma 2.1: Assume that the harm from an accident is fixed at a predetermined level D (y) =
h > 0 for all y. Denote x∗ (h) the socially efficient level given a level of harm h, and let x (h) ≡
{a|h = qxx∗ (h) + p0 (x∗ (h) ; a)h} ∈ (0, x∗ (h)). Then the optimal level of accident-prevention per-
ceived by a partially hindsight-biased court C0;a satisfies
x0 (a) =

x∗ (h) if a < x (h)
0 if a ≥ x (h)
,
where x = a is the level of accident-prevention exerted by DM. We then obtain the follow outcome
from implementing the negligence standard: DM chooses effort x (h), C0;a sets due care at 0, and
DM escapes liability.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: I fill gaps in the Proof of Lemma 2 provided in the text of the chapter. I
start by establishing that C0;a perceives DM to potentially take only two courses of action. The first
perceived possibility is that DM chooses zero accident-prevention in order to minimize losses (Option
A). This dominates any effort level x ≤ a, given C0;a’s correct understanding that precautionary
measures are costly, combined with its incorrect perception that an accident is inevitable (p0 (x; a) =
1). The second perceived possibility is that DM chooses max {a, x∗ (h)} (Option B). This dominates
any effort level x > a, given that C0;a correctly understands the marginal value of effort over this
range, and so wants to mimic the efficient level as closely as possible.
To translate these insights into a characterization of the optimal amount of effort perceived
by C0;a, I compare the costs of Option A and Option B. C0;a always perceives the cost of Option
A to be h. Turning to Option B, max {a, x∗ (h)}, I discuss separately the case where a < x∗ (h)
and a ≥ x∗ (h). When a < x∗ (h), max {a, x∗ (h)} = x∗ (h), and so the cost of Option B is
qxx
∗ (h)+p (x∗ (h) ; a)h. Because qxx∗ (h)+p (x∗ (h) ; a)h is increasing in a, Option A dominates for
a < x (h), while Option B dominates for a ∈ [x (h) , x∗ (h)). When a ≥ x∗ (h), max {a, x∗ (h)} = a,
and so the cost of Option B is a + h. Because a + h > h; Option A necessarily dominates for
a ≥ x∗ (h). Combining these findings, I obtain the characterization of x0 (a) in the statement of
Lemma 2. 
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Chapter 3
The Inter-generational and Social Transmission
of Cultural Traits:
Theory and Evidence from Smoking Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Cultural traits and norms, like risk-preferences, corruption, and altruism, are important in shaping
individual economic behavior. The process by which such traits get transmitted from one generation
to the next determines whether they survive and and how they are geographically distributed. In this
study, we explain how cultures first emerge in society and how they may persist across generations
even when parental preferences change over time. Our study adds to a growing economics literature
that looks at the joint role of parental and social channels of cultural transmission.
Researchers from a wide range of scientific disciplines have long debated the nature/nurture
question to evaluate the relative contribution of cultural (or environmental) and genetic effects on
cognitive and psychological traits (Sacerdote 2011). Economists have also contributed to this debate,
and have provided elaborate theory predicting that the genetic transmission of traits determines
behavior (Robson and Samuelson 2011). However, this literature generally concurs with the standard
Darwinian prediction of the survival of the fittest, and is at odds with evidence for the resilience
of minoritarian ethnic and religious traits, e.g. among the US immigrant population. The ‘melting
pot’ hypothesis, which suggests that characteristics and traits of the immigrant population in the
US will converge over time until they resemble those of the general population, is not consistent with
observed patterns. The observed behavior and characteristics of migrants conforms more closely
to the ‘salad bowl’ hypothesis, which suggests that different ethnic and minoritarian communities
can simultaneously co-exist and maintain their respective cultural identities. In fact, norms in the
country of immigrant origin are found to significantly predict the behavior of second- and third-
generation US immigrants (e.g Borjas 1992, Fernandez and Fogli 2009, Algan and Cahuc 2010).
Starting with Bisin and Verdier (2001), the cultural transmission literature emerged to provide a
rationale for this previously unexplained persistence of cultural traits (see Bisin and Verdier 2011
for a review).
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Bisin and Verdier (2001) developed a model in which children acquire traits either via societal
role models or via parental socialization efforts. They assume that children are more likely to acquire
a given trait the more prevalent that trait is in society, and that all parents want to transmit their
own cultural trait to their children. Given these assumptions, their model identifies a key feature of
the social environment that ensures the co-existence of cultural traits in equilibrium. This property,
which Bisin and Verdier term cultural ’substitutability’, states that parents socialize their children
less when their cultural trait is more prevalent in the population. Although ground-breaking, Bisin
and Verdier’s model fails to explain the persistence of traits that all parents want to avoid passing on
to their children, even if they themselves possess them (e.g. insincerity, preferences for unprotected
sex, substance use, low educational attainment). Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) address this failure
by imposing that societal role models who belong to the minority group have a disproportionate
influence on children. This condition ensures the resilience of traits that parents do not actively
transmit.
Still, existing theory fails to account for two important aspects of cultural transmission. First,
it says little about how traits emerge. If societal role models of a new cultural trait do not exist
then it is unclear how that culture would arise in a society where all parents socialize their children
to the same preferred culture. Second, the theory does not inform us about how and why parents
with the same cultural trait may prefer different traits for their children. Most efforts have focused
on developing a framework for contexts where parents’ cultural attitudes are fixed. Yet, history is
alive with examples of newly born cultural traits (e.g. the culture of social networking) and traits
that switched from being perceived as virtuous or socially acceptable to being perceived as bad or
undesirable, and vice versa (e.g. preferences about smoking, polluting the environment, pre-marital
sex, polygyny, divorce, womens’ rights etc.). Using the smoking habit as a case-study, we adapt the
cultural transmission framework to account for this general class of traits.
Smoking of tobacco was first adopted before the 15th century by native Americans, who used it
for recreation, medicinal purposes, or as a hallucinogenic in rituals. When Christopher Columbus
and his crew discovered the American continent, they also discovered smoking of tobacco and
introduced the practice to Europe. In 1854, Philip Morris made the first hand-rolled cigarettes in
London’s Bond Street. The second industrial revolution then saw the invention of the cigarette
rolling machine, which made it possible to mass produce cigarettes cheaply. From that time and till
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the 1960s, the habit of smoking diffused rapidly, producing high profits for the tobacco industry.
By the time of the world wars, smoking had become so socially acceptable that governments in
most countries distributed cigarettes to troops as part of their regular daily rations. Some even
continued to subsidize cigarette consumption during peacetime. The social perception of smoking
started to change only after the publication of the Royal College of Physicians 1962 report on
Smoking and Health (RCPL, 1962) and the US Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking (USDHEW
1964). Those reports compiled and distilled for public consumption scientific evidence about the
health consequences of tobacco use that had been accumulating for more than three decades. In the
ensuing years, public campaigns against tobacco consumption followed. Over time, those campaigns
and the ever accumulating evidence impacted the popularity of the smoking habit.
What this brief history of smoking teaches us is that the dynamics of the smoking culture
have been shaped by the strategic behavior of a profit-maximizing industry, and the discovery
and diffusion of scientific evidence. We take this lesson to theory and build the first model of
cultural transmission that is able to predict both the emergence and the long-term persistence of
culture in a world where outside forces may affect parents’ preferred trait for their children. In our
model, the flexibility in parental preferences is due to the availability and spread of information
affecting perceptions about the health cost of smoking. This makes our setup more general than
existing models, each of which assumes a particular distribution of parental preferences, e.g. that
all parents promote their own trait (Bisin and Verdier 2001) or that all parents promote the same
trait (Saez-Marti and Sjogren 2008). We also relax a standard assumption in the literature that
children are more likely to acquire a given trait the more popular that trait is in society. Instead,
we assume the existence of a tobacco industry which can manipulate youth smoking behavior (e.g.
via advertising). We respectively define as cultural conformity and cultural distinction the positive
and the negative relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of
that trait in society. Our theory formalizes the relationship of parental and social influences that
existing models predict by showing that cultural substitution in the parental channel of transmission
is always tied to cultural conformity in the social channel of transmission. It also makes the novel
prediction that cultural distinction is always tied to cultural complementarity. To establish support
for our predictions, we carry out an empirical investigation of smoking behavior using U.S. data.
Our empirical exercise adds to a small but growing group of ‘structural socialization studies’ that
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explicitly test the properties of the transmission mechanism (e.g. Jellal and Wolff 2002, Namoro and
Roushdy 2008, Patacchini and Zenou 2011, Dohmen et al. 2012). Consistent with our theoretical
set-up, we model smoking participation by children as a function of parental socialization efforts and
societal influences. We then estimate this function using a novel dataset. Specifically, we use data on
the smoking behavior of parents and children, and on parental efforts to socialize children against
substance use, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We combine these data with newly
constructed smoking prevalence rates from the Current Population Survey, and newly collected
data on individual exposure to anti-smoking information based on the content of magazine articles.
Our identification of the causal effect of parental socialization relies on state- and time-variation in
parental exposure to anti-smoking information. Our identication of the causal effect of the societal
influences relies on the state-level measurement of the smoking prevalence, which rules out bias due
to peer-choice and residential selection, and on the use of fixed effects, which account for unobserved
factors that drive both individual and group behavior. We find evidence that supports our variant
of the cultural transmission theory. Using our results, we project smoking participation rates of
children to future generations and show that they converge to a steady-state in which smoking
persists.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we summarize the health economics liter-
ature on smoking behavior and explain how this falls short of describing smoking dynamics across
generations. In Section 3.3 we formally present our model. In Sections 3.4-3.6, we describe our
empirical strategy, the data we use, and our empirical results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the
chapter.
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3.2 Health economics literature on the transmission of smoking
Empirically, children whose parents smoke are themselves more likely to smoke. But researchers
have not established that this simple correlation reflects a causal relationship. Available evidence is
often suspect because studies use poor data, small samples, or fail to account for the endogeneity
of parental smoking decisions. Even the better studies have produced mixed evidence. Loureiro et
al. (2010) find correlations consistent with sex-specific transmission using a UK sample. Göhlmann
et al. (2010) find no sex differences using German data. Using the same data but a different iden-
tification strategy, Lillard (2011) finds that parental smoking behavior does not influence whether
children start smoking (for a review of earlier studies see Avenevoli and Ries Merikangas 2003). One
explanation for these mixed findings is that parental behavior may have countervailing influences on
their children smoking habits and these influences may cancel out each other’s effect. For example,
a child of a smoker may be discouraged from smoking by parental advice and anti-smoking rules in
the home (Powell and Chaloupka, 2005). Conversely, a child of a non-smoker may be attracted to
smoking as an act of revolution against parental control (Huver et al., 2007). Such diverse influences
of parenting styles have been overlooked by most of the empirical studies.
Further, social transmission mechanisms of smoking may also be at play. Children may copy
the smoking behavior of their peers or societal role-models irrespective of their parents’ behavior.
This channel of smoking transmission has been the subject of a large and growing literature in
economics, which consents that ’peer-effects’ are important drivers of smoking participation. This
general conclusion is qualitatively robust across different definitions of peer groups, e.g. school-
mates, classmates or friends (Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Powel, Tauras and Ross 2005, Lundborg
2006, Clark and Loheac 2007, Fletcher 2010); siblings (Harris and Lopez-Valcarcel 2008); partners
(Clark and Etile 2006); and the population residing in the same state or prefecture (DeCicca et al
2008, Yamamura 2011). Christopoulou and Lillard (2013) argue that, in fact, societal influences on
smoking participation stretch beyond current generations and across national borders. They show
that the smoking prevalence of the children of British immigrants in Australia, South Africa, and
the US, varies systematically with the smoking behavior of their parents’ birth cohort in the UK
when that cohort was at the same point in their life-cycle. The implication is that immigrant parents
who grew up in a culture that tolerated (or even condoned) smoking will carry and transmit those
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values (consciously or subconsciously) to their children, thereby increasing the probability that they
smoke.
The available theory on the economics of smoking does not reflect the intuitive processes that
the empirical evidence describes. To analyze smoking behavior, researchers typically use either a
myopic addiction model or a rational addiction model. These models aim to explain the life-course
dynamics of the consumption of addictive goods assuming that individuals introspectively change
their own preferences. The former model assumes that current consumption depends on one’s
own past consumption (Pollak 1970, 1976a); the latter model assumes that current consumption
depends both on its past levels and on expectations of future consumption (Stigler and Becker 1977;
Becker and Murphy 1988). Both models ignore the possibility that one’s consumption may depend
on the (past, present, or future) consumption of another person. As importantly, both models
stipulate that the initial consumption of the addictive good (i.e. when previous consumption has
been consistently zero) depends only on current factors and characteristics (e.g. prices). Thus,
neither model is able to account for the fact that two individuals with similar characteristics who
face exactly the same environment may take different smoking initiation decisions depending on
their familial experiences during childhood. In effect, the models fail to achieve their purpose of
describing consumption dynamics over the life-course, and they completely ignore consumption
dynamics across generations. The same holds for subsequent models that were built to reconcile
the myopic and rational addiction theories (e.g. Orphanides and Zervos 1995, 1998).
The economic theory on social interactions, which was developing concurrently with the theory
of addiction, offers a less restrictive framework of analysis. The benchmark study by Pollak (1976b)
developed a model of habit formation and learning, allowing individual preferences to depend on
others’ behavior, which either provides information about the costs and benefits of behavior, or
establishes a point of reference. However, rarely have the theoretical implications of this approach
been drawn with respect to smoking behavior, and in the few occasions that they have, they have
focused on peer effects and have ignored the parental channel of transmission (e.g. Nakajima
2007, Poutvaara and Siemers 2008). In this chapter, we draw on the literature of intergenerational
transmission of cultural traits to extend the theoretical analysis in this direction.
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3.3 The model
3.3.1 Environment
Assume that there are an infinite number of periods (t = 1, 2, 3, ...), and each individual is alive for
two consecutive periods. A person born in period t is a child in period t and an adult in period
t+ 1. Each individual bears one child in adulthood. Hence, in period t+ 1 the population consists
of two overlapping generations: adults (born in period t) and children (born in period t + 1). We
use “he” to refer to a generic child and “she” to refer to a generic adult.
Individuals are either smokers or non-smokers; we call qt the proportion of the youth who smoke
in period t. We then denote Qt+1 the proportion of adult smokers in period t+ 1. An individual’s
smoking behavior need not be constant throughout the course of a lifetime, since a smoker may
decide to quit smoking. To simplify the exposition, we however impose Qt+1 = qt. This is consistent
with the literature on cultural transmission, which assumes a cultural trait is acquired once and for
all during childhood.70 Our results are qualitatively robust to extending the model to one where
parents may quit smoking in adulthood.
3.3.2 Socialization process
Children are born without predefined traits and acquire their smoking behavior through a trans-
mission process. A child is first exposed to his parent’s influence, a process we refer to as vertical
transmission. The parent’s preferred trait need not coincide with her exhibited trait, and so our
specification does not force parents to socialize their children to their own traits. In particular,
a smoker parent may choose to socialize her child away from smoking, while remaining a smoker
herself. The driving force for this divergence between own behavior and desired behavior could
be, for instance, that quitting has addiction costs that are only incurred by someone who already
smokes. To our knowledge, Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) and Patacchini and Zenou (2011) are the
only studies to have theoretically investigated in a cultural transmission framework the possibility
that parents agree on the trait to be passed on to future generations (e.g. educational attainment).
70By implicitly assuming that socialization is a function of a parent’s youth (rather than adult) smoking behavior, we are
imposing that attitudes towards smoking are acquired early on in life. This modeling assumption allows us to abstract away
from the strategic considerations that would arise from a situation where it would be Pareto optimal for all parents to quit
smoking for their childrens’ sake, but who cannot credibly commit to doing so because they each have an incentive to freeride
on others’ efforts.
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In contrast, the bulk of the literature on cultural transmission has been motivated by the study of
traits like religion, where parents want to promote their own trait.
Bisin and Verdier call ‘direct’ transmission the process of having parents socialize children to
their own traits. ‘Vertical transmission’ can thus be thought of as a generalization of ‘direct trans-
mission’.71 We will then refer to a parent socializing her child to her own trait as direct socialization,
and to a parent socializing her child to a trait other than her own as active socialization. From here
on, we focus on the case where all parents want to discourage their children from becoming smok-
ers. A smoker parent does not directly socialize her child to smoke, nor does a non-smoker parent
actively socialize her child to smoke. This feature arises endogenously once we let parents choose
the extent of vertical transmission, as it would be counterproductive to ever encourage children to
acquire the unwanted cultural trait. In the terminology of the model, non-smoker parents directly
socialize their children to their own trait with probability d (qt), while smoker-parents actively so-
cialize their children to the other trait with probability a (qt). With remaining probability 1−d (qt)
for non-smoker parents, and 1− a (qt) for smoker parents, the child acquires his trait through non
parental influences, a channel which the literature typically labels as horizontal transmission.
With probability S (qt) / 1 − S (qt), the child then becomes a smoker/non-smoker. We think of
S (qt) as reflecting not only the influence of societal role models but also the advertising efforts of
a profit-maximizing tobacco industry, as well as the child’s own choices.
Throughout the analysis, we impose one of two possible assumptions on the vertical transmission
process: cultural substitution or cultural complementarity. The concept of cultural substitution
has been a cornerstone of the literature starting with Bisin and Verdier (2001), while cultural
complementarity has received less attention (e.g. Bisin, Topa and Verdier 2004; Patacchini and
Zenou 2011).
Assumption V1 (Cultural Substitution): d (qt) and a (qt) are increasing in qt, and d (0) =
a (0) = 0.
Assumption V2 (Cultural Complementarity): d (qt) and a (qt) are decreasing in qt, and d (1) =
a (1) = 0.
71Note however that our terminology deviates from the literature, which interchangeably uses “vertical” and “direct” trans-
mission to refer to children mimicking their parents.
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Assumption V1 says that a parent’s vertical transmission effort is an increasing function of the
unwanted trait in society, and that parents exert no effort when the unwanted trait is absent from
society. When smoking is the unwanted trait, parents want to make sure their children do not
fall prey to the influence of smoker role models, and so d (qt) and a (qt) are increasing functions
of smoking prevalence qt. Assumption V2 says that a parent’s vertical transmission effort is a
decreasing function of smoking prevalence in society. This phenomenon can emanate in two possible
ways. Parents may either give up on socializing their children when the outside threat becomes
greater, or the threat of the unwanted trait might be decreasing with its prevalence in society.
We also impose one of two assumption on the horizontal transmission process: cultural con-
formity or cultural distinction. While cultural conformity has been an implicit feature of existing
models on cultural transmission, cultural distinction has been largely overlooked by theoretical stud-
ies. In a recent paper, Bisin et al. (2013) call cultural conformity (distinction) the drop (increase)
in psychological costs of interacting with a member of an outside cultural group when that outside
group becomes more dominant. They use those notions to understand the implications of ethnic
identify on marriage outcomes in a cultural transmission framework. We, however, define those
concepts differently:
Assumption H1 (Cultural conformity): S (qt) is increasing in qt.
Assumption H2 (Cultural distinction): S (qt) is decreasing in qt.
A large literature on identity formation in psychology, sociology, and political science argues
that cultural or ethnic minority groups may either pursue cultural assimilation into the majority
population or they may strive to keep their distinct identities.72 We follow this reasoning to assume
that the child culturally distinguishes himself when he horizontally adopts the minority culture, and
he culturally conforms when he horizontally adopts the majority culture. Thus, cultural distinction
predicts that the greater smoking prevalence is in society, the less likely the child is to adopt this
trait. Cultural conformity makes the opposite prediction, that the greater smoking prevalence is in
society, the more likely the child is to adopt this trait.
As we noted above, our definition of cultural conformity has been implicitly assumed in the
literature as part of the horizontal socialization. Existing work has thought of S (qt) as representing
72 See Bisin and Verdier (2011) for a survey of this literature and a list of references.
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a matching process, i.e. the likelihood a child is matched to a smoker role model from the population
of adults (random-matching (e.g. Bisin and Verdier 2001; Bisin et al.2013); non-random matching
(e.g. Bisin et al. 2004; Saez-Marti and Sjogren 2008)).73 This matching process must satisfy two
basic properties: (i) A child can only be matched to a non-smoker/smoker when there are only non-
smokers/smokers (S (0) = 0 and S (1) = 1), and (ii) the likelihood of being matched to a smoker
increases with the proportion of smokers in society (i.e. our definition of cultural conformity). As
we will show in the empirical section of this chapter, there is strong support for the possibility of
having cultural distinction, which cannot be accommodated by existing models. More importantly,
the study of dynamics in Section 3.3.5 reveals that under cultural substitution, assuming S (0) = 0
leads to the disappearing of the smoking culture in steady state, which is at odds with real-world
behavior. The mechanism for horizontal transmission that we propose addresses this gap in the
theoretical literature.
3.3.3 Endogenous vertical transmission
We now explicitly define the likelihood that a child follows his parent’s desire to not smoke as a
function of parental socialization. We find the optimal level of parental investment, and derive
comparative statics for the effect of smoking prevalence and health costs of smoking.
As before, the subscript i ∈ {0, 1} denotes the adult’s smoking behavior. When the child is
born, his parent decides how much to invest in his anti-smoking socialization, λi ≥ 0. The cost of
socialization is c (λi), and causes the child to become a non-smoker with probability v (λi). With
remaining probability 1−v (λi), the child becomes a smoker with probability S (q), and a non-smoker
with probability 1− S (q).
We normalize a parent’s utility from not seeing her child smoke to 0. We then denote by
ui (H) < 0 the utility of having a child who smokes, where H represents the perceived (but not
necessarily actual, H) detrimental health effects of smoking. All parents alike value their children’s
health status, and so ui (H) decreases with the perceived health costs of smoking. Formally, an
73Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) refer to as conformism a non-random matching process that favors the dominant trait. Their
definition of conformism thus differs from both our and Bisin et al. (2013)’s definition of cultural conformity.
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adult’s utility function can be written as follows:
U (λi; q,H) ≡ (1− v (λi))S (q)ui (H)− c (λi) ,
where a parent’s investment is associated with a probability (1− v (λi))S (q) of seeing her child
smoke. Proposition 3.1 gives the optimal interior investment in the anti-smoking acculturation of a
child.
Proposition 3.1: Let v (.) be a differentiable, increasing and concave function, and c (.) be a
differentiable, increasing and convex function. When interior, a parent’s optimal investment choice
λ∗i solves
v′ (λ∗i )
c′ (λ∗i )
=
1
−ui (H)S (q) . (9)
Proof of Proposition 3.1: See Proofs Section.
The assumptions on v (.) and c (.) are standard to ensure the existence of a unique solution
to the maximization problem. They state that (i) more effort leads to a greater likelihood (cost)
of dissuading the child from acquiring the unwanted behavior, and (ii) the effectiveness (cost)
of this investment decreases (increases) in the amount of effort that is invested. The optimal
investment choice simply equates the marginal cost of investing to its expected marginal benefit.
The assumption that ui (H) < 0 for i = 0, 1 makes it not optimal for any parent to invest in pro-
smoking culturalization, as this would promote the parent’s undesired trait. Had we assumed instead
that smoker parents perceive a non-negative net utility from smoking, u1 (H) ≥ 0 , we would be in
the world of Bisin and Verdier (2001) where each type of parent promotes her own trait. Ceteris
paribus, this possibility is more likely to arise when the health costs of smoking are small, since both
parents perceive children’s utility to be decreasing the more harmful the smoking habit is. From
the result in Proposition 3.1, we can then derive comparative statics on the investment choice:
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Proposition 3.2: Performing comparing statics on the optimal investment derived in Proposi-
tion 3.1, we obtain the following predictions:
• Prediction 1: Parents who perceive larger health costs from smoking invest more in anti-
smoking culturalization.
• Prediction 2: We have cultural substitution iff cultural conformity holds, and cultural comple-
mentarity iff cultural distinction holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: See Proofs Section.
Prediction 1 is straightforward; it states that parents invest more in the anti-smoking culturaliza-
tion of their children the more serious the health costs of this habit. Prediction 2 says that vertical
socialization follows cultural substitution when horizontal socialization follows cultural conformity,
which is a well-known theoretical result in the literature, starting with Bisin and Verdier (2001).
It implies that when a higher smoking prevalence increases the likelihood that a child smokes, it is
more worthwhile for the parent to exert socialization effort. However, Prediction 2 also says that
vertical socialization follows cultural complementarity when horizontal socialization follows cultural
distinction, which is a result that is not emphasized in the literature. It implies that when smoking
prevalence decreases the likelihood that a child smokes, it also lowers the value of socialization to
the parent. Patacchini and Zenou (2011) produce the opposite finding in a cultural transmission
model augmented with peer effects at the vertical transmission stage. Their result requires assuming
that both the cost and marginal cost of socialization are increasing in the proportion of smokers.
Like the rest of the literature, we instead favor a framework where society only plays a role through
horizontal transmission; i.e. in the event that the parent is unsuccessful at socializing her child to
the desired trait.
3.3.4 Endogenous horizontal transmission
To complete the model, we explicitly define the likelihood that the child adopts smoking through
non-parental channels. Before parents decide how much to socialize their children, a profit-maximizing
monopolist chooses a level of investment θ into increasing the appeal of smoking to the youth. Such
a feature could arise, for example, through celebrity endorsements of this habit. Advertising θ can be
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thought of as stimulating "demand", but to have diminishing marginal returns, so that ∂S(q,θ)∂θ > 0
and ∂
2S(q,θ)
∂θ2
< 0.74 The function κ (θ) represents the convex cost of advertising (κ′ > 0 and κ′′ > 0).
Keeping the firm’s investment constant, we assume that S (.) can still be thought of as a matching
process, so that ∂S(q,θ)∂q > 0. We finally impose a regulatory condition to ensure an interior level
of investment for the firm, ∂S(0,θ)∂θ > κ
′ (0). Proposition 3.3 describes the equilibrium of the game
implied between the monopolist and parents.
Proposition 3.3: In a subgame perfect equilibrium, we have S (0, θ∗ (0)) > 0, which ensures a
heterogeneous distribution of traits in steady state. Moreover, both cultural substitution and cultural
conformity may obtain.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: See Proofs Section.
S (0, θ∗ (0)) > 0 follows directly from assuming an interior solution to the problem. It ensures
that the tobacco company would always want to invest a positive amount in making the smoking
habit emerge. The second part of the result comes from a study of the sign of dSdq
∣∣∣
θ∗
= ∂S∂q +
∂S
∂θ
∣∣
θ∗
∂θ∗
∂q .
We have cultural complementarity whenever this quantity is positive, and cultural substitution
otherwise. While determining the sign of this quantity involves the interaction of numerous terms,
it is possible to talk loosely about when each possibility obtains using the findings in Proposition 3.2.
For example, cultural distinction obtains when: 1) an increase in smoking prevalence decreases the
value of the investment sharply (∂
2S(q,θ)
∂θ∂q negative enough), or 2) smoker parents are less tolerant
of their children becoming smokers (a > d). The main take away message is that both cultural
conformity and cultural distinction are realistic possibilities. We leave it to the data to tell us when
each obtains.
3.3.5 Dynamics
We summarize the period t+ 1 transmission process into a transition matrix Pt ≡
 Pt0
Pt1
, where
Pt0 ≡ (1− d (qt))S (qt) , (Pt1 ≡ (1− a (qt))S (qt)) gives the proportion of children of non-smokers
(smokers) who adopt smoking. This matrix is subscripted by the time period t since transmission
74We put the word “demand” in quotation marks given that children do not make any active choice in the cultural transmission
framework.
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is a function of the parents’ smoking behavior, which is acquired in their youth. We can represent
the evolution of smoking in society through the equation
q˙ = P Tt
 1− qt
qt
− qt, (10)
where the superscript T indicates the transpose of a matrix. The following result describes the
steady state behavior of the system.
Proposition 3.4: In a steady state, there always exists a fraction of non-smokers. Moreover,
under cultural complementarity the smoking habit always persists, while under cultural substitution
it persists as long as S (0) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: See Proofs Section.
Under cultural complementarity, we must have cultural distinction (Proposition 3.2), and there-
fore children always have the proclivity to reject the status-quo so that neither traits disappear in
steady state. Under cultural substitution, smoking never becomes the unique trait since parents
have an incentive to prevent this from happening. In contrast, smoking may disappear if no outside
factor forces it to persist. Given Proposition 3.3, we know that the existence of a tobacco industry
can guarantee the coexistence of both traits under this scenario.
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3.4 Empirical strategy
We use the following baseline specification:
Pr(ever smoke = 1)c = α0
+ α1 ∗ Pr(socialization = 1)p
+ α2 ∗ sm. prevalence of role model populationcs (11)
+
∑
j
α3j ∗Xjcs
+ νc
Pr(socialization = 1)p = β0
+ β1 ∗ exposure to health informationp
+ β2 ∗ sm. prevalence of role model populationcs (12)
+
∑
j
β3j ∗Xjcs
+ υc
Equation (3) is the empirical counterpart of PT , as described in the previous section. It is a
structural form equation that treats Pr(socialization = 1) as the endogenous regressor. Equation
(4) is the empirical counterpart of (1). In this first-stage equation we identify parental socialization
using different indicators of the parent’s exposure to health information as instruments. X denotes
exogenous control variables; α denotes a structural parameter; and β denotes a reduced-form pa-
rameter. Indexes c and p stand for child and parent, respectively; s stands for state; and j identifies
each characteristic (individual, parental, or state) that we include as a control variable. Finally, ν
and υ are the jointly distributed error terms.
We estimate (3) and (4) as a system by IV probit, even though this method is meant to be
used when the endogenous regressor is continuous rather than binary. Because Heckman’s (1978)
maximum likelihood bivariate probit was built to accommodate binary endogenous regressors, it
would have been more appropriate to use in our case. However, we choose not to use it because it is
computationally cumbersome,75 and it does not significantly outperform IV probit or even IV linear
75Researchers find that to run a bivariate probit often takes 10 or 20 times as long as other similar models, and that standard
statistical software like Stata and R frequently fail to find the maximum of the likelihood (e.g. Freedman and Sekhon 2010)
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probability models in terms of accuracy (see Nichols 2011 and references therein). To confirm the
latter point, we test the robustness of our baseline specification to a range of alternative estimation
methods, including the bivariate probit.
To statistically identify exogenous variation in parental socialization we assume that, controlling
for the child’s own exposure to anti-smoking articles, we can exclude parental exposure to health
information as a direct determinant of the child’s decision to smoke. To test this exclusion restric-
tion, we calculate the Amemiya-Lee-Newey (ALN) minimum χ2 statistic under the null that the
instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term) and correctly excluded from the out-
come equation.76 To test whether our instruments have weak explanatory power, we calculate the
χ2 statistic under the null that the instruments are jointly statistically insignificant in the reduced
form. We also calculate the Hausman χ2 statistic to test whether there is a statistically significant
difference between IV probit and probit (naive) estimates. The null of this test is that the probit
model provides both consistent and efficient estimates while IV probit estimates are only consistent,
and that the difference between the two is normally distributed with mean zero. Further, we cal-
culate the Wald χ2 statistic to test the null that the correlation coefficient between ν and υ is zero
and, therefore, Pr(socialization = 1) can be treated as exogenous. Finally, we check the robustness
of our baseline estimates to the inclusion of a wide range of controls and instruments.
To statistically identify the social transmission of the smoking trait we rely on the fact that the
smoking prevalence of the role-model population is measured at the state-level. Because we can
plausibly assume that state-specific smoking prevalence is exogenous to the parental choice of the
state of residence and it cannot be affected by endogenous peer-choice, we rule out selection and
simultaneity bias from the estimated effects. Bias due to exogenous correlated effects, however, re-
mains a possibility (Manski 1993, 2000). The smoking prevalence of the role-model population is the
aggregation of individual behavior which (depending on how the role-model population is defined)
may include the parent or the child. Thus, our estimate of α2 may reflect the fact that individuals
in a given state have similar smoking behavior because they have unobserved similar characteristics
or because they are exposed to the same institutional or contextual factors (‘Manski’s reflection
problem’). To account for such unobserved common factors, we follow the health economics litera-
76The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test is only possible after running the two-step Newey (1985) IV probit estimator. All other
results we present in this chapter are derived using the maximum likelihood IVprobit estimator.
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ture and use a fixed effects specification (see, for example, Nakajima 2007 and references therein).
Because, as we describe below, the smoking prevalence of the role model population varies by state
and child age, we include a full set of state and age fixed-effects. We thus identify causality of the
social effects by using variations in the proportion of smokers between age-groups within a state.
We use the results to assess whether socialization by parents and role models affect a child’s
smoking decision, to identify the relative contribution of the two types of socialization to the trans-
mission of the smoking culture, and to test important properties of the transmission process; namely,
cultural substitution versus complementarity, and cultural conformity versus cultural distinction.
Finally, we use the structural parameter estimates to forward project how the rate of ever-smoking
of 10-18 year olds will evolve under different policy scenaria.
3.5 Data
Our empirical analysis exploits new as well as existing data in novel ways. Below we discuss the
source and construction of each type of data. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of selected
variables.
3.5.1 Individual level data on children and care-givers
We draw individual level data on children aged 10-18 from the 2002 and 2007 waves of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) - Child Development Supplement/Transition to Adulthood
(CDS-TA) surveys, and supplementary data on parents of each child from the main family files
of the PSID. The CDS-TA sample was originally drawn from PSID families with children 0-12 years
in 1997 and reinterviewed in 2002 and 2007. We use sample weights provided by the PSID to ac-
count for unequal probabilities of being selected into the CDS sample and for differential attrition
rates of PSID and CDS participants. The 2002 and 2007 wave of CDS-TA directly surveys children
age 10 and older about tobacco use and other types of behaviors. These data were collected by an
audio computer assisted self-interview. In such interviews, youth listen to the questions through
a headset and record their responses directly into a laptop computer. Neither the child’s parents
nor the interviewer knew how s/he answered the questions. Aquilino (1994) documents that this
method generates more accurate data on socially sensitive topics such as psychological well-being,
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sexual behaviors, and experiences with tobacco, alcohol, and drug use. We use the data on whether
a child ever smoked (defined on the survey as smoking at least 1 cigarette every day for 30 days) to
represent Pr(ever smoke = 1)c. Eighteen percent of our sample smoked at some time between age
10 and 18.
The CDS-TA surveys asks questions not only of the child but also of the person in the PSID
household who identified herself/himself as the ‘primary’ care-giver (PCG) of that child. Table 3.1
documents that biological mothers comprise 93 percent of self-identified care-givers, six percent of
care-givers are biological fathers, and the rest are adoptive mothers or step-mothers. Because of
the disproportionate share of biological mothers in our sample, we cannot separately model how
cultural transmission varies with the nature of the parent-child relationship.
While the CDS-TA surveys do not ask questions that are specifically about smoking socialization
efforts of the PCG, the surveys do collect information that is likely to proxy for it. Ideally the surveys
would ask each PCG to report how much effort she spends socializing her child about the health
risks of smoking. Instead the CDS/TA surveys asked each care-giver to report how frequently during
the past month she talked to each child about the dangers of substance use (e.g. drinking alcohol
or taking drugs). The survey specified five response categories that ranged from “not in the past
month” to “every day.” While these data are not ideal, we expect answers to them to be correlated
with the conceptual variable of interest. In addition, we identify variation in the pattern of responses
in these data using variation in information that is specifically about health risks of smoking. As
a result, though imperfect, the CDS data are likely to proxy well for the conceptual variable of
interest. Table 3.1 shows that 21 percent of care-givers reported they had not spoken with their
child about the dangers of substance use in the past month. Most (42 percent) care-givers discussed
this subject once or twice per month. However, 37 percent of care-givers discussed substance use
at least once a week during the previous month.
In addition to the socialization data, we draw CDS-TA data on age, sex, race, and religion
of the child; household income; family size; and measures of parenting styles, reading habits, and
employment status of the PCG.
We also draw data on the smoking behavior and educational attainment of the PCGs from the
main PSID files. We use data on smoking behavior from the 1986, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007,
and 2009 family files and data from a special 1990 questionnaire administered to all PSID household
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members over the age of 55 to construct our measure of whether a parent ever smoked. Finally, we
draw data on years of completed schooling from all waves of the PSID. In our sample, 45 percent of
PCGs smoked at some point in their lives and the average PCG has completed 13 years of schooling.
3.5.2 Smoking prevalence rates of the role model population
To construct measures of role-model smoking behavior, we use data from the Tobacco Use Supple-
ments to the Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS). Sponsored by the National Cancer Institute
and administered as part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s continuing labor force survey, the TUS-CPS
data have been collected intermittently since 1955. We use responses from 21 surveys conducted in
August 1967, August 1968, September 1989, September 1992, January and May 1993, September
1995, January and May 1996, September 1998, January, and May 1999, June and November 2001,
February 2002, February, June, and November 2003, May and August 2006, and January 2007.
Each survey asks respondents: “Have you ever smoked regularly?”; “If yes, what is the age when you
started?”; “Do you currently smoke?”; and “If not, what is the age when you last smoked regularly?”.
After dropping multiple observations for each individual across monthly waves of the same
calendar year, we pool all data from these waves and use the smoking questions to construct the
smoking history of every TUS-CPS respondent. To do this we identify all respondents who ever
smoked and who report a start age, a current smoking status, and a quit age (former smokers only).
We then assume that a person smoked in every year between the age she started and either the
age at the survey date (current smokers) or the age she quit (former smokers). Because in each
calendar year our sample includes all respondents who were alive in that year and retrospectively
answered the smoking questions in any later year, we start with an enormous sample of current, ever,
and never smokers (approximately 81 million observations). We combine our computed smoking
life-histories with data on the state of residence (at the time of the survey) to construct smoking
prevalence rates by sex, cohort, state, and calendar year (weighted by the CPS sampling weights).
To match our empirical specification as closely as possible with our theory, we assume that a
child’s role model is drawn from his parent’s generation. This assumption means that we create
smoking prevalence rates of the role model population using males and females who are 20-29 years
older than the child.77 Table 3.1 shows that among the potential social role models of children in
77i.e. we assume an average generation gap of 25 years, which is slightly smaller than the average generation gap that we
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our sample, the average smoking prevalence rate is 26 percent. Later in the analysis we experiment
with different definitions of the role-model population (by age and sex).
To illustrate the variation in the data we develop, Figure 3.1 plots the smoking rates by sex,
state, and calendar year for the social role models of children who are age 14 at the time of the
survey (i.e. at mean age). While these data have rich variation across all dimensions, the variation
we can exploit is limited because we only observe a child’s smoking behavior and his parent’s
socialization effort in 2002 and 2007. Despite that limitation, plenty of variation remains available
to us: across states, gender, and by child age. Figure 3.2 showcases the data that we actually use
in the analysis.78 Clearly, the smoking rates vary significantly by gender and state, but note that,
because the state-specific curves cross, the rates also vary by age of the child/parent generation.
3.5.3 Information about the health risks of smoking
To instrument parental socialization we use temporal and geographic variation in exposure to in-
formation about the health risks of smoking. The basic data consist of counts of articles published
between 1924 and 2009 that warn readers about the health risks of smoking. We use counts of
articles published in each of more than 21 popular consumer magazines. To generate additional
geographical, but also temporal variation, we also exploit data on the number of issues of each
magazine that were sold in each state in each year.
The data on articles were generated by first searching two electronic databases (ProQuest and the
Historical Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature) using a keyword search on “smok* and cancer,”
“smok* and health,” “cig* and cancer,” “cig* and health” and similar text strings. Successive searches
produced roughly 5,000 titles of articles published between 1890 and 2009. Two undergraduate
research assistants then independently reviewed all 5,000 titles to identify articles that potentially
warned about the health risks of smoking. This review eliminated roughly 2,500 articles that focused
on the effect of the health risk information on financial returns of tobacco companies, tobacco
growing agriculture, and international trade in tobacco. The remaining set included articles whose
observe in our data (28 years).
78Note that instead of 2007 data we use data that correspond to 2006 because the 2007 survey was conducted in January.
Aside from the fact that the sample is smaller, smoking behavior in January does not represent average smoking behavior
throughout the year because more people quit smoking in January to implement a New Year’s resolution. Many of these people
fail in their resolution. Consequently, smoking prevalence rates in January are lower and more widely distributed than smoking
prevalence rates over the whole year.
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titles suggested that the articles discussed content about risks individuals faced. A team of research
assistants collected copies of all articles and read them. Two of them independently rated the articles
as a) “pro-smoking,” b) “neutral,” and c) “anti-smoking” when they judged that an article conveyed
to readers the impression that smoking a) improved, b) did not affect, or c) degraded the health of
smokers. Any disagreement was discussed and resolved. The resulting list of articles generated a
list of magazines in which the articles appeared.
We then compiled data on sales of each of those magazines in every state in each year. We
got the sales data from the Audit Bureau of Circulation. The Audit Bureau of Circulation is an
organization that publishers voluntarily join. Its sole purpose is to audit and verify circulation
figures the publishers provide to them. Their independent auditing provides a valuable service to
publishers because they charge advertisers more for space in more widely circulated magazines.
Advertisers therefore demand (and publishers willingly provide) an independently verified count of
circulation. The magazine circulation data vary by month, year, and state.
We assume that, when a magazine is sold, it is seen by all members of the household in which
the purchaser resides.79 To capture this exposure, we divide estimates of each state’s population
from the Current Population Reports of the Census Bureau by 2.3 (the average household size) and
divide the number of issues sold in each state in each year by that number. The resulting Figure
3.is an estimate of the fraction of each state’s population that read each magazine (in each year).
We then multiply the fraction of each state’s population that read each magazine by the number of
articles that appeared in that magazine. This step yields the exposure of a randomly drawn person
from a given state to an article that appeared in a given magazine in a given year. Finally, we sum
across all magazines in which an anti-smoking article appeared. The final data proxy for the total
potential exposure to anti-smoking magazine articles in a given state in a given year. Currently we
compute this sum using articles that appear in 21 magazines that accounted for 70 percent of all
anti-smoking magazine articles produced by the above searches. Formally our measure is given by:
Anti-smoking articles readst =
21∑
m=1
Articlesmt
Issuesmst
Populationst/2.3
(13)
where s denotes state, t denotes calendar year, and m denotes each of 21 magazines.
79In fact we only assume a household member potentially sees the article. From now on we use the terms “exposure” and
“potential exposure” interchangeably.
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Figure 3.3 plots the resulting measure for all states between 1929 and 2009. We use these data
to compute several alternative measures of exposure to anti-smoking information of both PCGs and
children. The two measures we select to use in the baseline specification are: (i) the accumulated
sum of articles (potentially) seen by the PCG or the child since age 10, which should capture the
degree of exposure; and (ii) the standard deviation in the articles read since age 10, which should
capture the infrequency of the information flow. Similar measures have been shown to predict
changes in consumption of fats and oils as information developed and spread about the health risks
of consumption of saturated, monounsaturated, and poly unsaturated fats (Chern et al. 1995). We
start counting exposure from age 10, assuming that it is the earliest age a child can comfortably
read. Year 1929 is the earliest year in which a PCG in our sample was age 10, and year 1994 is
the earliest year in which a child was age 10. Thus, our measures of exposure for PCGs (i.e. our
instruments) encompasses all temporal and state variation illustrated in Figure 3.3. In contrast, our
equivalent measure for children (which we use as a control) encompasses the variation illustrated in
the shaded area only. The ‘typical’ PCG in our sample has been exposed to about 12 anti-smoking
articles since age 10, while the corresponding number for the ’typical’ child is 4.
3.5.4 Indicators of the economic environment
In our regressions, we control for time-varying state-specific economic factors that may affect the
child’s probability to smoke or the PCG’s socialization efforts. Specifically, we control for state
and federal cigarette taxes and state per-capita income. We use the measure of ‘full’ taxes on
cigarettes described in Lillard and Sfekas (2013). This measure is the sum of the state and federal
cigarette tax and the per pack escrow payments that are required on the 1998 “Master Settlement
Agreement” between the four major cigarette manufactures and the US states. Viscusi and Hersh
(2011) and Lillard and Sfekas (2013) document that this payment is functionally equivalent to a
per pack cigarette tax. We draw data on real per capita state income from the Regional Economic
Information System of the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. Department of Commerce
(SA05 series) and adjust them in units of real 2008 dollars. To illustrate the variation in these two
variables, we plot them by state and year in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Vertical versus horizontal transmission of the smoking trait
The naive way to think about the cultural transmission of the smoking trait would be to as-
sume no reverse causality between parental socialization efforts and the childrens’ decision to
smoke. Table 3.2 presents estimates of equation (3) under this assumption; that is, by treating
Pr(socialization = 1) as exogenous. In column 1 we use the socialization data in their ‘raw’ form;
i.e. in five categorical dummy variables: not in the past month (the reference category), once/twice
a month, once a week, several times a week, and daily. In columns 2-5 we dichotomize the data
into a single dummy to denote that children are socialized with ‘at least’ a given level of frequency
(at least once/twice per month, at least once a week etc.). The resulting estimates vary across
the combinations. In column 1, PCG socialization efforts are associated with a higher probability
that the child ever smokes, even though that association decreases as the frequency of socialization
increases. The estimates in column 2 also suggest a positive association, while columns 3-5 suggest
a weak negative association (which in 3 and 5 is statistically insignificant). The probable cause of
these counterintuitive results is the endogeneity of the socialization variable. Children may be less
likely to smoke when their parents socialize them against it, but it is also likely that a PCG will
discuss substance use more often if a child smokes or the parent suspects a child is likely to smoke.
To isolate the former effect we abandon the naive approach.
Table 3.3 presents our baseline estimates of jointly determined equations (3) and (4), as described
in Section 3.4.80 To simplify the analysis, we dichotomize the socialization variable, Pr(socialization = 1),
to indicate the probability that the PCG socializes the child about the dangers of substance use at
least once a week.81 As we mentioned earlier, we instrument the PCG’s socialization efforts with the
parental exposure to smoking-related health information since age 10 and the infrequency of that
80From this point onwards all regressions are estimated by IV probit. See Table 3.4 for a set of robustness test of the baseline
estimates to alternative methods of estimation.
81We dichotomize the socialization variable because the coefficients on the different versions of the socialization variable
presented in columns 2-5 of Table 3.2 suggest that socialization categories “once a week”, “several times per week” and “every
day” produce results that are similar among them but much different to the results produced by category “once/twice a month”.
This implies that the response distribution we observe could be a mixture of two distributions, each capturing a different kind
of decision process. Nonetheless, our baseline results show low sensitivity to the definition of the dichotomized socialization
variable. See Table 3.5 for the robustness analysis. In a similar exercise, Patacchini and Zenou (2011) use the frequency that
a parent reads to a child to capture parental effort to cultivate interest in education to the child. They dichotomize their
socialization variable the same way.
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exposure. In contrast to the results in column 3 of Table 3.2, the coefficient on the instrumented
socialization variable is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a parent’s effort to
socialize her child is effective. The performance of the instruments in the first-stage equation is
satisfactory: they are statistically significant and the sign of their coefficients are in the direction
described in Prediction 1. Those PCGs who are exposed to more anti-smoking articles on average
also exert more effort to socialize their children. Holding the average level of exposure constant,
PCGs socialize their children less if their exposure varies more over time. That is, PCGs socialize
their children more when they are exposed to a constant stream of information about the health
risks of smoking compared to PCGs who see the same number of articles on average but who see
no articles in some years and many articles in others. The diagnostic test results corroborate the
good performance of our instruments and of the baseline specification in general.
We should note that a factor contributing to instrument validity is that the baseline specification
controls for the child’s exposure to anti-smoking articles since age 10. Again, the estimated coeffi-
cient on this variable makes economic sense: a higher information exposure of the child is associated
with a lower probability that the child ever smokes and with a lower socialization effort by the PCG
(as s/he now relies on the external information to do the job). Although the statistical significance
of these effects is somewhat weak, it is important to mention that removing the measure of child
exposure from the estimation significantly impacts the ALN test of over-identification. In this case,
the χ2 statistic increases to 3.255 and the probability values drops to 0.071, so that we reject the
hypothesis that the instruments are valid at the 10% level of significance.
In all regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3, the probability that the child ever smokes increases
with the state-specific smoking prevalence rates of the role-model population, providing evidence
for cultural conformity. In the first-stage of Table 3.3, the socialization effort of PCGs also in-
creases with the smoking prevalence in the role model population and it is statistically unrelated to
parental smoking status, providing evidence for cultural substitution. The co-existence of cultural
substitution and conformity supports Prediction 2 of the model. It suggests that all parents wish
to discourage smoking and, because they know that their children will conform to societal trends,
they will increase their anti-smoking socialization efforts when smoking becomes more popular in
society (we expand this discussion in Section 3.6.3).
To compare the importance of the parental (vertical) and social (horizontal) channels of trans-
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mission of the smoking habit, we calculate marginal effects of ‘equivalent’ changes in parental
socialization efforts and the smoking prevalence of the role model population on the probability
that the child smokes. Clearly, defining changes of equivalent magnitude in two completely different
variables is a challenge. We take a ‘let the data speak’ approach and allow both variables to increase
by half their standard deviation. This corresponds to a 9.8 percentage point increase in the share
of parents who socialize their children at least once a week (from 41.6% to 51.4%)82, and to a 2.6
percentage point increase in the smoking prevalence rate of the role model population (from 26.3%
to 28.9%). We find that these changes cause the likelihood that the child smokes to decrease by
3.9 percentage points and to increase by 2.8 percentage points, respectively. The implication is
that parental influences are stronger than social influences in the determination of youth smoking
participation. Note that we reach this conclusion without taking into account the direct effects of
parental smoking behavior on the probability of youth smoking participation (e.g. due to genetics,
mimicking, nicotine addiction from passive smoking, or easier access to cigarettes). Our results
suggest that this channel of transmission is also important; the child is more likely to have ever
smoked when the PCG has ever smoked. The reported marginal effects, therefore, understate the
true effect of the parental channel of transmission.
All regressions in Tables 2 and 3 control for the PCG’s education, family income, state cigarette
tax, state income, and a wealth of demographic variables.83 The signs of the estimated coefficients
on all these variables are in the expected direction and consistent with empirical findings in the
health economics literature. The child is more likely to have ever smoked when the PCG is less
educated, when family and state income is low, and when cigarette taxes are low. The PCG is more
likely to socialize the child at least once a week when s/he is highly educated, when family and state
income is higher, and when cigarette taxes are higher (e.g. because, when taxes are high, smoking
by the child entails a higher financial cost for the entire family). From this point on, we do not
show estimated coefficients on the control variables, but rather focus on the variables of interest.
82Because the parental socialization variable is binary, we calculate its standard deviation (0.19) using its estimated value
from the reduced-form regression. To induce an increase in this variable that corresponds to half of its standard deviation, we
had to randomly shift PCGs from category 0 to category 1 so that the mean of the variable increases by 9.8 percentage points.
This is mathematically equivalent to increasing the probability of socialization for those parents who do not socialize their kids
at least once a week from 0 to 0.17 (=(0.19/2)/(1-0.416)).
83To save space, we do not present coefficients on the age fixed effects of the PCG and the age, sex, state, race, and religion
fixed-effects of the child. However, full results for all models are available on request.
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3.6.2 Robustness analysis
Although the baseline specification is already very conservative, there are reasons that induce us to
test its robustness to new instruments and controls. First, the performance of our instruments may
be impaired by their limited variation; e.g., our measure of PCG exposure to health information
does not vary across PCGs who live in the same state and were born in the same year. We could
benefit from an exposure measure that is parent-specific and adds individual-level variation to our
instrument. Second, our definition of the exposure measure (i.e. as the accumulated sum of anti-
smoking articles) imposes the restrictive assumptions that information does not decay and that it
has constant returns to scale. More flexible specifications of the exposure measure may be more
appropriate. Third, in our baseline specification we do not account for differences in the personality
of children or in parenting styles. Both of these have been shown in the psychology literature to
vary with children’s smoking behavior and the effectiveness of parental socialization efforts (e.g.
Huver et al. 2007). Fourth, in our baseline specification we do not control for differences across
PCGs in the cost of the parental socialization efforts. We next try to address these issues using a
new set of variables which Table 3.6 presents along with some basic descriptive statistics.
Our first exercise aims at introducing individual-level variation in our set of instruments. To
do this, we draw from the PSID-CDS-TA a variable that measures how often the PCG reads the
newspaper during the week. Assuming that this variable is highly correlated with magazine reader-
ship, we interact it with the PCG’s information exposure measure to generate a new variable that
varies across PCGs. Column 1 of Table 3.7 tests the robustness of the baseline specification to this
inclusion. The results are highly robust, and the new instrument appears with a positive and signif-
icant coefficient, suggesting that anti-smoking information is more effective at increasing parental
socialization efforts when parents have the habit of reading the newspaper often. In comparison to
the baseline results, the diagnostic test results are slightly improved (e.g. the probability value of
the the ALN test statistic increases to 0.578).
As a further robustness test, we define information exposure to be the average number (instead
of the accumulated sum) of anti-smoking articles that the PCG or the child potentially read since
age 10. This specification essentially decreases the contributing value of each anti-smoking article by
a factor proportional to the age of the PCG, so that (older) PCGs who see a given number of articles
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over a longer life-span end up with a lower information exposure score than (younger) PCGs who
see the same number of articles over a shorter life-span. In other words, the new exposure measure
allows the value of information to decay over time. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.7 show how the
baseline estimates change when we replace the original exposure measure with this new measure,
and when we interact it with the frequency the PCG reads the newspaper. Although the results
are qualitatively robust to this change and the instrument coefficients are positive and statistically
significant, the tests of instrument identification reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
Finally, in Table 3.8 we check the robustness of the baseline estimates to controls that capture
personality traits of the child and parenting styles of the PCG (column 1), to controls that capture
the cost of PCG socialization efforts (column 2), and to both set of controls together (column 3).
The first set of controls includes: (i) an indicator of whether the child has a tendency to “break
rules”, which we create by combining a selection of variables documenting “problematic” past be-
havior (see note of Table 3.6 for the exact definition); (ii) an indicator of high and strict parental
control, which we create by combining responses of the PCG to questions about the number of rules
s/he impose on the child, whether these rules are strictly enforced, and whether s/he discusses these
rules with the child; (iii) an indicator of violent parenting, which flags whether the child is spanked
more than 3 times per week; and (iv) an indicator of complete lack of communication among the
PCG and the child. Controlling for these variables is potentially important because it may further
address the problem of reverse causality between socialization efforts of the PCG and the smoking
behavior of the child. Rebellious children or children subject to authoritative parenting may react
against parental anti-smoking pressure and may be more likely to smoke when the socialization
efforts of the PCG are more frequent. We find that the these controls significantly predict the
dependent variables in both the structural and reduced-form equation, while leaving the remaining
coefficients almost unaffected. As expected, children who are “rule-breakers” and children who are
spanked regularly are more likely to ever smoke and more likely to be socialized by PCGs. In con-
trast, children who are under strict parental control are less likely to ever smoke and are less often
socialized by parents. Finally, children who never discuss any subject with their parents are more
likely to ever smoke.
Our measures of the parental socialization cost include: (i) the number of individuals younger
than 18 in the family unit; (ii) an indicator of whether the PCG is employed; (iii) the weekly
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hours that the PCG spends at work; (iv) an indicator of whether the PCG works a regular daytime
schedule; and (v) an indicator of whether it takes the PCG over an hour to get to work each way.
Once more, we find that, when included in the baseline regression, these variables significantly
predict the dependent variables and only result in small quantitative changes in the estimated
coefficients of the other variables. Children who live in households with many other children are
less likely to smoke and more likely to be socialized by PCGs. Children of working parents are less
likely to smoke but also less likely to be socialized, whereas children whose parents work more and
regular hours are more likely to smoke and more likely to be socialized.
When we insert in the baseline specification all the new controls together we obtain similar
results. All three specifications of Table 3.8 pass the diagnostic tests. In fact, the probability
values of the ALM test for specifications (1) and (3) are higher in comparison to that of the base-
line specification (0.860 and 0.648, respectively), suggesting that the addition of the controls aids
identification.
3.6.3 The mechanisms underlying the transmission process
In the previous sections we found a positive coefficient on the smoking prevalence of the role-
model population in both the reduced-form and the structural-form equations. We interpreted these
findings as evidence for cultural substitution and conformity. In this section, we scrutinize these
results by carrying out two exercises. First, we interact parental smoking status with the prevalence
rate of the role-model population to inform our discussion of cultural substitution. Second, we use
alternative definitions of the role-model population to inform our discussion on cultural conformity.
Both exercises allow us to confirm the links between substitution and conformity and between
complementarity and distinction. We conclude this section by further exploring differences in the
socialization process between smoker and non-smoker parents.
3.6.3.1 Substitution versus complementarity
Assuming that both smoker and non-smoker parents wish to discourage smoking, cultural substi-
tution entails that all parents should increase anti-smoking socialization efforts in response to the
smoking rate in society. The first-stage estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.9 show that this
prediction is supported by the data. We find positive and significant coefficients on all interactions of
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smoking prevalence and parental smoking status. We read this result to suggest that our extension
of the Bisin and Verdier model is more appropriate to use when studying the transmission of traits
like smoking than the Bisin and Verdier model in its original version. If smoker parents wished
to transmit the smoking culture to their children, like the Bisin and Verdier model would assume,
then we would expect to find evidence of cultural complementarity for smoker parents and cultural
substitution for non-smoker parents (i.e. positive coefficients on the interaction terms in Table 3.9
for non-smoker parents, and negative coefficients for smoker parents). However, our results suggest
otherwise.
As our model predicts, we find similar behavior across smokers and non-smoker parents because
there is an exogenous force (anti-smoking information) that has changed people’s perceptions of
smoking from a ‘good’ trait to a ‘bad’ trait. As a result, parents wish to socialize children to be
non-smokers, even if they themselves smoke. We follow this logic to develop another implication:
we should find evidence of culture complementarity among smoker PCGs exposed to little (or very
low) anti-smoking information because, absent other information, these would still consider smoking
to be a good trait. In column 3 of Table 3.9 we attempt to test this hypothesis by interacting the
parental smoking status with smoking prevalence in the role model population at different quantiles
of parental information exposure (quantiles 0-10, 10-50, 50-90, and 90-100).
We note that, in our data there is no PCG who is subject to no anti-smoking information.
All PCGs are exposed to some non-negligible level of information. In fact, the PCG at the 10th
percentile of the distribution of our exposure variable saw 8 articles, relative to a mean of 12.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we do not find evidence of cultural complementarity in our
results (none of the estimated coefficients carries a negative sign). Nonetheless, there is enough
variation in the data to reveal two important patterns that corroborate our theoretical set-up.
First, when the smoking prevalence of the role model population increases, all parents respond
by increasing their socialization efforts, and their response is larger the more exposed they are to
information about the health risks of smoking. Second, this response is not statistically different
from zero for smoker parents who are exposed to very low levels of information. These findings
encourage us to speculate that, had we observed in our data parents with no or negligible information
exposure, we would be able to document a switch in the direction of the relationship between parental
socialization and the proportion of smokers in society from positive to negative.
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3.6.3.2 Conformity versus distinction
To this point, all the results we have reported are based on the assumption that children derive their
role-models from the population that is 20-29 years older. Next, we test whether the probability that
the child ever smokes is associated with the smoking prevalence rate of the population of individuals
0-9 and 10-19 years older than the child, and whether that association differs by gender.84 We present
our results in Table 3.10. Estimates in columns 1-4 are based on the total sample, while estimates
in columns 5 and 6 are based on data on male and female children, respectively.
The structural form estimates suggest that the probability that the child ever smokes increases
with the smoking prevalence rates of all population sub-groups, except for males who are 0-9 years
older. The implication is that, in relation to the bulk of the population, children form their smoking
decisions based on their needs to achieve assimilation, inclusiveness, and cultural conformity. In
relation to the sub-group of young boys, however, the childrens’ motive is the exact opposite. In
this case, it is their need to generate a sense of distinctiveness from individuals that are part of
that group that motivates their smoking decisions. To put it bluntly, our results suggest that young
boys operate as anti-role-models. Although this result might seem surprising, one should note that
health economic studies on peer effects have not reached a consensus on gender differences in social
influence. For example, Nakajima (2007) study peer effects of smoking among school-mates in the
US and finds that these are positive and significant within the same gender but statistically negligible
across genders. In contrast, Clark and Loheac (2007) study peer effects on different types of risky
behavior among friends and school-mates in the US and find significant cross-gender interactions
for alcohol use, with young males being more influential than young girls. While we are the first
to provide evidence on cultural distinction using smoking data, our evidence complements those
presented in the study of ethnic identity formation by Bisin et al.(2013). These authors find that,
in neighborhoods in which the share of a given ethnic group is high, the association between the
share of the ethnic group and individual ethnic identities is negative.
84Naturally, the alternative measures of smoking prevalence rates are correlated with each other, but there is still independent
variation in the smoking prevalence rates across the different groups. See Table 3.11 for correlation coefficients and Table 3.6
for means and standard deviations.
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3.6.3.3 The link between substitution (complementarity) and conformity (distinction)
In both Tables 9 and 10, the smoking prevalence rates significantly predict the PCGs socialization
efforts in the reduced form and the probability that the child smokes in the structural form. Impor-
tantly, these effects always run in the same direction, a result which reconfirms the inter-connection
between cultural substitution and conformity and between cultural complementarity and distinc-
tion, and corroborates Prediction 2 of the model. This result suggests that, because all parents
wish to discourage smoking, they will increase their anti-smoking socialization efforts when smoking
becomes more popular among all societal groups to which their children will conform, and they
decrease their anti-smoking socialization efforts when smoking becomes more popular among young
boys from which their children will want to distinguish themselves.
It is worth noting that both our theory and findings contradict those produced by Patacchini
and Zenou (2011), although they apply a comparable exercise to identify the cultural transmission
mechanisms of preferences for education. Like our assumption that both smoker and non-smoker
parents wish to transmit preferences against smoking to their children, Patacchini and Zenou assume
that both educated and uneducated parents wish to transmit preferences in favor of education to
their children. However, unlike our prediction that cultural complementarity is tied with cultural
distinction, these authors predict that complementarity is tied with conformity. As we briefly
discuss in Section 3.3, this prediction relies on their assumption that a high prevalence of education
in society creates positive externatilities in the effectiveness of parental socialization efforts by
decreasing socialization costs (e.g. because more educated neighbors can help a less educated
parent to better socialize the children). Their results support their theory. They find that all
parents socialize their kids in favor of education, that their socialization effort increases with the
prevalence of educational attainment in the population residing in the same neighborhood and, at
the same time, the neighborhood education level increases the probability that children acquire
education.
3.6.3.4 Other mechanisms
Also relevant is that the theoretical predictions of Patacchini and Zenou rely on the assumption that
educated parents are more effective in socializing their children than uneducated parents because
115
they face lower cost of socialization. Our model necessitates no particular assumption about the
mechanisms underlying the vertical transmission process of smoker versus non-smoker parents. On
the contrary, it allows many mechanisms to be at work at the same time. For example, smoker
and non-smoker parents may or may not differ in the effectiveness of their socialization efforts, in
their tolerance of having children who smoke, in their perception of the health-risks of smoking, and
other dimensions. Whether or not each of these scenaria is true is an empirical question.
The evidence we present in Table 3.9 already shed some light on this issue. We find that never-
smoker parents respond to the popularity of smoking in society by increasing their socialization
efforts both more than ever-smokers (column 1) and more than current and ex-smokers (column
2). Further, we find that this difference persists at all levels of information exposure (column 3).
We present more evidence in Table 3.12. There we show that never-smoker parents also have a
higher responsiveness to health information both relative to ever smokers (column 1) and relative to
current and ex-smokers (column 2). Both these findings suggest that smoker and non-smoker parents
evaluate differently the health risks that their children face when they smoke, and are consistent
with existing empirical evidence that non-smokers tend to overestimate the impact of smoking on
health (e.g. Viscusi and Hakes 2008). In Table 3.12 we also show that never-smoker parents lower
their socialization efforts when they work and increase their socialization efforts when their child is
a rule-breaker less than ever-smokers (column 3 and 5, respectively). This may be because, unlike
parents who smoke, never-smoker parents are more effective at socializing their kids to be non-
smokers by setting the right example and can, therefore, afford to lower their socialization efforts
when socialization cost increases or when they have reactive children. Somewhat at odds with this
interpretation is our finding that the responsiveness to the socialization cost does not statistically
differ between never-smokers and current smokers (column 4), whereas the responsiveness to having
a reactive child does not statistically differ between never-smokers and ex-smokers (column 6).
3.6.4 Forward projections of the share of children who ever smoke
As a final exercise, we simulate the dynamics of youth ever-smoking rates over time as described by
equation (2) in Section 3.3.5. To do this we use the estimated structural parameters from column
3 of Table 3.8 (i.e. our most restrictive specification), and the mean probability that a child ever
smokes that we observe in our sample as the initial condition. This exercise serves two purposes.
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First and foremost, it shows that the smoking trait persists in the steady state of the population
dynamics, it provides an estimate of the smoking rates at the steady state, and it provides an
estimate of the time that smoking rates would need in order to adjust to that steady-state. Second,
this exercise provides a framework that we can use to test how different policy regimes can affect
the speed of adjustment of the youth smoking rates to equilibrium. We draw the projections in
Figure 3.6.
The solid line shows how the youth ever-smoking rates would fare in future generations all else
equal. It indicates that the share of youth ever-smokers converges to a steady-state value just above
11 percent.85 This evidence confirms the long term persistence of the smoking trait, and is consistent
with Predictions 3 and 4. Full convergence to that steady-state occurs within five generations (which
are on average 25 years apart); i.e. for individuals that are born between 2108-2121. However, 90
percent of the adjustment occurs within only three generations; i.e. for individuals who are born
between 2058-2071.
This trajectory can be altered by a social planner via several policy instruments. Here we give
the examples of ‘reasonable’ increases in cigarette taxes and in parental socialization efforts during
the lifetime of the children observed in our data. The dotted line shows how the smoking rates would
fare under half a standard deviation increase in cigarette taxes (i.e. under a 0.27 dollar increase);
and the dashed line shows how they would fare under half a standard deviation increase in the
share of parents who socialize their children at least once a week (i.e. an increase of 9.8 percentage
points). The former is an example of a policy that targets children directly, while the latter is an
example of a policy that targets children indirectly, via parental behavior.
We find that the proposed increase in taxes accelerates the rate of adjustment of youth ever-
smoking rates so that 90 percent of the adjustment is achieved within two generations. In compar-
ison, the proposed increase in socialization accelerates the rate of adjustment so that 90 percent
of the adjustment is achieved within only one generation. Similarly, the increase in taxes reduces
the rate of young smokers at the steady-state by 0.8 percentage points, whereas the increase in
socialization reduces it by 1 percentage point. By no means, do we present these results to suggest
85Because we use our most restrictive specification to carry out the projections, our results are based on a sample size of
2074. The probability that the child ever smokes in this sample equals 19.6% (as opposed to the 18% reported in Table 3.1).
Our results suggest that, in order to reach their equilibrium value, youth smoking rates need to drop by 8.6 percentage points
(from 19.6% to 11%).
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that subsidizing parental socialization is a preferred tobacco control policy relative to a tax increase.
Such a claim would require evidence on the cost of each policy regime. Rather, this evidence demon-
strates that a policy maker has the tools to significantly change both the steady-state smoking rates
of young people and the speed of adjustment to that steady state. For example, Healthy People
2020 reports that 19.5 percent of adolescents in grades 9 through 12 smoked cigarettes in 2009 and
sets the objective to reduce that percentage to 16 percent by 2020. The results we present in Figure
3.6 suggest that, by using the right policy regime, the government can achieve and even surpass
that goal.
3.7 Conclusion
Building on the literature on cultural transmission, we develop a model of smoking dynamics that
focuses on the role of parents and social norms; we use novel data to test its theoretical predictions;
and we find empirical support. Our chapter advances the literature in several ways.
On the theory front, we extend the seminal work by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to provide a
rationale for why traits first emerge, why parents may change the traits they prefer to transmit to
their children, and how long-term cultural heterogeneity can be achieved when that occurs. We
argue that a cultural trait may emerge when a profit-maximizing industry promotes it, and the way
people perceive that trait can be influenced by the flow of related information. Thus, relative to
the existing theory, we contribute a framework of analysis to study the transmission mechanisms
of a wider variety of cultural traits. Specifically, our model can be used to study (i) cultural traits
that already exist and the way people perceive them does not change over time (e.g. preferences on
education; trust; religion); (ii) cultural traits that already exist but the way people perceive them
changes over time (e.g. preferences on smoking, polluting the environment, or women’s rights); and
(iii) cultural traits that are brand new (e.g. the culture of social networking). To date, the cultural
transmission theory has focused on the traits in the first category.
In developing our model, we introduce new mechanisms to characterize the cultural transmission
process. Specifically, we relax a standard assumption in the cultural transmission theory that,
when children adopt their traits from society, this happens via a (random or non-random) matching
process. This matching process entails that the probability of acquiring a trait always increases with
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the prevalence of that trait in society. In our model, we allow the industry to affect the direction
of this relationship. Borrowing terminology from the literature on identity formation, we formally
define the positive relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of that
trait in society as cultural conformity. We show that conformity in the social channel of transmission
is always tied to substitution in the parental channel of transmission, which posits that parents
increase their socialization efforts the more prevalent their preferred cultural trait is in society, and
is a cornerstone assumption in the literature. Conformity and substitution will co-exist because
parents will lower their socialization efforts when their preferred trait becomes more popular among
societal groups to which they know that their children will conform. Correspondingly, we formalize
the assumption of cultural distinction to predict the opposite of cultural conformity; i.e. a negative
relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of that trait in society.
We show that distinction in the social channel of transmission is always tied to complementarity in
the parental channel of transmission, which posits that parents decrease their socialization efforts
the more prevalent their preferred cultural trait is in society. Distinction and complementarity will
co-exist because parents will increase their socialization efforts when their preferred trait becomes
more popular among societal groups from which they know that their children will distinguish
themselves. We take all our theoretical predictions to U.S. data and we find supporting evidence.
To test our model, we carefully account for the endogeneity of the parental socialization efforts
using a novel measure of parental exposure to anti-smoking information as an instrument. We
also avoid selection, simultaneity, and exogenous correlation bias in the estimated social effects
by measuring smoking prevalence of the role-model population at the state-level, and including a
full set of fixed effects in our regression models. Thus, our empirical analysis contributes to the
health economics literature causal estimates of parental and social influences on youth smoking
participation. Whether smoking behavior is transmitted through parents, role-models, or peers is
relevant for designing tobacco control policy and anti-smoking campaigns. If children primarily
pick up smoking from their parents, policies that target parental behavior may be more effective
at preventing smoking onset than policies that target young people directly. If children primarily
pick up smoking from the society, then this implies externalities that can lead to large differences
in smoking behavior through social-multiplier effects. On the one hand, social pressure can cause
consumption to be sticky in the face of policy instruments; on the other hand, social influences
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can complement government interventions to prevent smoking initiation among young people. Our
results suggest that parental influences are more important than social influences in the transmission
of the smoking trait, and they showcase the spread of anti-smoking information as a key instrument
to lower smoking rates among young people.
Finally, we demonstrate how the cultural transmission theory can provide an analytical frame-
work which policy makers can use to evaluate the long-term effects of tobacco control policies.
Specifically, we use our empirical results to project what will be the steady state rate of youth
smoking in future generations. We show that the rate converges to a steady state in which smoking
persists. But we also show that a policy maker can affect both the level of smoking at that steady
state and the speed of adjustment to that steady state. Our projections suggest that, under the
right policy regime, it is possible to achieve the youth smoking rate objectives set by Healthy People
2020.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Smoking prevalence of role-model population of 14 year old children by sex, state, and
year
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Figure 3.2: Smoking prevalence of role-model population by sex, age, and state
Figure 3.3: Number of published magazine anti-smoking articles by state and year (weighted by
state subscription rate to each magazine)
122
Figure 3.4: Cigarette taxes, by state and year ($)
Figure 3.5: Real income per capita, by state and year ($)
Figure 3.6: Forward projections of youth ever-smoking rates
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Weighted means and frequencies of selected variables
Variable x¯/% [s.d]
Child
Female 0.50
Age 13.83 [2.25]
Race
White, non Hispanic 0.66
Black, non Hispanic 0.16
Other 0.18
Ever smoked regularly 0.18 [0.39]
Acc. sum of anti-smoking articles potentially read since age 10 4.07 [0.05]
Primary Care Giver (PCG)
Age 41.99 [6.10]
Education 13.02 [2.75]
Relationship to child
Biological mother 0.93
Biological father 0.06
Adoptive mother 0.01
Stepmother 0.00
Socializes child against substance use
Never 0.21
Once or twice a month 0.42
Once a week 0.14
Several times a week 0.13
Every day 0.10
Ever smoked regularly 0.45 [0.50]
Acc. sum of anti-smoking articles potentially read since age 10 12.2 [2.78]
St.deviation of anti-smoking articles potentially read since age 10 0.42 [0.07]
Family unit
Real family income/10000 4.31 [5.22]
State
Real cigarette tax 1.59 [0.54]
Real state income/10000 3.66 [0.50]
Sm. prevalence of total population 20-29 years older than child 0.26 [0.05]
Observations: 2246.
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Table 3.2: Probit regression of the probability that the child has ever smoked
All
categories Dichotomized: 1=‘At least’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child socialized against substance use
Once or twice per month 0.351*** 0.288***
(0.026) (0.024)
Once a week 0.256*** -0.025
(0.033) (0.020)
Several times a week 0.187*** -0.050**
(0.033) (0.022)
Every day 0.192*** -0.031
(0.037) (0.031)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 3.399*** 3.117*** 3.598*** 3.579*** 3.522***
(1.048) (1.047) (1.043) (1.041) (1.041)
PCG has ever smoked 0.329*** 0.333*** 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.338***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Education of PCG -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Family income -5.453*** -5.433*** -5.121*** -5.100*** -5.127***
(0.388) (0.387) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385)
State cigarette tax -0.930*** -0.919*** -0.900*** -0.902*** -0.901***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
State income per capita -2.404*** -2.450*** -2.372*** -2.374*** -2.384***
(0.171) (0.172) (0.171) (0.170) (0.170)
Pseudo R-squared 0.257 0.256 0.252 0.252 0.252
Controls: Dummies for age of PCG, and age, sex, state, race, and religion of child. Observations: 2246. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: IV probit estimates of baseline specification
Prob(child
Prob(child socialized at
ever smokes) least 1/week)
Child socialized at least once/week -1.461***
(0.159)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 4.929*** 1.309***
(0.856) (0.197)
PCG has ever smoked 0.251*** -0.003
(0.026) (0.005)
Education of PCG -0.085*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.001)
Family income -3.504*** 0.471***
(0.468) (0.048)
State cigarette tax -0.656*** 0.045***
(0.083) (0.0110)
State income per capita -1.684*** 0.148***
(0.205) (0.022)
Child info exposure since age 10 -0.025* -0.012**
(0.014) (0.005)
PCG info exposure since age 10 0.018***
(0.006)
Infrequency of PCG info exposure since age 10 -1.160***
(0.101)
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 statistic 0.82 [0.365]
Hausman χ2 statistic 252.0 [0.000]***
Wald χ2 statistic 40.4 [0.000]***
χ2 for joint significance of instruments 165.4 [0.000]***
Change in prob(child ever smokes) after half s.d increase in:
Socialization -0.039
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 0.028
Controls: Dummies for age of PCG, and age, sex, state, race, and religion of child. Obs:
2246. Standard errors in parenthesis; p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Robustness of baseline estimates to alternative methods of estimation
Linear probability model Bivariate Probit
2SLS IVLIML IVGMM probit + Ord. probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-stage
Child socialization -0.187*** -0.207*** -0.173** -1.501*** -0.415***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.071) (0.019) (0.147)
Sm. prev. of role-model pop. 1.215*** 1.246*** 1.153*** 4.171*** 4.982***
(0.187) (0.191) (0.176) (0.721) (1.164)
PCG has ever smoked 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.223*** 0.338***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018)
Education of PCG -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.086*** -0.077***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014)
Family income -0.346*** -0.337*** -0.354*** -3.054*** -4.779***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.297) (0.406)
State cigarette tax -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.534*** -0.821***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.059) (0.079)
State income per capita -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.072*** -1.487*** -2.344***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.134) (0.171)
Child info exposure since age 10 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.022 -0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.016)
First-stage
Sm. prev. of role-model pop. 1.305*** 1.305*** 1.305*** 4.438*** 2.984***
(0.200) (0.200) (0.204) (0.657) (0.487)
PCG has ever smoked -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012)
Education of PCG -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.115*** -0.090***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Family income 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 1.400*** 1.145***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.137) (0.113)
State cigarette tax 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.180*** 0.231***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.033) (0.027)
State income per capita 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.440*** 0.257***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.071) (0.056)
Child info exposure since age 10 -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.067*** -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010)
PCG info exposure since age 10 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.081*** 0.057***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011)
Infreq. of PCG info exp. since age 10 -1.161*** -1.161*** -1.161*** -3.717*** -2.505***
(0.105) (0.105) (0.114) (0.275) (0.210)
Controls: Dummies for age of PCG, and age, sex, state, race, and religion of child. Observations:
2246. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The child socialization
variable in (1)-(4) is the Prob(child socialized at least once/week) and in (5) it is the original ordinal
variable that takes values 1-5 to measure how often PCGs socialize children. In (5) we estimated the
1st stage by ordered probit, and the 2nd stage by probit using the hat values from the 1st stage as
the socialization variable. We did not adjust the errors.
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Table 3.5: Robustness of baseline estimates to alternative definitions of the socialization variable
Dichotomized: 1=‘At least’
Once or twice/month Several times a week Every day
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child socialization -1.465*** -2.215*** -3.249***
(0.324) (0.150) (0.183)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 3.397*** 3.809*** 5.218***
(0.862) (0.718) (0.652)
PCG has ever smoked 0.266*** 0.136*** 0.195***
(0.0345) (0.0343) (0.031)
Education of PCG -0.049*** -0.097*** -0.085***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Family income -3.625*** -2.369*** -2.415***
(0.695) (0.528) (0.514)
State cigarette tax -0.618*** -0.334*** -0.302***
(0.121) (0.100) (0.097)
State income per capita -1.835*** -1.420*** -1.088***
(0.282) (0.219) (0.234)
Child info exposure since age 10 0.005 0.002 -0.057***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
First-stage: Prob(child socialization)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 0.345** 0.752*** 1.057***
(0.175) (0.168) (0.120)
PCG has ever smoked 0.012** -0.024*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Education of PCG -0.012*** -0.034*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family income 0.353*** 0.329*** 0.083***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.029)
State cigarette tax 0.061*** 0.090*** 0.048***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
State income per capita 0.033* -0.007 0.040***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014)
Child info exposure since age 10 0.030*** -0.0004 -0.019***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
PCG info exposure since age 10 -0.025*** 0.015*** 0.011***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Infreq. of PCG info exp. since age 10 -0.214** -0.620*** -0.379***
(0.089) (0.087) (0.064)
All controls and remaining information, as in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.6: Weighted means and frequencies of new controls and instruments
x¯/% [s.d] N
Indicators of child personality and parenting styles
Child is a ’rule-breaker’ 0.31 [0.46] 2232
Child subject to many rules, strictly enforced, rarely discussed 0.10 [0.31] 2232
Child spanked more than 3 times per week 0.01 [0.09] 2232
PCG never discusses any subject with child 0.01 [0.08] 2232
Measures of socialization cost
Number of children in the family unit 2.10 [1.15] 2088
PCG has a job 0.71 [0.45] 2088
Hours per week PCG typically works 27.5 [20.5] 2088
PCG usually works a regular daytime schedule 0.57 [0.49] 2088
Typically takes PCG over an hour to get to work each way 0.05 [0.21] 2088
Alternative measures of information exposure
Mean anti-smoking articles PCG potentially read per year since age 10 0.88 [0.13] 2236
Days per week the PCG reads the newspaper 1.96 [1.94] 2236
Alternative definitions of role-mode sm. prevalence
State-specific smoking prevalence of:
Total population 0-9 years older than child 0.19 [0.07] 2246
Total population 10-19 years older than child 0.26 [0.06] 2246
Females 0-9 years older than child 0.17 [0.07] 2246
Females 10-19 years older than child 0.23 [0.06] 2246
Females 20-29 years older than child 0.24 [0.06] 2246
Males 0-9 years older than child 0.21 [0.07] 2246
Males 10-19 years older than child 0.30 [0.05] 2246
Males 20-29 years older than child 0.29 [0.05] 2246
Rule breaker: the child did something dangerous, damaged public property, got in a fight, drove drunk or
high over 10 times the last 6 months or that the child has been arrested or put in jail more than once to
date or that the child has a lot of secrets or hides a lot of things from parents.
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Table 3.7: Robustness of the baseline specification to new instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child socialized at least once/week -1.465*** -1.436*** -1.576***
(0.138) (0.174) (0.132)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 4.376*** 4.527*** 3.952***
(0.861) (0.889) (0.850)
First-stage: Prob(child socialization)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 1.231*** 1.245*** 1.186***
(0.197) (0.210) (0.211)
PCG info exposure since age 10 (acc. sum) 0.017***
(0.006)
* frequency PCG reads the newspaper 0.0005***
(0.0000)
PCG info exposure since age 10 (mean) 0.290*** 0.273***
(0.082) (0.079)
* frequency PCG reads the newspaper 0.006***
(0.001)
Infrequency of PCG info exposure since age 10 -1.167*** -1.206*** -1.181***
(0.099) (0.104) (0.103)
Observations 2,236 2,246 2,236
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 statistic 1.095 17.0*** 17.1***
Hausman χ2 statistic 252.0*** 253.9*** 295.0***
Wald χ2 statistic 53.3*** 33.8*** 57.6***
χ2 for joint significance of instruments 216.5*** 163.6*** 194.0***
Controls: for (1) as in baseline specification; (2) and (3) control for child info exposure since
age 10 (mean) instead of (acc. sum).
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Table 3.8: Robustness of the baseline specification to new controls
(1) (2) (3)
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child socialized at least once a week -1.424*** -1.843*** -1.836***
(0.179) (0.095) (0.108)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 4.248*** 3.535*** 2.773***
(0.894) (0.760) (0.791)
Child is a ’rule-breaker’ 0.417*** 0.389***
(0.024) (0.025)
Child subject to many rules, strictly enforced, rarely discussed -0.593*** -0.562***
(0.031) (0.035)
Child spanked more than 3 times per week 0.546*** 0.707***
(0.115) (0.093)
PCG never discusses any subject with child 0.611*** 0.395***
(0.102) (0.093)
No. of kids below 18 in the family unit -0.032*** -0.027***
(0.010) (0.010)
PCG has a job -0.303*** -0.374***
(0.039) (0.039)
Hours per week PCG typically works 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
PCG works a regular daytime schedule 0.089*** 0.086***
(0.021) (0.022)
Takes PCG over an hour to get to work each way -0.062* -0.004
(0.036) (0.037)
First-stage: Prob(child socialized at least once/week)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 1.312*** 1.006*** 0.979***
(0.197) (0.208) (0.208)
PCG info exposure since age 10 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Infrequency of PCG info exposure since age 10 -1.121*** -1.205*** -1.171***
(0.101) (0.105) (0.105)
Child is a ‘rule-breaker’ 0.054*** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.005)
Child subject to many rules, strictly enforced, rarely discussed -0.109*** -0.100***
(0.007) (0.008)
Child spanked more than 3 times per week 0.367*** 0.368***
(0.026) (0.026)
PCG never discusses any subject with child -0.038 -0.047*
(0.028) (0.027)
No. of kids below 18 in the family unit 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
PCG has a job -0.177*** -0.184***
(0.011) (0.011)
Hours per week PCG typically works 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCG works a regular daytime schedule 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.007) (0.007)
Takes PCG over an hour to get to work each way 0.015 0.025**
(0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2,232 2,088 2.074
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 statistic 0.045 1.299 0.209
Hausman χ2 statistic 242.7*** 358.1*** 350.1***
Wald χ2 statistic 31.0*** 90.1*** 71.9***
χ2 for joint significance of instruments 157.8*** 139.6*** 133.4***
Controls: as in baseline specification.
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Table 3.9: Robustness of the baseline specification to new controls
(1) (2) (3)
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child socialized at least once a week -1.424*** -1.843*** -1.836***
(0.179) (0.095) (0.108)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 4.248*** 3.535*** 2.773***
(0.894) (0.760) (0.791)
Child is a ’rule-breaker’ 0.417*** 0.389***
(0.024) (0.025)
Child subject to many rules, strictly enforced, rarely discussed -0.593*** -0.562***
(0.031) (0.035)
Child spanked more than 3 times per week 0.546*** 0.707***
(0.115) (0.093)
PCG never discusses any subject with child 0.611*** 0.395***
(0.102) (0.093)
No. of kids below 18 in the family unit -0.032*** -0.027***
(0.010) (0.010)
PCG has a job -0.303*** -0.374***
(0.039) (0.039)
Hours per week PCG typically works 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
PCG works a regular daytime schedule 0.089*** 0.086***
(0.021) (0.022)
Takes PCG over an hour to get to work each way -0.062* -0.004
(0.036) (0.037)
First-stage: Prob(child socialized at least once/week)
Sm. prevalence of role-model population 1.312*** 1.006*** 0.979***
(0.197) (0.208) (0.208)
PCG info exposure since age 10 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Infrequency of PCG info exposure since age 10 -1.121*** -1.205*** -1.171***
(0.101) (0.105) (0.105)
Child is a ’rule-breaker’ 0.054*** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.005)
Child subject to many rules, strictly enforced, rarely discussed -0.109*** -0.100***
(0.007) (0.008)
Child spanked more than 3 times per week 0.367*** 0.368***
(0.026) (0.026)
PCG never discusses any subject with child -0.038 -0.047*
(0.028) (0.027)
No. of kids below 18 in the family unit 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
PCG has a job -0.177*** -0.184***
(0.011) (0.011)
Hours per week PCG typically works 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCG works a regular daytime schedule 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.007) (0.007)
Takes PCG over an hour to get to work each way 0.015 0.025**
(0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2,232 2,088 2.074
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum X2 statistic 0.045 1.299 0.209
Hausman X2 statistic 242.7*** 358.1*** 350.1***
Wald X2 statistic 31.0*** 90.1*** 71.9***
X2 for joint significance of instruments 157.8*** 139.6*** 133.4***
Controls: as in baseline specification.
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Table 3.10: Probit estimation of the probability that the child is socialized at least once/week
(1) (2) (3)
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child socialized at least once/week -1.462*** -1.457*** -0.998***
(0.159) (0.161) (0.208)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked 4.455*** 4.154***
(0.875) (0.881)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked 5.158***
(0.867)
Prev. of RMP * PCG currently smokes 4.938***
(0.870)
Prev. of RMP * PCG used to smoke 3.966***
(0.878)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q0-10 0.461***
(0.080)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q10-50 0.295***
(0.062)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q50-90 0.252***
(0.056)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q90-100 0.318***
(0.0541)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q0-10 0.573***
(0.083)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q10-50 0.540***
(0.066)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q50-90 0.485***
(0.057)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q90-100 0.478***
(0.057)
First-stage: Prob(child socialized at least once/week)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked 1.367*** 1.361***
(0.200) (0.200)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked 1.195***
(0.206)
Prev. of RMP * PCG currently smokes 1.197***
(0.206)
Prev. of RMP * PCG used to smoke 1.119***
(0.208)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q0-10 0.053***
(0.019)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q10-50 0.078***
(0.017)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q50-90 0.094***
(0.016)
Prev. of RMP * PCG never smoked * PCG info exposure q90-100 0.124***
(0.016)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q0-10 0.030
(0.020)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q10-50 0.061***
(0.017)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q50-90 0.096***
(0.016)
Prev. of RMP * PCG ever smoked * PCG info exposure q90-100 0.086***
(0.016)
χ2 test of the equality of the coefficients in first-stage 3.538* 11.64*** 237.5***
Observations: 2246. Controls: as in baseline specification, excluding sm. prevalence of role model population.
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Table 3.11: Baseline specification under alternative definitions of the role-model population
Total population Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage: Prob(child ever smokes)
Child soc. at least once/week -1.439*** -1.442*** -1.424*** -1.424*** -2.153*** -1.842***
(0.163) (0.163) (0.161) (0.165) (0.183) (0.094)
Sm. prevalence of:
total pop. 0-9 years older -0.083
(0.594)
total pop. 10-19 years older 5.434***
(0.892)
total pop. 20-29 years older 5.366***
(0.851)
males 0-9 years older -1.088** -5.766*** -3.917*** -4.909***
(0.513) (0.666) (1.010) (0.912)
males 10-19 years older 5.543***
(0.707)
males 20-29 years older 3.690***
(0.746)
females 0-9 years older 1.328** 5.114*** 7.787*** 2.268***
(0.549) (0.661) (2.179) (0.866)
females 10-19 years older 1.375**
(0.689)
females 20-29 years older 4.145***
(0.683)
First-stage: Prob(child socialized at least once/week)
Sm. prevalence of:
total pop. 0-9 years older -0.023
(0.159)
total pop. 10-19 years older 1.272***
(0.208)
total pop. 20-29 years older 0.153
(0.178)
males 0-9 years older -0.186 -0.552*** -0.824*** -0.003
(0.137) (0.160) (0.239) (0.237)
males 10-19 years older 0.087
(0.138)
males 20-29 years older 1.247***
(0.173)
females 0-9 years older 0.329** 0.711*** 1.286*** 0.594**
(0.142) (0.164) (0.266) (0.249)
females 10-19 years older 0.428***
(0.164)
females 20-29 years older 0.466***
(0.166)
Observations 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246 1,058 1,045
Controls: as in baseline specification.
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Table 3.12: Correlation coefficients of alternative measures of the sm. prevalence of the role-model
population
Measure 1: Measure 2: Correlation
Smoking prevalence in total population:
0-9 years older than child 10-19 years older than child 0.4839
0-9 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.6679
10-19 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.8355
Smoking prevalence in male population:
0-9 years older than child 10-19 years older than child 0.3405
0-9 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.5592
10-19 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.7127
Smoking prevalence in female population:
0-9 years older than child 10-19 years older than child 0.5732
0-9 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.7106
10-19 years older than child 20-29 years older than child 0.8505
Smoking prevalence in population 0-9 years older than child:
Males Females 0.9170
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Table 3.13: Probit estimation of the probability that the child is socialized at least once/week
(first-stage)
PCG info exposure PCG has a job Child is a rule-breaker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interacted with:
PCG never smoked 0.020*** 0.020*** -0.066*** -0.065*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PCG ever smoked 0.012** -0.044*** 0.068***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
PCG currently smokes 0.013** -0.056*** 0.087***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
PCG used to smoke 0.012* -0.032*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 2,246 2,246 2,101 2,101 2,238 2,238
χ2 test 17.7*** 22.0*** 3.9** 11.0*** 4.7** 22.5***
Controls: as in baseline specification, excluding interacted variable.
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3.10 Proofs
Proposition 3.1: Let v (.) be a differentiable, increasing and concave function, and c (.) be a
differentiable, increasing and convex function. When interior, a parent’s optimal investment choice
λ∗i solves
v′ (λ∗i )
c′ (λ∗i )
=
1
−ui (H)S (q) . (14)
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The parent invests an amount λ∗i ≡ arg maxλ0 (1− v (λi))S (q)ui (H)−
c (λi) into anti-smoking culturalization. The assumptions on v (.) and c (.) ensure the maximization
problem is concave, and so the solution solves the First Order Condition −v′ (λi)S (q)ui (H) −
c′ (λi) = 0, which can be rewritten as (9).
Proposition 3.2: Performing comparing statics on the optimal investment derived in Proposi-
tion 3.1, we obtain the following predictions:
• Prediction 1: Parents who perceive larger health costs from smoking invest more in anti-
smoking culturalization.
• Prediction 2: We have cultural substitution iff cultural conformity holds, and cultural comple-
mentarity iff cultural distinction holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: By total differentiation of (9), we get
dλ∗i
dH
=
−u′i (H)
(ui (H))
2
1
S (q)
[c′ (λ∗i )]
2
c′′ (λ∗i ) v′ (λ
∗
i )− v′′ (λ∗i ) c′ (λ∗i )
> 0
(Prediction 1). We then always have dλ
∗
−i
dq =
S′(q)
[S(q)]2
1
−ui(H)
[c′(λ∗i )]
2
c′′(λ∗i )v′(λ∗i )−v′′(λ∗i )c′(λ∗i )
> 0 iff S′ (q) > 0,
and the effect of an increase in smoking prevalence on the likelihood a child becomes a smoker can
be expressed as (1− v (λ∗i ))S′ (q) (Prediction 2). 
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Proposition 3.3: In a subgame perfect equilibrium, we have S (0, θ∗ (0)) > 0, which ensures a
heterogeneous distribution of traits in steady state. Moreover, both cultural substitution and cultural
conformity may obtain.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the firm’s objective function can be
written as:
max
θ
Q (q, θ)− κ (θ) ,
where Q (q, θ) ≡ [q (1− a (q, θ)) + (1− q) (1− d (q, θ))]S (q, θ) denotes the proportion of children
who become smokers given a proportion q of adult smokers. whose solution θ∗ (q) solves the FOC:86
[q (1− a (q, θ)) + (1− q) (1− d (q, θ))] ∂S (q, θ)
∂θ
= κ′ (θ)
In order to understand when cultural distinction vs. conformity arise, we need to study the sign of:
dS
dq
∣∣∣
θ∗
= ∂S∂q +
∂S
∂θ
∣∣
θ∗
∂θ∗
∂q , where
∂θ∗
∂q =
[d(q)−a(q)−qa′(q)−(1−q)d′(q)] ∂S(q,θ)
∂θ
+[q(1−a(q))+(1−q)(1−d(q))] ∂2S(q,θ)
∂θ∂q
c′′(θ)−[q(1−a(q))+(1−q)(1−d(q))] ∂2S(q,θ)
∂θ2
.
While the denominator of the expression for ∂θ
∗
∂q is always positive, the numerator can admit both
signs. Hence cultural substitution obtains if and only if the numerator takes a large enough negative
value. 
Proposition 3.4: In a steady state, there always exists a fraction of non-smokers. Moreover,
under cultural complementarity the smoking habit always persists, while under cultural substitution
it persists as long as S (0) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: When q = 0, we have q˙ = (1− d (0))S (0). Under cultural substitution
we have d (0) = 0 and so q˙ > 0 iff S (0) > 0. Under cultural complementarity we have d (0) > 0
and so q˙ > 0 iff S (0) > 0 and d (0) < 1. When q = 1, we have q˙ = (1− a (1))S (1) − 1. Under
cultural substitution we have a (1) > 0 and so q˙ < 0 always. Under cultural complementarity we
have a (1) = 0 and so q˙ < 0 iff S (1) < 1. By Proposition 3.2, we have S′ < 0 under cultural
complementarity, and so S (0) > 0 and S (1) < 1. 
86Our assumptions ensure that the second order condition satisfies
SOC :
[
q
(
1− a1 (q))+ (1− q) (1− d0 (q))] ∂2S (q, θ)
∂θ2
− κ′′ (θ) < 0
and so we have a concave problem whose solution can be recovered through the FOC.
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A1 Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure A2: Land elevation in Virginia
Notes: Counties are divided into four quartiles on land elevation (Q1: light grey, Q2: dark grey, Q3: light red,
Q4: dark red). In the second map, 100% urban counties are marked in a white box on the map.
Figure A3: Plot of the residuals from a reduced-form regression of turnout on the number of ISPs
144
Table A4
Robustness analysis of the effect of broadband on survey data measures
Know. index Pro-abortion Pro-gay Liberal index Online donations
ISPs 0.474*** 0.491** 0.374** 0.457** 0.417
(0.161) (0.229) (0.15) (0.215) (0.308)
Obs. 5,103 11,349 20,201 8,546 2,178
R2 0.323 0.172 0.246 0.276 0.098
TV Internet Cable TV Non-cable TV CBS FOX
ISPs -0.606*** 0.440** -0.657** -0.0913 -0.0754 -0.146
(0.220) (0.215) (0.283) (0.274) (0.135) (0.147)
Obs. 18,969 18,969 9,529 9,529 9,529 9,529
R2 0.081 0.166 0.039 0.074 0.047 0.027
Notes: The analysis is identical to the ones repored in Tables 12-14, but now adding state-time dummies to
the list of controls, as well as county controls. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates
significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
A2 Cable vs ADSL broadband Internet
The history of the Internet can be traced back to Arpnet, a 1960s computer network of the U.S.
Department of Defense. In the early 1970s, the private sector – in particular AT&T – was given
the opportunity to take over this new technology (Sunstein 2007). However, it is only two decades
later that the corporate world received these calls for privatization with enthusiasm. In 1992,
the National Science Foundation started supervising the commercialization of the Internet. From
then on, government funding was slowly withdrawn, until the Internet was fully privatized in 1995
(Greenstein 2004).
In the early days of the commercial Internet age, residential customers could only connect
through low-speed dial-up connections. It would however be wrong to assume this was due to firms’
inability to provide high-speed service. In fact, the three technologies which would later dominate
the broadband market had already been fully developed by the early 1990s (T1-lines, ADSL, CM).87
As it turns out, a complex web of market, technological, regulatory and geographical limitations
87The word ‘Asymmetric’ refers to the fact that downstream (i.e. browsing) speed is higher than upstream (i.e. sending)
speeds (Grubesic and Murray 2004).
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have shaped the broadband map as we know it today.
One reason telephone companies were slow to deploy DSL was their fear of cannibalizing their
lucrative commercial T1-lines business (e.g. Greenstein 2004). The spread of DSL was also ham-
pered by the fact that it could only operate in areas where the distance between key components
of the infrastructure is small enough (household, central office, network backbone).88 In 1999, DSL
could only potentially reach 44% of the U.S. population (Faulhaber 2002). For example, many rural
and high-income suburban areas, as well as a large part of the Southern United States, could not
readily get broadband access through DSL.
Federal regulation – in particular the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96) – also made it
unattractive for incumbent telephone companies (e.g. Verizon, BellSouth) to enter the broadband
market.89 First, TA96 mandated that high-cost customers be served at the same prices as low-
cost customers (Hazlett and Bittlingmayer 2003). Second, TA96 required incumbent firms to lease
DSL facilities to their competitors on an unbundled basis and at a predetermined rate (FCC, 2005,
pp.19-20).90 The direct effect of this regulation was to discourage investment in telecommunications
infrastructure (Kahn et al. 1999; Hazlett and Havenner 2003). It also created an environment where
non-incumbent telephone firms could cheaply provide service on incumbents’ lines (Kahn et al. 1999;
Hazlett and Havenner 2003). In practice, it also made it difficult for customers to assign blame when
broadband service was unsatisfactory (Rosenbush 2001).91
In contrast with ADSL, cable companies’ technology for broadband required a hefty investment
88ADSL only involved a relatively minor hardware cost, through the installation of Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers
(DSLAMs) in central offices (Ferguson 2001).
89In particular, see Section 706 and the Computer III regime of TA96. A number of subsidy programs were also instigated by
the government, again primarily at the federal level (Goolsbee 2002, Wallsten 2005). The only one that has been documented to
be somewhat successful is the Universal Service Fund’s Rural Health program, which was targeted towards networking projects
in schools / libraries in rural / low income areas (Flamm 2005, 2011).
90Rates were set by each individual state through rights-of-way laws (ROWs). These state-level laws determine rates for
building broadband infrastructure on both publicly- and privately-owned land. According to one estimate, the cost of abiding
with ROWs can add up to 20% of the total cost of providing broadband servic. The impact of these rates can be par-
ticularly acute in rural areas, where there often are more poles per mile than households. Securing rights to this infras-
tructure is often a difficult and time-consuming process that discourages private investment. For instance, the application
process is more streamlined in some states (e.g. Connecticut, New York). (e.g. zoning rules, regulation of utility poles). See
http://www.broadband.gov/plan/6-infrastructure/#_edn3
91In 2003, legislators became concerned with the low broadband penetration of telephone companies. This led to an overhaul
of the regulatory framework set by TA96 through a series of reforms. In February 2003, the FCC eliminated the DSL line
sharing rules which forced incumbents to only sell the high-speed proportion of their lines. From there on, competitors would
thus have to pay for the entire local loop or strike a commercial agreement with the carrier to share a loop. In August 2005,
the FCC moved further in this direction by putting broadband DSL services on regulatory parity with cable services (Hazlett
and Caliskan 2008). These changes were positively received by ILECs, which aggressively deployed DSL starting in 2003. By
2008, the change was visible with DSL and CM controlling roughly equal shares of the broadband residential market (Robinson
and Weisman 2008).
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in upgrading infrastructure (see Section 1.3.1). This initially put them at a competitive disadvantage
relative to telephone companies.92 However, TA96 had little direct impact on the operations of cable
operators, whose activities it classified as an “information service.” This indirectly encouraged cable
companies to enter the broadband market, by giving them a regulatory advantage over incumbent
telephone companies. As an added advantage, broadband networks would help cable companies
compete better with satellite-based television systems that were threatening their core television
operations (Fabrikant and Schisel 2001).93 Cable firms responded to these incentives by upgrading
their one-way TV networks for two-way data transmission, spending over $10 billion per year starting
in 1996 (i.e. $200 per home passed).
A3 Pew survey questions
The following questions are used to construct variables on media consumption, liberal values, and
campaign donations:
Media: How do/did you get most of your news about the presidential election campaigns? From
television, from newspapers, from radio or from magazines or from the Internet?
TV follow-up: Did you get most of your news about the election campaigns from network TV
news (ABC, NBC, CBS), from local TV news, or from cable news networks (CNN, Fox News,
MSNBC)?
Pro-choice: Do you think abortion should be ... legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in
most cases, or illegal in all cases?
Pro-gay: Do you ... strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose ... allowing gays and
lesbians to marry legally?
Campaign donations: Thinking about the past 12 months, have you contributed money to a
political candidate or party, or any other political organization or cause?
Online vs. Oﬄine donating: Did you make those contributions on the internet. . . or did you
make those contributions oﬄine, say, in person, by phone or through the mail. . . or have you made
contributions both on the internet and oﬄine?
92As for cable companies, they were not required to provide access to their networks to competitors. This position was latter
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in NCTA v. Brand X Internet Services (2005).
93By using a device known as a statistical multiplexer, an HFC network may carry a variety of services, including analog
TV, digital TV, telephony, and high-speed data (Hazlett and Bittlingmayer 2003, Starks 2013).
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A respondent can volunteer up to two answers to the Media question, and 5 to 8 answers on
the TV follow-up question (depending on the survey). Note that CNBC is mentioned as a possible
answer choice in all but one of the surveys that ask the TV follow-up question. To have a consistent
measure of cable TV consumption, I base it on the first 5 TV channels reported other than CNBC.94
For the pro-choice and pro-gay questions, answers are on a 4-point scale, which I collapse them into
2 categories: legal/illegal (pro-choice), and favor/oppose (pro-gay).
I now report questions used for constructing the political knowledge index, arranged by survey.
Some questions have open-ended answers, in which case I report in parentheses all valid answer
choices. When the survey allows multiple answers, I report in bold the correct answers to the
questions. To facilitate the comparison of surveys, I mention next to each question in which other
survey (if any) this question also appears. The number of these questions varied between 6 and 17
across surveys.
February 2007 (1,420 Respondents)
Now I would like to ask you about some people who have been in the news recently. Not everyone
will have heard of them. If you don’t know who someone is, just tell me and I’ll move on. Can you
tell me who [...] is?
1. Hillary Rodham Clinton (Correct answers: Senator, Bill Clinton’s wife, former First Lady,
Presidential candidate, Democratic leader)
2. Harry Reid (correct answers: Senate Majority Leader, senator, Democratic leader)
3. Nancy Pelosi (correct answers: Speaker of the House of Representatives, congresswoman,
Democratic leader, San Francisco politician) (also in March 2007)
4. Condoleezza Rice (correct answers: Secretary of State, member of Bush’s Cabinet, Bush
advisor) (also in Feb 2008)
5. Barack Obama (correct answers: Senator, presidential candidate, Democratic leader)
6. Arnold Schwarzenegger (correct answers: Governor of California, actor)
7. Robert Gates (correct answers: Secretary of Defense, member of Bush’s Cabinet, Bush
advisor, former CIA official) (also in March 2007; Aug 2007; Dec 2008)
94Only 2.4% of respondents report watching CNBC to access news about political campaigns.
148
8. Lewis “Scooter” Libby (correct answers: vice president’s former top aide, worked for Dick
Cheney, White House aide, accused of divulging name of CIA operative Valerie Plame, on trial)
9. Will you tell me who the Vice-President of the United States is? (correct answers: Dick
Cheney, Richard Cheney)
10. Can you tell me the name of the President of Russia? (March 2007; August 2007) (correct
answer: Vladimir Putin)
11. Can you tell me the name of the current Governor of your state? (All states excluding DC)
(Correct answer depends on state code)
12. Can you tell me the name of the current Mayor of your city? (Only DC) (correct answer:
Adrian Fenty)
13. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives? (also in Feb 2008; Dec 2008) (correct answer: Democrats)
14. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is John Roberts. Can you tell me if he is gen-
erally considered a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative? (Also in Dec 2008) (correct answer:
conservative)
15. Has Hillary Rodham Clinton announced that she is running for president in 2008, or has
she not announced that she is a candidate? (correct answer: Yes, has announced)
16. And now please tell me, what is the name of the former mayor of New York City who is
being mentioned as a possible Republican presidential candidate in 2008? (correct answer: Rudy
Giuliani)
17. Since the start of military action in Iraq, about how many U.S. military personnel have been
killed? To the best of your knowledge, have there been [...] troop deaths? (Also in Feb 2008; Dec
2008) (correct MCQ answer: Around 3,000)
March 2007 (955 respondents)
1. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives?
(also in August 2007; Feb 2008; Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: The Democratic party)
2. Can you tell me who is the President of Russia? Is it. . . (Also in Feb 2007; August 2007)
(correct MCQ answer: Vladimir Putin)
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3. Can you tell me who is the Vice-President of the United States? Is it... (correct MCQ answer:
Dick Cheney)
4. Is Nancy Pelosi. . . (Also in Feb 2007) (correct MCQ answer: The Speaker of the House of
Representatives)
5. Is Robert Gates. . . (Also in Feb 2007; Aug 2007; Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: The U.S.
Secretary of Defense)
6. Followers of the two major branches of Islam are seeking political control in Iraq. One branch
is the Shi’a, whose members are known as Shiites. Can you name the other one? Is it . . . (Also in
March 2007; Feb 2008) (correct MCQ answer: The Sunni)
August 2007 (940 respondents)
1. Which popular online website sponsored a Democratic presidential debate in July with CNN?
Was it... (correct MCQ answer: YouTube)
2. What religion is Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney? Is he ... (correct MCQ
answer: Mormon)
3. Which of the following Democratic presidential candidates is Hispanic? (correct MCQ answer:
Bill Richardson)
4. Followers of the two major branches of Islam are seeking political control in Iraq. One branch
is the Shi’a, whose members are known as Shiites. Can you name the other one? Is it . . . (Also in
March 2007; Feb 2008) (correct MCQ answer: The Sunni)
5. Do you happen to know the name of the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
Is it. . . (also in Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: Nancy Pelosi)
6. Is Robert Gates. . . (Also in Feb 2007; March 2007; Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: The
U.S. Secretary of Defense)
7. Can you tell me who is the President of Russia? Is it. . . (Also in Feb 2007; March 2007)
(correct MCQ answer: Vladimir Putin)
8. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives? (also in March 2007; Feb 2008; Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: Democrats)
9. Since the start of military action in Iraq, about how many U.S. military personnel have been
killed? To the best of your knowledge, have there been [...] troop deaths? (Also in Feb 2008; Dec
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2008) (correct MCQ answer: Around 3,500)
February 2008 (926 respondents)
1. Is Condoleezza Rice. . . (correct MCQ answer: The U.S. Secretary of State)
2. Followers of the two major branches of Islam are seeking political control in Iraq. One branch
is the Shi’a, whose members are known as Shiites. Can you name the other one? Is it . . . (Also in
March 2007; Aug 2007) (correct MCQ answer: The Sunni)
3. Since the start of military action in Iraq, about how many U.S. military personnel have been
killed? To the best of your knowledge, have there been [...] troop deaths? (Also in Aug 2007; Dec
2008) (correct MCQ answer: Around 4,000)
4. Do you happen to know what state U.S. Senator John McCain represents in Congress? Is
it. . . (correct MCQ answer: Arizona)
5. Do you happen to know the name of the current majority leader of the U.S. Senate? Is
it. . . (correct MCQ answer: Harry Reid)
6. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives? (also in March 2007; August 2007; Dec 2008) (correct MCQ answer: Democrats)
7. What is the name of the talk show host who has campaigned for Democratic presidential
candidate Barack Obama? Is it. . . (correct MCQ answer: Oprah Winfrey)
8. Is Hugo Chavez the President of. . . (correct MCQ answer: Venezuela)
9. Can you name the chairperson of the Democratic National Committee? Is it. . . (correct
MCQ answer: Howard Dean)
10. Do you happen to know who is chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board? Is it. . . (correct
MCQ answer: Ben Bernanke)
11. Which of the following recently declared its independence from Serbia? (correct MCQ
answer: Kosovo)
December 2008 (959 respondents)
1. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives?
(also in March 2007; August 2007; Feb 2008) (correct MCQ answer: Democrats)
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2. To what cabinet position has Barack Obama recently nominated Hillary Clinton? Is it. . .
(correct MCQ answer: Secretary of State)
3. Since the start of military action in Iraq, about how many U.S. military personnel have been
killed? To the best of your knowledge, have there been [...] troop deaths? (Also in Aug 2007; Feb
2008) (correct MCQ answer: Around 4,200)
4. Is Nicolas Sarkozy the President of. . . (correct MCQ answer: France)
5. Is Guantanamo Bay . . . (correct MCQ answer: The location of a U.S. naval base)
6. Do you happen to know the name of the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives? Is
it. . . (Also in Dec 2007) (correct MCQ answer: Nancy Pelosi)
7. Is Robert Gates. . . (Also in Feb 2007; March 2007; Aug 2007) (correct MCQ answer: The U.S.
Secretary of Defense)
8. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is John Roberts. Can you tell me if he is generally considered
a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative? (Also in Feb 2007) (correct MCQ answer: Conservative)
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